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Foreword
The U.S. Navy has had a long tradition of operating in East Asian waters. The first
American warship to appear in those waters was the thirty-six-gun frigate USS Congress
in late 1819, which called at Canton while providing protection to American merchant
ships. In 1830, USS Vincennes, the first American warship to circumnavigate the globe,
passed through the China seas and called at Macao. Two years later, in November 1832,
the arrival of the sloop of war USS Peacock marked the beginning of a nearly constant
presence of American warships in the Far East and the early beginnings of an American
naval squadron cruising regularly to protect American shipping and business interests
1
in the region. A dozen years later, in 1844, USS Brandywine brought the American envoy Caleb Cushing to Macao to negotiate the first treaty of peace, amity, and commerce
between China and the United States, signed at the nearby village of Wanghai. Commodore James Biddle returned to China in the ship of the line USS Columbus in January
2
1846 to return America’s formal ratification of that treaty.
Among the officers in Columbus during this voyage was Midshipman Stephen B. Luce,
who thus became the first in the long line of officers and faculty members at the Naval
War College—the institution Luce founded nearly forty years later—to have had some
direct experience of China. From that beginning, the College’s body of expertise in and
understanding of China, and of American experience in China, has grown exponentially. For over a century and a quarter, Naval War College students and faculty have had an
interest in the subject. In the first part of the twentieth century, officers associated with
the Naval War College served in—and even commanded—the Asiatic Fleet, the Yangtze
Patrol, the Sino-American Cooperative Organization, and U.S. Naval Group China. Evidence of some of the College’s past interests and connections in these areas may still be
3
found and used in its archives and in its historical document and museum collections.
Between 1950 and 1979, during the Cold War, much of the U.S. Navy’s relationship
with China centered around the Taiwan Patrol Force, whose duties included patrolling the international waters off mainland China’s Fujian Province, which separates
the mainland from the island of Taiwan. Based on Taiwan at Keelung in the north and
at Kaohsiung in the south, U.S. Seventh Fleet sailors who were assigned to those patrol
duties—mainly in destroyers and destroyer escorts—found on the island the only direct
relationship available to them to interact with China and Chinese culture. Mainland
China remained distant and obscure, sensed only by the distinctive smell of the land
that many a sailor commented on in approaching the Chinese coast, even before it
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became distantly visible from the deck. American sailors in those years could get closer
only during the occasional port visit to the British crown colony of Hong Kong, where
they could take an opportunity to go to the far side of Hong Kong’s New Territories to
peer across the closed border into the People’s Republic of China and to try to imagine
what the mainland was really like.
In this volume, Bruce Elleman, research professor in the Maritime History Department
at the Naval War College, applies his expertise as one of the College’s specialists in
Chinese language and history to provide a pioneering history of American naval experience in the Taiwan Patrol. His focus reflects the Naval War College’s interests in the policy, strategy, and operational levels and is designed to provide a historical complement
to other work on current issues being done at the Naval War College—in the China
Maritime Studies Institute and in other departments.

john b. hattendorf, d.phil.
Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History
Chairman, Maritime History Department

Notes
1. Robert Erwin Johnson, Far China Station: The
U.S. Navy in Asian Waters, 1800–1898 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1979), pp.
3–4, 26.
2. David. F. Long, Sailor-Diplomat: A Biography of Commodore James Biddle, 1783–1848

(Boston: Northeastern Univ. Press, 1983), pp.
185–207.
3. See Bruce A. Elleman, comp., Naval Historical
Collection Documents Relating to East Asia
(Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 2011).
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Introduction
Following its defeat on the mainland in 1949, the Nationalist government retreated to
Taiwan. Although the Nationalist navy was comparatively large, to many it seemed
almost certain that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) would attack and take Taiwan,
perhaps as early as summer 1950. The Korean War began on 25 June 1950, however, and
the possibility of a PRC invasion of Taiwan was countered when on 27 June President
Harry S. Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet to “neutralize” the Taiwan Strait. Mao
Zedong at first postponed and eventually canceled altogether his planned invasion of
Taiwan.
The U.S. Navy’s Taiwan Patrol Force operation lasted from summer 1950 until at least
1979, arguably even sporadically after that date. Lasting twenty-nine years, the Taiwan
Patrol Force was one of the longest naval operations in modern history. It was also one
of the most successful, since—as the most obvious symbol of American power—it ensured that friction over the Taiwan Strait did not escalate into a full-blown war. In fact,
the Taiwan Patrol Force did its job so well that virtually nothing has been written about
1
it. U.S. Navy ships acted both as a buffer between the two antagonists and as a trip wire
in case of aggression. The force fulfilled the latter function twice in the 1950s—during
the first (1954–55) and second (1958) Taiwan Strait crises—and a third time in the next
decade (1962), at which point additional U.S. Navy vessels were called in to assist.
Even after the Taiwan Patrol Force was terminated in 1979 it continued in spirit, as
shown by a fourth Taiwan Strait crisis. During the PRC missile tests of 1995–96 two
U.S. aircraft carriers were deployed to the area, and in 2001, during the ten days of
negotiations over the EP-3 incident of 1 April, a carrier was almost sent. As recently as
2009, when maritime tensions between an American survey ship and Chinese vessels
threatened to escalate into a larger conflict, a U.S. Navy destroyer was sent to the scene.
Thus, the patrolling functions that began in 1950 have continued largely unchanged to
this day, as U.S. Navy vessels act to influence China’s military, economic, and political
relations with its maritime neighbors.

2  the
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As the following study will show, on 4 August 1950, Adm. Arthur Dewey Struble formally established Task Group (TG) 77.3 as the “Formosa Patrol.” Later, on 24 August
1950, the surface component of the “Formosa Strait Force” was restructured as Task
2
Force (TF) 72, and later still as TG 72.1. On 7 March 1953, the “Formosa Patrol Force”
fell under the operational control of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet. The
Formosa Patrol Force was renamed again during late 1955 as the “Taiwan Patrol Surface
Force,” during 1958 as the “United States Taiwan Straits Patrol,” and on 1 November
3
1959 as the “Taiwan Patrol Force.” For the sake of simplicity, this work will use the final
official name, Taiwan Patrol Force, throughout.

Notes
1. One exception is a report by Edward J.
Marolda, “Invasion Patrol: The Seventh Fleet
in Chinese Waters,” in A New Equation:
Chinese Intervention into the Korean War. Proceedings of the Colloquium on Contemporary
History (Washington: Naval Historical Center,
1991), available separately at www.history
.navy.mil/. Some materials appeared earlier
in Edward J. Marolda, “The U.S. Navy and the
Chinese Civil War, 1945–1952” (PhD diss.,
George Washington Univ., 1990).
2. UK Consulate, Tamsui, to Foreign Office, 18
February 1958, FO 371/133522, The National
Archives–United Kingdom [hereafter TNA/
UK].

3. In 1953, the Royal Navy referred to its force
protecting British shipping with the PRC as
the “Formosa Straits Patrol,” which could be
easily confused with “Formosa Strait Force”
or “Formosa Patrol Force.” By November
1955, “Formosa” had been switched to
“Taiwan,” to refer to the Republic of China
on Taiwan. “MDA Programs for the National
Government of the Republic of China,” Strategic Plans Division, box 266, Naval History
and Heritage Command [hereafter NHHC]
Archives, Washington, D.C.

CHAPTER ONE

The Two Chinas, the Offshore Islands, and
the Korean War
This Newport Paper examines the U.S. Navy’s most robust buffer patrol in its twocenturies-plus history, as well as one of the longest naval operations of any type in world
history—the Taiwan Patrol Force. From 1950 through 1979, and arguably until the
mid-1990s and sporadically even to the present day, the U.S. Navy (USN) has sent ships
to patrol the Taiwan Strait, separating the People’s Republic of China from the Republic
of China (ROC), on Taiwan. Given the Cold War context from 1950 to 1979, a conflict
in the Taiwan Strait might easily have spread to include the Soviet Union (the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, or USSR) and the United States.
The most important goal of this operation was to ensure that neither side attacked
across the Taiwan Strait. While it is often assumed that the U.S. government’s focus was
on the PRC alone, in fact there was equally valid reason for concern that the Nationalists might invade across the Taiwan Strait and so spark a new world war; this operation,
therefore, was—at least initially—also intended to operate as a neutral buffer separating
the two sides.
Another important function of the Taiwan Patrol Force beginning in late 1950 was
to help enforce a trade embargo on strategic goods against the PRC. On 23 December
1950, the secretary of commerce announced that “effective immediately no vessel or
aircraft registered under the laws of the United States shall enter Chinese Communist
Port or any other place under control of Chinese Communists.” In effect, “No cargoes
1
[would] be transported to such ports.” This American embargo was aimed exclusively
at the PRC. In line with this decision, USN vessels often cooperated with ships from
the Nationalist navy in enforcing the strategic embargo. Finally, when not engaged in
patrol duties, USN personnel participated in the training of the Nationalist navy and in
morale-building exercises on Taiwan.
To set the stage for this study, this chapter will examine the creation of the “two Chinas”
conflict, the strategic importance of the Taiwan Strait and the offshore islands, the
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beginning of the Korean War, and the contribution of these factors to the establishment
of the Taiwan Patrol Force.
The Two Chinas
The division of China into a Taiwan-based Republic of China and the mainland-based
People’s Republic of China was a direct outcome of World War II and the Chinese civil
war. During World War II, the U.S. government encouraged the Nationalists and Communists to form a coalition government. In December 1945, President Harry S. Truman
even appointed Gen. George C. Marshall as a special envoy to China to negotiate a
cease-fire between them. Truman also urged the peaceful reunification of China under
the auspices of a joint Political Consultative Conference.
After Japan’s surrender, the internationally recognized government of China was under
the control of the Nationalists, led by Chiang Kai-shek. By late 1945 the United States
had equipped thirty-nine Nationalist army divisions, and in August 1946 the U.S.
government sold the Nationalists approximately $900 million worth of war surplus for a
mere $175 million. This war surplus included ships, trucks, airplanes, and communications equipment. The Nationalists had both an air force and a navy, while the Communists had neither.
Communist forces were concentrated in North China and in Manchuria. When Soviet
troops began to withdraw in mid-March 1946, the Communists quickly filled the
political vacuum. By May 1946, they controlled the northern two-thirds of Manchuria.
Meanwhile, growing economic problems in the Nationalist-controlled areas began to
erode Chiang’s political legitimacy. Inflation quickly spiraled out of control: between
September 1945 and February 1947 wholesale prices in Shanghai alone increased
thirtyfold. Inflation destroyed many small businesses and hindered China’s economic
recovery.
By early 1947, the Marshall mission had ended in failure. On 29 January 1947, the United
States notified Chiang Kai-shek’s government in Nanjing that it would stop its efforts
to halt the civil war. As Nationalist rule imploded, the Communists orchestrated an
increasingly effective campaign to rally popular support. For example, on 4 May 1946
they announced a land redistribution program, and during the summer of 1947 they held
a National Land Conference to draft a land-reform law confiscating landlord property.
Over time, massive defections weakened the Nationalist army. By contrast, the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) experienced enormous growth, from an estimated half-million
in mid-1945 to 1.3 million in mid-1946, two million in mid-1947, 2.8 million by mid2
1948, and four million by early 1949. During September 1947 the Communists were
able to shift to the offensive, pushing the retreating Nationalist troops into a small
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triangle bounded by the cities of Jinzhou, Changchun, and Mukden. By summer 1948,
the PLA had cleared most Nationalist troops from Manchuria.
Following their victory in the northeast, Communist forces spread southward into China
proper. During the Huaihai campaign—the largest battle of the civil war, involving well
over a million combatants—Communist forces moved into Jiangsu and Anhui Provinces. On 15 December 1948, after sixty-three days of fighting, the Communists took
3
Xuzhou, opening the road south to the Yangtze River and Nanjing. However, although
they had lost northern China, the Nationalists retained their traditional power base in
the south. Many foreign commentators assumed that China would now be divided into
a North and South, with the Yangtze River serving as the new boundary. On 25 February 1949, however, the Nationalist flagship, Chongqing, mutinied, becoming another
symbol of the waning of the Nationalist mandate to rule. By the end of April 1949, much
4
of the rest of the Nationalist fleet guarding the Yangtze River had also defected. On 20
April 1949, Communist forces crossed the Yangtze River, overrunning Nanjing three
days later. Thereafter, the PLA quickly consolidated control over all of mainland China,
taking Shanghai and Wuhan in May, Xi’an and Changsha in August, Guangzhou in
October, and the Nationalist wartime capital of Chongqing in November 1949.
The PLA’s rapid advance forced the remaining Nationalist units to retreat to Taiwan
if they were to continue their anti-Communist struggle. Relocating his government to
Taipei, Chiang Kai-shek claimed that the ROC remained the legitimate government of
all of China. Meanwhile, in late September 1949, Mao Zedong assembled a new Political
Consultative Conference, which elected him chairman of the central government and
once again made Beijing the capital. On 1 October 1949, Mao officially proclaimed the
creation of the People’s Republic of China.
If the Nationalists had been forced to retreat, they had not been defeated. Instead,
Chiang shifted from a land-based offensive to a naval one, supporting a blockade strategy against the PRC. The Nationalist navy was comparatively large, but it was mainly
for the defense of Taiwan. To conduct their blockade against the PRC, the Nationalists
worked with a number of autonomous guerrilla movements on offshore islands not far
from China’s coast. Later, the USN provided military assistance—especially aircraft—
that made air patrols of the blockade possible. The Nationalist blockade was to last from
1949 through 1958.
The Nationalist Blockade Strategy
The Nationalists still had a large navy. As World War II was ending, Congress had
passed Public Law 512, providing for the transfer of as many as 271 surplus naval ves5
sels to China. The United States eventually donated to China approximately 130 ships
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of various classes, including six 1,300-ton destroyer escorts (DEs), plus a number of
6
tank landing ships (LSTs) and medium landing ships (LSMs). Britain also gave China
nine small ships, as well as a light cruiser, HMS Aurora, which was renamed Chongqing
7
and made the flagship. Finally, China was supposed to acquire a quarter of the thirty
8
destroyers and sixty-seven escort vessels confiscated from Japan at the end of the war.
According to one estimate, an additional forty demilitarized Japanese warships were
9
given to China. Taken together, the Nationalists controlled a total of 824 naval vessels
of various types, including a handful of modern ships, like Chongqing, and numerous
small patrol boats.
By 1947 the Nationalist navy had grown to almost forty thousand men. By 31 October
1948 it had reached 40,859; this figure included 2,452 line officers, 5,221 staff corps officers, and 389 marine officers, for a total of 8,062 officers. The remainder were enlisted
10
personnel (19,252 regular navy, 3,554 marines) and 9,991 noncombatants. Chinese students who trained in England during the war brought back a corvette, Petunia, and later
groups returned with a destroyer escort and eight torpedo boats. In November 1946
six hundred Chinese went to England, where two hundred were trained to bring back
two submarines and the rest to man Chongqing. As for the United States, a thousand
Chinese arrived in Miami during the spring of 1945 to undergo training. Later, fortynine officers were enrolled at Swarthmore College, Philadelphia, to study naval science;
of these twenty-five were subsequently sent to the U.S. Naval Academy, at Annapolis,
Maryland, and twenty-four went to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, in Cam11
bridge, for advanced training.
In 1947, with their navy both equipped and manned, the Nationalists attempted to halt
Soviet shipments to the Communists in Manchuria via Port Arthur (now Lüshun) and
12
Dalian, by imposing a naval blockade. Because Manchuria’s ports were already closed
to most foreign shippers, the blockade of Lüshun and Dalian elicited no complaint from
the foreign powers. Beginning on 18 June 1949, however, the Nationalists announced
that any Chinese port not under their control would be closed to trade as of midnight
on 25 June. The majority of China’s territorial waters would be denied to foreign vessels,
from a point just north of the Min River to the mouth of the Liao River. In practical
terms, this included China’s coastline from just north of Taiwan all the way to a point
roughly opposite Beijing. Major Chinese ports to be closed included Qinhuangdao,
Tianjin, Shanghai, Ningbo, and Wenzhou.
A July 1949 report by the Intelligence Division of the Admiralty in the United
Kingdom was optimistic about the prospects that the blockade could be sustained.
Comparing the Communists’ thirty warships to the Nationalists’ thirty-two and
analyzing capacities for refueling and rearmament, this study concluded that retaining the Miao Islands in the north allowed the Nationalists to blockade most of the
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ports on the Bo Hai Gulf and provided them with 50 percent coverage of Qingdao.13
However, other British reports warned that while the Nationalists could effectively
14
close the major ports, they could not control junk traffic. But Commander in Chief,
Far Eastern Squadron Afloat reported on 18 July 1949 that the blockade was indeed
effective and was delaying the Communists and, he argued, might help bring about
a political solution to China’s problems. Therefore, he was “strongly averse in present
circumstances to breaking the blockade which [the] Nationalists appear to be operating
15
very reasonably.”
There was American backing for the Nationalist blockade. For example, during July
1949 the American minister to China, John Leighton Stuart, supported it as contributing to an American “let them stew in their own juices” strategy toward a communistrun China. This was based on his belief that the Marxist-Leninist ideology was
inappropriate for China. The best possible policy, he believed, would be to allow the
Soviets to “demonstrate, if they could, that they were able to give a communist China
the assistance she will need.” Once Beijing realized that Moscow could not finance
China’s development alone, “China would have to turn to us again and we might then be
16
able to come back on terms which would suit us.”
As the Nationalists retreated from their northern bases, the focus of the naval blockade
necessarily moved farther and farther southward. For example, a British map (map 1)
shows that the blockade cut access to the Yangtze River during 1949–50. For the U.S.
government, the fear of a complete Communist victory eventually outweighed other
considerations. On 24 December 1949, Washington warned American shipowners that
their operating licenses could be revoked if they attempted to run the Shanghai block17
ade. According to one American assessment, the Nationalist navy’s approximately
eighty oceangoing vessels could maintain a reasonably effective blockade of China’s
18
major ports from Shanghai southward to Fujian Province.
In addition to enforcing the blockade, during 1949 the Nationalist navy helped transport Chiang Kai-shek’s government-in-exile to Taiwan. The Nationalist retreat to
Taiwan was a major maritime undertaking, during which the Nationalist navy and
other ships pressed into service carried approximately two million civilians and soldiers
19
to Taiwan. More importantly, the Nationalist navy helped fortify and protect a large
number of offshore islands, which were to be the first barriers in the defense of Taiwan
from an expected PRC invasion. These military and political developments left the two
competing Chinas facing each other across the Taiwan Strait, which made this roughly
eighty-mile-wide stretch of water strategically important.
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MAP 1

Nationalist Blockade of the Yangtze River
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The Strategic Importance of the Taiwan Strait
The division of China was not as striking as the fact that the dividing line was the
Taiwan Strait rather than the Yangtze River. China’s split in itself largely fit within
the framework of the Cold War, in which Germany was divided into a communist
East and democratic West, and both Korea and Vietnam were split into a communist
North and a nominally democratic South. Whereas, however, the halves of these other
divided states were somewhat similar in territory and population, the Nationalist island
stronghold was dwarfed by the enormous territory and population of the PRC. To many
outside observers it seemed that the PRC could overwhelm Taiwan at will. But the maritime security provided by the strait could not be overlooked. In fact, the much smaller
English Channel, only twenty-one miles wide at its narrowest point, had proved itself to
be a solid wall against Napoleon, imperial Germany, and the Nazis. The Taiwan Strait
proved to be an equally important barrier protecting the Nationalists from attack.
There were historical reasons why the Nationalists retreated to Taiwan. During the
seventeenth century, Zheng Chenggong (Cheng Ch’eng-kung), known in the West as
Koxinga, had made Taiwan his base when attempting to defeat invading Manchus from
North China. Koxinga used a number of small offshore islands—including Quemoy
(Jinmen) Island—as stepping-stones to cross the Taiwan Strait. In 1661, he based his
forces on the Pescadores (Penghu Islands) to conduct naval operations to expel the
20
Dutch colonizers from Taiwan. In 1683, Qing forces also used various offshore islands
to defeat Ming loyalists and retake Taiwan.
The Taiwan Strait is inherently an important strategic zone, since it lies along the
primary north–south sea-lane in East Asia. Japanese, Korean, and northern and central
Chinese produce and luxury goods must transit this strait to reach Southeast Asia, just
as goods and raw materials flowing from south to north must travel through it. The
Taiwan Strait has long been a choke point, therefore, and a country that dominates both
sides can close it to international shipping. Such an action would force commercial vessels to take the longer and more exposed route to the east of Taiwan.
Taiwan itself has been fought over many times, including in the seventeenth century
by Ming loyalists, the Dutch, and Qing forces; in the eighteenth century, when the
Manchus put down a local rebellion; and during the Sino-French War of the 1880s.
As a result of the first Sino-Japanese War, China ceded Taiwan to Japan in perpetuity in
the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki. Japan maintained control over Taiwan for fifty years,
until its surrender in 1945, at which point—according to the terms of the Cairo and
Potsdam agreements—Taiwan was returned to China, specifically to the internationally
recognized government of Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist Party (Kuomintang).
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Chiang and his advisers officially moved the government to Taiwan on 8 December
21
1949, the eighth anniversary (Tokyo time) of Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.
In a larger context, Taiwan is part of a chain of islands running from the Aleutians
through Hokkaido to the Japanese main islands, and then on through Okinawa
and Taiwan to the Philippines. These islands would play an important role in any
north–south invasion. Communist control over Taiwan could put both Japan and the
Philippines at risk. U.S. Navy planners during World War II, for example, were keenly
aware that Japan’s successful invasion of the Philippines had been launched from
Taiwan. If Taiwan fell to the Chinese Communists, it was now assumed, the PLA could
use it as a base from which to invade other islands in the chain, as well as to interfere
with international shipping.
22

For these reasons, keeping Taiwan out of communist hands was vital. In 1955, Australian prime minister Robert Menzies put it succinctly: “From the point of view of
Australia and, indeed, Malaya, it would be fatal to have an enemy installed in the island
chain so that by a process of island hopping Indonesia might be reached and Malaya and
23
Australia to that extent exposed to serious damage either in the rear or on the flank.” A
year later, Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu of Japan told the U.S. ambassador that
“Japan would consider the fall of Taiwan to the Communists as a threat to its interests
24
and therefore supports the U.S. policy of preventing such an eventuality.” Finally, in
1958 British foreign secretary Selwyn Lloyd reaffirmed that the United Kingdom and
United States shared the views that there was a “Communist menace in the Far East”
and that the “containing line” had to be drawn so as to include Japan, South Korea,
25
Okinawa, Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Vietnam, and Malaya.
Due mainly to the strategic location of Taiwan, therefore, it was not in the interest of
the United States or its allies to see it fall to communism. It was this geographic divide
between continental China and Taiwan that precipitated the “two Chinas” problem and
that has allowed this political division to continue down to the present time. But it was
the Nationalist domination of a large number of offshore islands, some of them right
off the PRC’s coast, not Taiwan proper, that would be at the heart of two Taiwan Strait
crises during the 1950s and one in the early 1960s.
PRC Plans to Use Offshore Islands to Invade Taiwan
Before the U.S. government provided ships and aircraft to help enforce it, the Nationalist blockade was mainly a paper one, as far as naval forces were concerned. Although
Taiwan’s share of the former Chinese navy was large, these ships were needed to defend
the island’s security rather than to support the blockade.
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During the summer and fall of 1949, Nationalist forces fiercely defended the offshore
islands, from which the blockade was at the outset primarily sustained. The Nationalists
initially kept one regiment of marines on the Miao Islands, north of Shandong Peninsula, to blockade the Bo Hai Gulf and the northern ports, while they fortified Zhoushan
and the Saddle Islands to blockade the Yangtze River. Meanwhile, the Dachens, Matsu
(Mazu), Jinmen, and the Penghu Islands near Taiwan; Lema and Wan Shan Islands near
Guangzhou; and Hainan Island, fifteen miles off China’s southern coast, blockaded
about two-thirds of China’s coastline. But it was Nationalist-allied guerrillas on many
of these islands who, at first, largely enforced the naval blockade against the PRC. These
groups earned their living by preying on passing ships. As the U.S. Navy’s Office of
Naval Intelligence (ONI) reported, the Nationalists did not try very hard to suppress
these activities, since it would “undoubtedly lose them the guerrilla support in the
26
coastal islands.”
The tide began to change during the fall of 1949. In October, a Communist attack on the
Nationalist-held base on Jinmen Island was bitterly opposed by Nationalist troops, and
the PLA failed to take the island. However, the southern city of Guangzhou soon fell to
Communist forces, and the loss of a number of strategic islands in the north effectively
narrowed the blockade to central and southern China. As early as October 1949, Adm.
Sa Zhengbing, a former commander of the Chinese navy during the Qing dynasty,
27
concluded that the blockade would probably not last long. Communist forces, in spite
of naval and air inferiority, overwhelmed the Nationalist base on Hainan Island during
February–May 1950, the Zhoushan Archipelago in May 1950, and Tatan Island that July.
By the summer of 1950, therefore, the Nationalists had lost their crucial island bases in
the Bo Hai Gulf, off the mouth of the Yangtze River, and on Hainan Island. These losses
cut the blockade area by over half. Traditionally, offshore islands in the strait had acted
as forward bases to support invasions of Taiwan. Thus, continued Nationalist control of
them was considered critical to deterring the Communists from launching an invasion.
By spring 1950, the Communist forces seemed to be preparing to invade. The PLA
began to concentrate thousands of junks in the port cities along the Taiwan Strait, ap28
parently in preparation for a massive amphibious invasion. According to one USN estimate, the Communists could assemble seven thousand ships and two hundred aircraft
29
to transport two hundred thousand troops across the strait. This development made
continued Nationalist control over a number of strategic offshore islands even more
important. After a 1954 visit to Taiwan, a former commander of the Seventh Fleet, Adm.
Charles M. Cooke, Jr., drew a map highlighting Taiwan’s “critical sea areas” (map 2).
The key to the PLA’s success in Hainan had been a fleet of small boats crossing
the Qiongzhou Strait, mainly at night. PRC forces, once ashore, overwhelmed the
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Nationalist air and surface units and the relatively small island garrisons. As one USN
report concluded, “The tremendous losses in men and boats sustained by the Communists attested to their stubborn determination to remove this threat to their security and
30
their economy.” The PLA was successful in taking Hainan Island in large part because
it was only fifteen miles from the Chinese mainland; its tactics there would be of little
31
use against Taiwan, six times farther out. In fact, an invasion of Taiwan would require
a major naval effort on the PRC’s part, including the gathering of hundreds, perhaps
thousands, of ships and the training of tens of thousands of troops.
To foil such an attempt, as well as to sustain the blockade, the Nationalists especially depended on large island bases of Jinmen and Mazu, right off the coast of Fujian
Province, and the Penghu Islands, halfway between the mainland and Taiwan (map 3).
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MAP 3

Nationalist-Controlled Offshore Islands

The Nationalists’ naval
dominance in the Taiwan Strait gave them
the capability to carry
out an offensive policy,
including capturing cargoes destined for Chinese ports, mounting
raids against the mainland, and procuring
intelligence. According
to one ONI report, the
Nationalist interception
of Communist armed
junks led to “numerous
32
junk battles.”

There were over twentyfive offshore islands in
all, however, and control
of them was to remain
extremely contentious
throughout the 1950s.
On 30 July 1953, a USN
report, “Security of
the Offshore Islands
Presently Held by the
Nationa list Government of the Republic of
China,” divided twenty
of these into three categories. In Category I were four offshore islands off Fuzhou/Foochow (including Mazu/
Matsu) and four islands off Xiamen/Amoy (including Jinmen/Quemoy), which could
be used to counter a Communist invasion of Taiwan. Retaining these eight islands was
militarily desirable. Category II included two islands in the Dachen group that were not
crucial for defending Taiwan and the Penghu/Pescadores Islands. Category III included
33
ten smaller offshore islands, which defended the ten islands in Categories I and II.
As for the other offshore islands under Nationalist domination, USN planners considered them simply not worth the effort necessary to defend them against a determined
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PLA attack. Still, as one USN report was quick to point out, none of the offshore
islands could be called essential to the defense of Taiwan and the Penghus in the sense
of being “absolutely necessary” militarily. Their importance to the Nationalists was
mainly psychological, aside from the usefulness in “pre-invasion operations, commando
raiding, intelligence gathering, maritime resistance development, sabotage, escape and
34
evasion.”
After the PLA retook the northernmost and southernmost offshore islands held by
the Nationalists during spring 1950, it stopped. To take the remaining Nationalistcontrolled islands would have required more advanced naval technology, such as amphibious landing craft, that was beyond the capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army
Navy (PLAN) in the early 1950s. The Communist army and naval forces would have to
retake remaining offshore islands with massive force or bypass them entirely and strike
directly for Taiwan. Preparations for such an invasion would be hard to hide, especially
from air reconnaissance.
Given this historical background and Taiwan’s strategic importance to both sides in
the evolving Cold War, China’s southeastern coastline was especially tense during the
early 1950s. Both Communist and Nationalist forces fiercely defended their positions on
numerous offshore islands, in the hopes of changing the strategic balance. As Secretary
of State John Foster Dulles pointed out, “for the United States, the offshore islands were
of no intrinsic importance except in the context of an attack on Formosa,” but they
35
could be used as “stepping stones for such an attack.” Losing additional islands to the
Communists might also undermine Nationalist morale, plus open up the Truman and
Eisenhower administrations to accusations of retreating before aggression. It was for
these reasons that the U.S. government felt obliged to support Chiang Kai-shek’s efforts
to retain a number of offshore islands.
Conclusions
By spring 1950 the two Chinas faced each other across the Taiwan Strait. To many it
appeared that the PLA was planning to replicate its success in Hainan by organizing a
mass attack against Taiwan. Due to the Truman administration’s disillusionment with
Chiang Kai-shek and his exiled Nationalist government, it seemed highly unlikely that
the United States would risk a wider war with the USSR by intervening openly on the
side of Taiwan. Meanwhile, Great Britain’s official recognition of the PRC government
on 6 January 1950 precluded British intervention. If a spring or summer cross-strait attack had gone forward then, Taiwan might have become part of the PRC during 1950.
Any possibility of a PRC attack against Taiwan was effectively countered, however, by
the beginning of the Korean War on 25 June 1950. Two days later, on the 27th, President
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Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet to neutralize the Taiwan Strait. The very next day,
the destroyer USS Brush (DD 745) pulled into Keelung, Taiwan. This was the first U.S.
Navy ship to visit Taiwan since Truman had adopted a “hands-off” policy in Janu36
ary 1950. One day later the aircraft carrier USS Valley Forge (CV 45), escorted by two
destroyer divisions, two submarines, and several logistic ships, steamed past Taiwan in a
37
show of force.
The United Nations (UN) immediately condemned North Korea’s attack, and UN forces
began to flow into South Korea. Suddenly, Taiwan’s continued existence became both
militarily and politically important, since the war in Korea could spread at any time to
Taiwan. Should the PRC succeed in taking Taiwan, it could cut off a major sea line of
communication (SLOC) bringing UN troops and supplies to the Korean theater. To help
prevent this, a USN contingent was sent to Taiwan, initially operated out of Keelung,
later also from Kaohsiung. Due to the U.S. military intervention and the presence of
USN ships, airplanes, and submarines to neutralize the Taiwan Strait, the planned PRC
invasion of Taiwan was postponed to the following year; eventually it was canceled
altogether. The Taiwan Patrol Force would be instrumental in keeping the peace in East
38
Asia during the next three decades of the Cold War.
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CHAPTER TWO

The U.S. Seventh Fleet and the Creation of the
Taiwan Patrol Force
The Taiwan Patrol Force was created immediately on the outbreak of the Korean War,
when it was thought the PRC might use the chaos and confusion surrounding that conflict to stage an invasion of Taiwan. Whereas in late 1949 and early 1950 Washington’s
backing for the Nationalists on Taiwan had waned, the Nationalists now immediately
gained active U.S. Navy support. In particular, the arrival of the Seventh Fleet in the
Taiwan Strait increased Taiwan’s security from attack. By contrast, the PRC condemned
the “neutralization” policy as aggressive and demanded the immediate withdrawal of
1
the Seventh Fleet.
From 1950 through the 1960s and thereafter until the late 1970s, the USN maintained
a nearly continuous patrol of ships and aircraft between the PRC and the Nationalists
on Taiwan. This buffer was mainly intended to prevent the Communists from invading across the Taiwan Strait; from 1950 to 1953, however, the Taiwan Patrol Force also
prevented the Nationalists from launching an invasion of mainland China, which might
have triggered a new world war. But this did not mean the Nationalist blockade of the
PRC ended in 1950. In fact, the U.S. Navy actively assisted the Nationalists in trying
to prevent the movement of specific goods into the PRC. This policy was largely in
line with a U.S.-sponsored strategic-goods embargo, adopted in January 1950, which
restricted a large number of goods, divided into Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) I, II, and III categories. This embargo lasted in varying
degrees of intensity for twenty-one years, through June 1971.
The number of USN ships in the Taiwan Strait at any one time could be quite small.
While published maps illustrating the patrol’s activities usually placed a silhouette of
an aircraft carrier in the strait, in reality the Taiwan Patrol Force normally comprised
one or two smaller USN ships—such as, beginning in late July 1950, the light cruiser
USS Juneau (CL 119) and in early August 1950 the destroyer Maddox (DD 731). But the
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Taiwan Patrol Force was a trip wire; if these ships were attacked, they could call in larger
2
and more powerful forces, including aircraft carriers, to assist.
Establishing the Taiwan Patrol Force
The U.S. government’s policy on Taiwan was extremely controversial during early 1950.
Some American groups had written off Chiang Kai-shek’s regime completely, while
others, including the U.S. Navy, advocated continued support. In January Truman
stated that the United States did not intend to use its armed forces to interfere in the
3
present situation between the PRC and Taiwan. His statement implied that the nation
would not intervene if the PRC invaded the island. All of this changed when North
Korea attacked South Korea on 25 June 1950. Even before this crucial event, however,
Gen. Douglas MacArthur, then Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers occupying Japan, had sent Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson a memorandum arguing that
Taiwan should not be allowed to fall to the PRC but should instead be fully protected
4
by the United States. The Truman administration backed MacArthur’s proposal, but
the manner in which it did so quickly became a point of friction between MacArthur
and Truman.
On 27 June Truman accepted MacArthur’s reasoning and ordered the Seventh Fleet to
prevent Communist attacks on Taiwan, as well as to stop all Nationalist attacks on the
5
Chinese mainland. For this reason, the move was referred to as a “neutralization” plan.
According to the terms of a USN operation order dated October 1950, units of the U.S.
Seventh Fleet had been stationed in the Taiwan Strait since June to “prevent an invasion
of Formosa Straits area to prevent an invasion of Formosa.” But during this early period
the United States was determined to stop any Nationalist invasion of the mainland, so
the U.S. Navy was also responsible for making sure that Taiwan and the Penghu Islands
6
were not used by the Nationalists as a base for operations against the PRC.
When he ordered the neutralization of the Taiwan Strait, Truman explained that the
occupation of Taiwan by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of
the western Pacific, as well as to U.S. forces performing their lawful functions in that
area. He declared, “The determination of the future status of Formosa must await the
restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by
7
the United Nations.” In other words, it was the American intention to put the political
8
problem of Taiwan “on ice.”
MacArthur decided it was imperative to visit Taiwan in person to assess the risk of a
PRC invasion. He was accompanied by Vice Adm. Arthur Dewey Struble, commander
of the Seventh Fleet, as well as Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Far East. Two days of
meetings with Chiang Kai-shek began on 31 July 1950. During MacArthur’s visit to
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Taiwan, the world press speculated on supposed secret agreements being reached
between the U.S. government and Chiang Kai-shek. Fearful that the newspaper
reports were true, on 4 August Truman wrote to MacArthur to remind him that “no
one other than the President as Commander-in-Chief has the authority to order or
authorize preventive action against concentrations on the mainland. The most vital
national interest requires that no action of ours precipitate general war or give excuse
to others to do so.” MacArthur’s reassuring reply on 7 August 1950 explained that he
had only directed sweeps (map 4) of the Taiwan Strait by the Seventh Fleet, reconnaissance flights over coastal China, and familiarization flights to locate possible refuel9
ing airstrips on Taiwan.
MAP 4

Typical Air Reconnaissance Mission over the
Taiwan Strait

Notwithstanding, a visit was
rapidly arranged by Averell
Harriman, special assistant
to the president, to see
MacArthur in Japan. On
his return Harriman too
reassured Truman that
MacArthur had not overstepped his authority in
his trip to Taiwan. However, the Communist nations
were quick to pick up on
this supposed rift between
MacArthur and Truman and
to accuse the United States
of wanting to occupy Taiwan
militarily. During August
1950, the PRC even demanded
that the UN Security Council
order the withdrawal of all
American armed forces from
Taiwan. The PRC foreign
minister, Zhou Enlai, announced a new policy to
“liberate from the tentacles of
the United States aggressors
Taiwan and all other territo10
ries belonging to China.”
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MacArthur, though having pledged his loyalty to Truman, added fuel to this propaganda
fire by releasing an advance copy of his planned speech to the Fifty-First National Encampment of the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) in Chicago. In it MacArthur referred
to Taiwan as part of the island chain that, reaching from the Aleutians to the Marianas,
provided a protective shield from attack from the Asian mainland; conversely, in the
hands of a hostile power Taiwan could act as an unsinkable aircraft carrier, sending
forth aircraft, as well as ships and submarines, to interdict the major sea-lanes in the
western Pacific. MacArthur’s speech concluded, “Submarine blockade by the enemy
11
with all its destructive ramifications would thereby become a virtual certainty.”
When Truman became aware of this VFW speech, he ordered its withdrawal.
MacArthur protested that these remarks were purely his personal opinions but did as
ordered. Nonetheless, unauthorized excerpts were released by Reuters on 28 August,
and a full copy found its way into the pages of the U.S. News & World Report on 1
September 1950. Andrei Vyshinsky, the Soviet ambassador to the United Nations, used
it to accuse the United States of fortifying Taiwan militarily: “None other than General
MacArthur recently informed, with cynical candor, the whole world about the decision
of the ruling circles of the United States of America at all costs to turn Taiwan into an
12
American base in the Far East.”
It was in this highly charged political climate that the first full-time USN patrol ships
arrived on the scene. Clearly, the Taiwan Patrol Force’s origins were neither secret nor
unnoticed by the world at large. It is important to reemphasize, however, that at this
point it was the U.S. Navy’s job to neutralize the threat from both sides of the Taiwan
Strait, so as to ensure that neither side could attack the other and thereby ignite a new
global war. Early organizational problems reflected the largely ad hoc nature of the
Taiwan Patrol Force’s creation.
Organization of the Taiwan Patrol Force
The Taiwan Patrol Force, as noted, was a direct response to the outbreak of the Korean
War. Almost immediately, USN vessels under the command of Commander, Seventh
Fleet began to visit Taiwan, both individually and in groups. The patrol as first constituted included Fleet Air Wing 1 (supported by Fleet Air Wing 6 based in Japan) and
an average of four destroyers in or near the Taiwan Strait at any one time. With these
limited assets the Taiwan Patrol Force covered the area from the East China Sea through
13
the strait down to the South China Sea. Beginning on 28 July 1950, Juneau was assigned to the force, and two submarines, USS Catfish (SS 339) and USS Pickerel (SS 524),
sortied from Yokosuka, Japan, and began ten-day patrols of the strait.
On 4 August 1950, the Seventh Fleet established Task Group 77.3 as the “Formosa
Patrol.” But on 24 August, it was renamed the “Formosa Strait Force” and redesignated
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Task Force 72; later the surface component became TG 72.1. Rear Adm. Thomas Binford
was the first commander of this force, using the heavy cruiser USS Saint Paul (CA 73)
as his flagship. The USN ships initially worked out of Keelung, on the northern tip of
Taiwan, later also out of Kaohsiung, on the southwestern corner of the island. A normal
patrol might last five to six days, followed by an evening in port. Gunnery departments
would stand “port and starboard” watches (i.e., half their personnel on watch), manning
one five-inch gun and one twin three-inch gun at all times. Often, due to concern about
being attacked, a ship’s operations department would stand twenty-four-hour duty, with
14
officers bedding down on cots at their duty stations.
The experiences of USS Fletcher (DD 445) on the Taiwan Patrol Force were fairly representative. Beginning in late April 1952, Fletcher arrived at its patrol area in the Taiwan
Strait, meeting O’Bannon (DD 450) at sea and transferring supplies. After steaming
independently, it pulled alongside USS Carpenter (DDE 825) to transfer light freight and
mail; two days later, Carpenter came alongside to transfer mail to Fletcher. After another
day of patrolling, the ship departed the area and proceeded to Kaohsiung, where it
15
moored alongside USS Platte (AO 24) to refuel.
Generally a tender or repair ship was anchored in the harbor, and the destroyers would
“tie up” alongside. Otherwise the ships moored at a buoy. Depending on weather conditions, the latter could, on occasion, be dangerous:
The weather, together with the harbor layouts, often made mooring or getting underway an adventure. In Keelung we had to do a Mediterranean moor, with a line from the stern to a buoy, and port
and starboard anchors set on either side of the bow. We once had an American diesel submarine,
which had been unsuccessful in finding an alongside berth in Keelung, request permission to tie
up alongside us. I gave permission, without taking into account that a submarine’s widest point is
several feet below water, making it impossible to get large fenders, which float, to serve as buffers
between the two ships. The weather was causing both ships to bounce around, and I spent the night
in dread of the submarine poking a hole in our side. We survived, but at the cost of some dents in
our side. Destroyers and Destroyer Escorts are called “Tincans” for good reason. The entrance to
Kaohsiung harbor is tight, and we had to moor to buoys or alongside USN destroyers already tied up
to the buoys. With the frequent strong beam winds that prevailed it often took all of our available
power to handle a safe entrance or exit.16

Readiness was paramount, since tension in the Taiwan Strait could run high. The hours
were long, and crews had to work at peak efficiency. During actual patrols, the crew
would take any chance opportunity for food and sleep:
I remember going to the mess deck for supper and being served eggs and getting extremely mad at
the cooks for serving such an evening meal. I was informed by them that it was 0700 [7 am] and that
as a result breakfast was being served and not supper. In [the] Combat Information Center (CIC) we
lived by Greenwich time and seldom went out on deck. Actual time would became meaningless for
Operations Department during the patrol.17

If four destroyers were assigned, the ships could rotate five days on patrol and five days
in port. However, equipment failures or other duties often made this impossible. For
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example, during one patrol USS Cowell (DD 547) became nonoperational due to an
engine problem and USS Cushing (DD 797) was away from the Taiwan Strait for some
other essential duty, while USS Pritchett (DD 561), now the flagship, was away most of
the time visiting Subic Bay or Hong Kong. Out of the four destroyers, therefore, only
“Denny J”—USS Dennis J. Buckley (DDR 808)—was available
to plow up and down the Strait. . . . [I]t carried the most junior ship Captain of all the Seventh Fleet
destroyers, which meant it was logical for Denny J to bear the brunt of the patrol work. It did not
mean we did not grumble. When Denny J would then return to Kaohsiung at the end of a patrol we
would top off our fuel tanks and take on stores. If we were lucky one of the [duty] sections would get
liberty until 2300 [11 pm]. Then it was back to sea.18

During most of the 1950s, the Taiwan Patrol Force usually consisted of four destroyers,
with an embarked division commander, in the rank of captain, assigned as Commander,
Task Group (CTG) 72.1 (figure 1). During the 1960s, as the Vietnam War heated up, the
destroyers, with their five-inch guns, were required there for shore bombardment duties.
As a result, the smaller, 1,700-ton, 150-man radar picket destroyer escorts (DERs) were
assigned to the patrol, mainly because the DER’s three-inch guns were poorly suited for
19
shore bombardment. The command structure was retained unchanged, however.
FIGURE 1

Taiwan Patrol Force Organizational Matrix (read right to left)
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By the mid-to-late 1960s, the destroyers would often split their time between Taiwan
and Vietnam, breaking midway in Hong Kong for rest and recreation (R&R). Off
Vietnam they participated in the Market Time interdiction program, which was
intended to stop troops and supplies from flowing by sea from North to South Vietnam.
During 1966–67, U.S. and South Vietnamese patrol boats inspected or boarded over
20
seven hundred thousand vessels. USN destroyers would patrol the strait for five days, a
week, or as long as ten days, at which point they would return to Keelung or Kaohsiung
for supplies and then go out again for another patrol. During slack periods, two DERs
rather than four destroyers would be assigned. The usual operating pattern for two ships
was one at sea for a week, while the other was on call in either Kaohsiung or Keelung;
turnovers were normally conducted at sea.
As these descriptions suggest, duty in the Taiwan Patrol Force was normally fairly dull.
Few Navy personnel remember these tours as particularly easy or enjoyable. But it was
considered an essential operation, keeping tensions in the Taiwan Strait from escalating
into war. These broad responsibilities were made more difficult by China’s maritime
geography and by extreme weather conditions.
Geography and Weather in the Taiwan Strait
The difficult geography, harsh weather, and unpredictable sea states that the ships of the
Taiwan Patrol Force had to deal with on a normal patrol produced operating conditions
that were usually poor and all too often horrific. Darkness, rough weather, and heavy
seas could make a patrol a true nightmare. As one veteran of the patrol later humorously
21
recalled, “The Straits were rougher than a [corn] cob.”
China’s southeastern coastline is conducive to maritime activities. Steep mountains run
mainly southeastward to the sea before disappearing under the water to form a myriad
of bays and coves. Off China’s shores are thousands of islands. Zhejiang Province alone
has over 1,800 islands off its coast, while Fujian Province has almost six hundred and
Guangdong Province approximately 550, making between the three provinces a total of
three thousand islands—three-quarters of all the islands along China’s entire coastline.
Many are too small to support settlement, while others, such as the sixty-square-mile
Jinmen, had over sixty thousand people living there in the 1950s (today closer to eightyfive thousand), while the Mazu Islands have about ten thousand inhabitants.
The weather off Taiwan can only be described as variable and extreme. The water
north of Taiwan is usually quite cold, chilled by the icy Oyashio Current from the
Sea of Okhotsk. In contrast, the waters in the South China Sea tend to be balmy. Two
ocean currents from the islands of Micronesia split after hitting the Philippines into
two branches, one that enters the South China Sea and the other that flows northward
and splits into the Tsushima and Kuroshio Currents. Seasonal monsoons tend to move
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northeast in winter and to the southwest in summer; the northeast monsoon is more
powerful. Winds are at their strongest during the five months from October through
February. The weaker and more variable southwest monsoon usually lasts from June
to August.
Superimposed on the monsoon are frequent storms. Ocean hurricanes are known as
“typhoons” in Asia. These usually originate in the Pacific Ocean east of the Philippines,
drive westward and northwestward over Luzon, and hit Taiwan from the southeast.
To be at sea during typhoons can be very dangerous, and fully two-thirds of China’s
typhoon shelters are located along the southeastern coast, along the coast of Taiwan,
or in the Penghu Islands. Typhoons usually occur intermittently from June to October
but are most violent in July and August, when winds can reach 145 miles an hour. The
general seaward tendency of the winds favors outbound voyages from China and so have
traditionally encouraged maritime voyages from the continent to Taiwan. However, the
unexpected arrival of typhoons—known in Japan as “kamikaze winds”—has acted as
a strong deterrent to naval invasions, as shown by the destruction of not one but two
Mongol fleets attacking Japan during the thirteenth century.
Although averaging a hundred miles across, the Taiwan Strait is three times wider in the
south than the north. Storms tend to enter from the south and move northward, becoming more and more constricted as the strait narrows. One USN document referred to the
Taiwan Strait as a “giant venturi,” in which fluid is forced to increase in velocity passing
22
through a constriction. During one storm, a U.S. warship making eight knots ahead
through the water was found actually to be moving at one knot astern with respect to
the sea bottom. The ship was rolling so violently that it took on “green” water—that is,
23
not simply spray—down the after stack.
These conditions made patrolling the Taiwan Strait grueling and at times absolutely
dangerous. The swells were particularly bad at either end of the north–south run, when
the ship needed to turn around and head back in the opposite direction. According to
one account:
The seas were high and fast, and we would need to use full rudder along with driving the screws
hard in opposite directions to make the turn as quickly as possible. When we got stuck in the trough
[parallel to the swells] the rolls the ship took were steep, up to 40 and sometimes 50 degrees at times.
Also, the pitching when heading into the seas was incredible. You could feel the ship pass over a 30
foot swell and then you would need to brace yourself for the crash as the ship buried its nose into the
next wave. 24

Another sailor remembers the ship taking a sixty-degree roll, which threw him
completely out of his bunk and injured his ribs when he hit a night-light across the
25
passageway.
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According to James Barber, captain of USS Hissem (DE 400), during one patrol in late
1968 the weather was particularly memorable:
During the winter the Taiwan Strait can be some very rough water. Several times the weather was
severe enough that we were restricted to little more than survival, making minimum speed both upwind and downwind. The characteristics of the DER engineering plant dictated that our minimum
speed was the idling speed of a diesel, which under normal circumstances gave us about seven knots
through the water. During the rough weather we would actually make something like three knots
going into the wind, and eleven knots going down wind. Thus we were spending about a quarter
of the time on the somewhat more comfortable downwind leg and the rest of the time slamming
into head seas on the upwind leg. The steep seas made reversing course an adventure, since if we
got caught in the trough of the waves we could be in serious trouble. I made it a practice to come to
the bridge for every reversal. We would watch for a temporary slackening, then come about with
full speed and full rudder. When the weather was like this about all we could do was hang on. I had
broken a finger playing touch football during one of our in-port periods, and the doctor had fitted
me with a large and clumsy cast that made it impossible to use that hand to hang on to railings while
moving about the ship. After just a few hours at sea in heavy weather it became evident that my
inability to hang on because of the cast risked life and limb, and I ordered our hospital corpsman
to remove the cast. One mental picture I retain is of a supertanker plowing into the seas with spray
coming over her bridge, but with the ship looking like an island and hardly being moved by the
waves, at the same time we were being beaten up in three dimensions by the same seas. That made
the difference between 200,000 tons and 1,500 tons abundantly clear.26

Because the patrol ships were so small, it was common for sailors to fall overboard and
27
never be seen again. Not only U.S. warships were affected by these conditions; in 1968,
Hissem assisted a damaged Chinese trawler (photo 1).

Photo 1
Crew of Hissem assisting a damaged Chinese fishing boat.

Serving meals during
bad weather could be
especially problematic.
As one former supply
officer recalled, “The
seas were so rough that
on many occasions we
used one bowl and a
spoon with meals[:] . . .
hang on to the table and
bowl with one hand, eat
28
with the other.” The
wardroom table could
be especially hazardous in heavy weather. It
was considered a severe
breach of etiquette to
allow one’s meal to end
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up in someone else’s lap;29 to make sure the bowls did not slide off the smooth table,
30
stewards would place wet hand towels under the bowls.
Due to the treacherous nature of the Taiwan Strait, four rules were eventually published
to assist new vessels assigned to the force:
1. When heading upwind, keep the ship’s head close enough to dead into the seas to keep the ship
level, generally a course within 20 degrees of the seas and wind.
2. Always go slow upwind, making only steerage way if necessary.
3. When heading downwind adjust the ship’s course and speed to keep the seas from coming
aboard the fantail and to keep the roll moderate. Generally for a destroyer, a course within 40°
of dead before the sea and speeds of 15 knots or more are effective.
4. Turn with full rudder and assist with the engines. As much as ahead full on the outboard engine
and back two thirds on the inboard engine may be necessary.

New ships to the patrol were warned that “the speed and destructiveness of these relatively low seas is a surprise to officers accustomed to the long period waves of open, deep
water.” During peacetime, ships were ordered to avoid heavy weather or seek shelter,
since there was no justification for “loss or damage to a ship by heavy weather” if the
31
mission was not urgent.
To this day, U.S. naval personnel who participated in the Taiwan Patrol Force remember
it with no great fondness. If nothing else, everyone who carried out a patrol mission in
the Taiwan Strait agreed, it provided excellent training, since the weather conditions
there were some of the worst in their naval experience. This was particularly the case for
station ships, which were responsible for refueling and resupply at sea.
Refueling, Replenishment, and Making the Rounds
To maximize time on the patrol, much of the refueling and replenishment occurred not
in port but under way. Often this took place in high seas or poor weather conditions. Because of the unpredictable weather, replenishment at sea was particularly difficult, and
it was not unusual for men to be injured by heavy seas crashing through the well deck of
32
the replenishment ship. Station ships would remain at sea in one particular area, often
for a week to ten days at a time. They conducted numerous activities, including delivering mail, replacement parts, and passengers.
Duty for supply ships assigned to the Taiwan Patrol Force usually lasted about a month.
After arriving in late April 1951, for example, Manatee (AO 58) returned to Sasebo on 20
May 1951. After resupply, it spent most of June on “line duty,” going up to combat areas
for fueling at sea. On 23 June 1952, Manatee arrived in Kaohsiung, Taiwan, to relieve
another oiler as station vessel. Its duties included underway fueling of various ships
in the Taiwan Patrol Force as well as providing movies, food, provisions, mail cargo,
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aviation gasoline, and passengers for the patrol vessels. A typical at-sea refueling might
33
transfer over sixty thousand gallons.
Durng 1957, after a week of almost continuous fueling at sea under extremely adverse
conditions, Manatee returned to port to replenish, only to leave two days later for another
rendezvous, this time to transfer supplies to twelve destroyers, two carriers, and a
cruiser. The weather conditions this time were even worse; fifteen-foot waves made station keeping almost impossible. Bad weather followed the ship. Returning to Sasebo on
28 June, it ran into dense fog. Throughout all of these ups and downs the ship continued
operations in a normal way. Navy Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) officials reported that the commanding officer of Manatee was even told by local Taiwanese
officials that his had been the best liked and most efficient station ship they had ever
34
worked with.
Once in port the crew might be granted R&R, but ship’s officers often had to work just
as hard as they did at sea. For example, it was necessary to open, organize, and read the
voluminous piles of orders and instructions received from Washington. Often the USN
documents seemed overly detailed and even, on occasion, contradictory:
My friend the CommOff [communications officer] paid a visit to wherever keylists and related
communications pubs were issued. Then he opened the canvas bag and examined its contents.
It primarily contained OpPlans [operations plans] and OpOrders [operations orders], and other
directives. They were from CinCPacFlt [Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet], ComSeventhFlt [Commander, Seventh Fleet], Commander Formosa Strait Patrol, and the destroyer squadron commander to which the ship would be attached while there. And none of them were up to date. Most were
accompanied by changes and corrections. He locked up the coding materials for a later time, and
carried all the contents of the canvas bag to the wardroom, the only place with a large table at which
to work. And, on the way, he informed the Ops Officer [operations officer]. Then he sat down at the
wardroom table and began making the many changes to the OpPlans, OpOrders, etc.
The Ops boss notified the CO [commanding officer] and XO [executive officer] and, about an hour
later, when the CommOff had completed the corrections and page checks to a number of the documents (he said he did them in descending order of command, i.e., starting with CinCPacFlt), Ops,
the XO and the CO sat down and began reading and trying to absorb their new orders. This went on
all afternoon. The CommOff was exhausted by all the work. The 3 seniors were not only tired of all
the reading, but also annoyed and frustrated to find that not all of the directives were in consonance
with each other. It was getting very hard to know what was expected of them in the many operational situations they might encounter. And the ship was about to take part in a very sensitive Patrol.35

One reason there were so many instructions was that so many different USN vessels
were assigned to the patrol. After about two years, most of the West Coast destroyers
had served their time on the Taiwan Patrol Force, so it was decided to introduce more
East Coast ships. Unlike their normal deployments, where they were assigned as part
of a squadron, individual East Coast ships could be detailed to the Taiwan Patrol Force.
A destroyer heading to Taiwan would sail from, generally, Newport or Norfolk, cruise
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down the East Coast, transit through the Panama Canal, and then set out across
the Pacific.
During the Korean War, many USN ships based in the Atlantic were sent to East Asia
with little or no warning. USS Keppler (DD 765) was in Destroyer Escort Division 61,
with Fred T. Berry (DD 858), McCaffery (DD 860), Norris (DD 589), and the light cruiser
USS Worcester (CL 144), Berry being the division leader. As one crew member in Keppler
would recall,
After a bad weekend in Newport, R.I., several of us were transferred from the Harwood [DD 861] to
the Keppler on Monday after the Korean War started. We went to Norfolk where we joined up with
several other ships and left a few days [later] for the Far East. After going through the Suez Canal,
etc., our next shore leave was in Colombo, Ceylon. The local paper printed a picture of two of the
destroyers and an article protesting about us being there en route to Korea. In addition to helping
transport the Marines to Inchon [we] then went to Keelung, Formosa, for a few months. Two of the
Destroyers would go out for about a Week of patrolling the Formosa Strait and then change off with
the other two Destroyers.36

To speed up transits, especially during an emergency, ships crossing the Pacific were
often met off Hawaii by oilers to transfer enough fuel to reach Taiwan. Gearing-class
destroyers, with extra fuel bunkers, could stay at sea longer before they needed to refuel.
Of course, the crew was unhappy to be deprived of Pearl Harbor liberty, but the worry
was that any day the PRC might attack across the Taiwan Strait. So these ships often
never entered port until they pulled into Keelung or Kaohsiung.
As tensions went up and down in East Asia, additional USN ships either deployed to the
Taiwan Strait or were ordered back home. During emergencies, sailors on leave might be
left behind; replenishment vessels would later bring them back to their ships. On 17 June
1957, for example, Regulus (AF 57) transferred eleven men who had been absent on 13
37
June when the oiler Manatee got under way. During the 1950s, the need to maintain a
constant patrol in the Taiwan Strait impacted almost every ship in the U.S. Navy.
Conclusions
Spurred on by war on the Korean Peninsula, the USN’s patrols of the Taiwan Strait were
intended to prevent the Chinese Communists from invading Taiwan. Moreover, as part
of their neutralization function, they also discouraged the Nationalists from mounting a major attack on the Chinese mainland. The goal was to limit the possible spread
of the Korean conflict farther to the south, which might then escalate into a world war
between the United States and the USSR.
A typical patrol in the Taiwan Strait might begin in waters just south of Japan; a ship
would pass the Penghu Islands and then cruise by southern Taiwan. Meanwhile, other
ships were usually patrolling in the opposite direction, heading north. By the mid1950s, rising tensions between the PRC and Taiwan meant that the Taiwan Patrol Force
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operated substantially farther to the north. In 1955, for example, during the first Taiwan
Strait crisis, USS Wiltsie (DD 716) found itself within twelve nautical miles of Shanghai,
right off the mouth of the Yangtze River.
The seas in the Taiwan Strait were rough, and storms were common. As one veteran
recounted, a sailor who arrived in the Taiwan Strait with seasickness was cured by the
38
end of the patrol. Since the primary goal was to deter invasion from either side, the
39
patrols often had the appearance of steaming up and down aimlessly. However, success was measured by what did not happen—no news was good news. To ensure that
a cross-strait conflict did not occur, the Taiwan Patrol Force had to take into account
a number of special strategic problems impacting the Taiwan Strait, including—most
importantly—the possible use of nuclear weapons.
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CHAPTER THREE

Special Strategic Concerns in the Taiwan Strait
To most outside observers, the forces facing each other across the Taiwan Strait during
the early 1950s may have seemed unevenly matched, in favor of the United States and its
allies. However, in warfare between forces of radically different technological capabilities—often referred to as asymmetric warfare—the advantages are not all on one side.
In Korea, for example, low-tech mass armies successfully fought modern armies with
higher-technology weaponry. During the early 1950s, the U.S. Navy was particularly
concerned that its large, seagoing ships might encounter unexpected problems fighting
the less heavily armed but more numerous and highly mobile junk fleets that were at the
disposal of Communist China.
One disparaging term used in the Korean conflict was “primitivism,” applied to
Communist tactics based on mass mobilization. Primitivism also affected the Taiwan
Strait theater. Beginning in early 1951, intelligence reports of Chinese troop and junk
concentrations in mainland ports indicated the possibility of an invasion. In line with
the seasonal monsoons, the best time to invade would be in early spring, when relatively
good weather was the norm. A likely PRC invasion fleet, it was thought, would be a
heterogeneous armada, probably including a few oceangoing vessels, accompanied by
a larger number of river steamers and perhaps a few conventional landing craft, but in
1
addition, “motorized junks and sailing junks will be employed by the thousands.”
To make sure that China could not invade Taiwan, the U.S. Navy began a series of
exercises to oppose hypothetical mass fleets composed not of modern ships but of traditional junks. Other important missions included constant reconnaissance by air and sea
throughout the Taiwan Strait region to make sure that any PLA-organized concentration of junks would be discovered early on. Once the PRC acquired submarines from the
USSR, these too became a focus of concern. Finally, the possible use of atomic weapons
was considered, in particular against an approaching surface and subsurface invasion
force. Numerous sea and air exercises were just one of the USN responses to the special
strategic concerns of the Taiwan Strait.
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Preparing for a PRC Invasion
During early 1950, U.S. naval intelligence warned of advanced preparations by the
Chinese Communists for an amphibious attack across the Taiwan Strait, appropriately
labeled Operation Taiwan. Walter McConaughy, the U.S. consul general at Shanghai,
even reported that the liberation of Taiwan was being trumpeted publicly by Beijing as
the nation’s paramount mission, one on which the PRC was staking its reputation and
all the resources of the new regime. By late spring 1950 it was reported that approximately five thousand vessels—including freighters, motorized junks, sampans, and
refloated ships that had been sunk in the Yangtze River during World War II—had been
gathered and that thirty thousand fishermen and other sailors had been drafted to man
2
the ships during their crossings.
Due to the Korean War and the creation of the Taiwan Patrol Force, the cross-strait
invasion never took place. In the meantime, the USN battle plan for Taiwan put a priority on attacking enemy aircraft, submarines, and steamships first, and leaving junks
3
for last. Since traditional wooden junks present small targets, they would be hard to
hit; having watertight compartments, they would be difficult to sink, even when holed
below the waterline. Their destruction might prove excessively costly in ammunition
expenditure. However, because of their flammable sails, junks would burn easily. One
proposed plan to oppose a large number of junks would be to give the Nationalists na4
palm, which their older propeller-driven planes could drop on attacking junk fleets.
By mid-February 1951, rumors of a new invasion buildup began to be reported. In
response, Admiral Struble visited Taiwan to prepare an improved and expanded defense
plan. Late in the month, Commander, Naval Forces, Far East (ComNavFE) studied the
situation and inaugurated a series of experimental exercises to determine the optimum
choice of weapons against a junk fleet. The comparatively short distance across the
Taiwan Strait appeared to favor the Communist forces:
Planners in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations estimated that a Communist junk flotilla
would be able to transit the strait in one day, at a four or five-knot speed of advance. For this reason
and because of the multitude of targets presented by a large fleet of junks, they believed a sizeable
body of enemy troops might reach the shore of Taiwan without being intercepted. And everyone
agreed that if any significant Communist forces landed on the island, the jig was up. Nationalist
resistance would collapse. Morale was clearly eroded.5

On 24 February 1951, therefore, with the possibility of a spring Taiwan invasion in
mind, Rear Adm. Lyman A. Thackrey was ordered to provide some sample junks at
Yokosuka for practice purposes. Eight sixty-foot Korean junks were salvaged at Inchon
and brought across in USS Tortuga (LSD 26). In addition, a sunken six-hundred-ton
Chinese junk was located. Acquiring this ship involved great difficulties, but in time it
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was refloated, beached at Wolmi Do, and embarked in Colonial (LSD 18) for delivery
to Japan.
During March and April 1951 extensive tests on how to counter a Chinese fleet made up
of numerous junks were conducted under the direction of Rear Adm. Edgar A. Cruise,
commander of the Hunter-Killer (HUK) Task Group. But his report on ordnance selection was not completed until May 1951. By this time the PLA buildup in and around
the Taiwan Strait had already had the effect of focusing USN resources on this region.
In the end, the expected PRC junk fleet did not materialize, and there was no PRC attack against Taiwan. During the next two decades, however, the U.S. Navy continually
checked, primarily by air, to see whether the PRC was once again preparing for a crossstrait invasion.
Air Reconnaissance Missions in the Taiwan Strait
From the very first days of the Taiwan Patrol Force, reconnaissance from the air was
a vital part of the patrol mission. On 29 June 1950, Rear Adm. John M. “Peg-Leg”
Hoskins, acting Commander, Seventh Fleet, sent twenty-nine fighters and attack planes
6
from Valley Forge roaring through the strait to show that the U.S. Navy had arrived.
This was the first sign of a long-term American air reconnaissance mission over the Taiwan Strait. Throughout the duration of the Taiwan Patrol Force, numerous U.S. aircraft
patrolled off the Chinese coast. This proved to be a much-needed addition to the normal
Nationalist reconnaissance flights.
Beginning in late July 1950, patrol aircraft began reconnaissance missions in the
Taiwan Strait. Patrol Squadron 28 (VP-28), known as the “Hawaiian Warriors,” flying
P4Y Privateers from Naha Air Force Base, Okinawa, initiated daily surveillance of the
northern strait and along the China coast. In Korea, this unit developed new techniques
to repel mass attacks, working closely with the U.S. Marine Corps to perfect night flaredropping techniques that proved on the peninsula to be “amazingly effective against the
‘human sea’ tactics employed by huge masses of attacking North Korean and Chinese
7
Communists troops.”
The day after VP-28 started operations, Patrol Squadron 46 (VP-46), with PBM-5
(Mariner patrol bomber) flying boats, began patrolling the strait’s southern sector
8
from a base in the Penghu Islands. VP-46, the “Grey Knights,” deployed twice more to
the region before hostilities in Korea ended in July 1953. The Grey Knights conducted
9
antisubmarine warfare patrols, as well as over-water search and reconnaissance. VP-46
airplanes could be outfitted with a wide variety of ordnance. If they saw a junk formation heading for Taiwan, they were to drop incendiary or hundred-pound bombs from

I:\__WIPfromC032812\_NewportPapers\_NP_38_TawianPatrol_Elleman\InDesign\05NP_38Chapter3.inddMarch15,201211:47AM

34   the

newport papers

between a thousand and 1,500 feet. Against larger ships, however, they were to descend
10
to two hundred feet to conduct masthead-level bombing.
Redeployment of seaplane Patrol Squadron 1 (VP-1), nicknamed “Fleet’s Finest,” from
11
the mid-1950s onward assisted this effort. VP-1 deployed to the western Pacific under
the operational control of Fleet Air Wing 1 (FAW 1), designated TG 70.6. It began combat operations from Naha on 19 August 1950. The squadron’s primary duty was patrol12
ling the sea-lanes of the Taiwan Strait, looking for enemy resupply vessels.
Throughout 1950 and 1951, one seaplane and one land-based squadron carried out nearly round-the-clock patrols from secure sea anchorages and land bases. Flying the patrols
could be hazardous, especially in the poor weather conditions of the area. Pilots were
ordered to remain outside of the PRC’s self-proclaimed twelve-mile territorial limit, but
to obtain more useful photographs the aviators sometimes strayed over Chinese territory. For example, during September 1952, in airspace not far from Shanghai, a pair of
13
PRC MiG-15s fired repeatedly on a Navy patrol plane but failed to shoot it down.
Other reconnaissance planes were not so lucky. On 18 January 1953, a P2V from VP-22
conducting passive electronic support measures (ESM) and electronic countermeasures
(ECM) off Shantou intercepted signals from a PRC radar station near Jinmen Island.
It moved in closer to try to obtain photographs of the antenna. There was often confusion as to exactly where the border was, and the plane appears to have flown too close;
antiaircraft (AA) guns on the island shot it down.
In response to the P2V’s distress call, coastguardsmen at Sangley Point, just southwest
of Manila, in the Philippines, who had search-and-rescue (SAR) responsibility for the

Photo 2
PBMs at the seaplane ramp at Naval Station Sangley Point, Philippines.
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area, launched a search-and-rescue PBM (photo 2). The
pilot, Lt. Cdr. “Big John” Vukic—also known as “John the
Greek” (photo 3), and who had made a large number of
open-sea landings—elected to land alongside the men in
the water to pick them up. He put the plane down successfully and picked up nine of the P2V’s crew of ten, some of
them injured. Unfortunately, on takeoff, when Vukic fired
his jet-assisted takeoff (JATO) rockets to help the plane
gain altitude, a malfunction on one side drove the aircraft
into a pinwheeling crash.
About ten men of the combined crews made it into the
water. Vukic himself, with two enlisted men, was in a raft
that tide and current were pushing toward a Communistheld island. When the men tried to paddle away, they drew
Photo 3
Lt. Cdr. “Big John” Vukic.
small-arms fire from the beach. The two enlisted men
stopped paddling and were taken prisoner, but Vukic jumped out of the raft and started
swimming. As he later explained, “My wife was due in to Sangley Point on the next
14
dependent transport, and I was damned well going to be there to meet her.” Vukic’s
determination is best appreciated when one considers he was about six hundred miles
from Sangley Point.
In the meantime, a destroyer from the Taiwan Patrol Force had been ordered to the
scene. By now it was night, so a second PBM was sent to assist, carrying millioncandlepower parachute flares. The pilot, Cdr. Mitchell A. Perry, later recounted,
Communicating with the Sangley Point Naval Station Rescue Co-ordination Center, we were able
to contact the navy destroyer that arrived on scene. We homed-in on the destroyer and they picked
us up on their air search radar. We were now in a solid stratus overcast on the Chinese coast. The
on-scene destroyer put us in a GCA [ground-controlled approach] type racetrack pattern and it was
now dark. The destroyer was maneuvering in shoal waters along the rocky Chinese coast and was
not too happy with their old British Admiralty charts. The on-scene-commander in the destroyer
asked us to drop two parachute flares at a time, when requested, to light up the area to assist them
in their navigation and to assist in locating the survivors from the two plane crews. The destroyer
crew did a fine job and after several hours was able to locate Lt. Vukic, his chief flight mechanic and
several crew members from the navy P2V.15

As the ship picked up survivors, it began to take fire from the shore. The destroyer ra
dioed in plain language a request to “Commander, Formosa Patrol Force for permission
16
to return fire,” which was immediately granted, also in plain language. Clearly the Chinese were listening; they ceased firing immediately. Three men, including Vukic, were
picked up. Vukic received a Distinguished Flying Cross for his determination not to
be captured. Meanwhile, the American sailors who had floated to shore were marched
through the streets of Shantou as prisoners.
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In hindsight, the P2V may have violated standing orders from the CinCPacFlt that all
patrol aircraft should remain well off China’s coastline. But it was fairly common in
the early 1950s for U.S. aircraft to fly into Chinese airspace. Rumors suggested that
the skipper of the VP squadron had been looking for a way to distinguish himself and
his squadron and so decided to conduct a passive signals-intelligence mission. Passive
ESM signals intelligence (SIGINT) missions were not encouraged in the VP squadrons.
17
Their aircraft carried some intercept gear, but their crews had little training in its use.
Over time, the reconnaissance focus shifted from seaplanes to land-based aviation.
While seaplanes could land on water, which was a plus, they had more corrosion and
rough-water problems than did land-based planes. Having limited funds, and on the
basis of a wide range of considerations, Adm. George Anderson, then head of the
Taiwan Patrol Force, determined in 1955 that it was easier to guarantee effective operations with a squadron of land planes than with seaplanes. Without a huge research-anddevelopment (R&D) investment to improve seaplanes, which clearly was not going to
happen, the U.S. Navy was up against the type’s technological limits. Anderson later re18
called, “It was really, in my mind, the end of the seaplane operations of the U.S. Navy.”
Another U.S. reconnaissance plane was shot down over Chinese territory in 1957. The
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Adm. Arleigh Burke, ordered the Seventh Fleet to begin SAR just off the Chinese coast; with approval from President Dwight D. Eisenhower,
USN ships searched up to the three-mile limit (under international law as it then was),
ignoring China’s twelve-mile claim. Although the pilot and his plane were not found,
Burke kept the ships on station longer than necessary, explaining, “Let’s stay there so
that we rub it in just a little bit. We [will] make sure that they recognize that we’re mad.”
As Burke observed in 1973, “Now, that’s the use of power. Never again did they shoot
19
down one of our planes.”
Passive signals-intelligence collection by aircraft was the wave of the future, but it was
still extremely risky, especially before long-range equipment had been developed and
successfully tested. Over time, special airplanes like the EA-3B Skywarriors and the EA6B Prowlers led to the Lockheed EP-3E Airborne Reconnaissance Integrated Electronic
System (ARIES). These aircraft would do a better job conducting electronic intelligence
from farther out to sea. Before these new airframes were developed, however, signalsintelligence missions were also conducted by specially outfitted USN ships.
Signals-Intelligence Missions by U.S. Navy Vessels
Signals-intelligence missions were conducted regularly by U.S. Navy vessels to guarantee that the PRC could not organize a cross-strait invasion without its being discovered
well in advance. Such missions were more dangerous than patrols for the ships and their
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crews (though they were often considered more exciting), since the ships approached
closer to the coast to test the PRC’s readiness. USN surface ships helped create a whole
new field of electronic surveillance technology.
Most USN vessels on the Taiwan Patrol Force were engaged in fairly simple patrol duty,
steaming up and down the strait. If attacked, they would bring in the rest of the Seventh
Fleet, with its aircraft carriers. However, other USN vessels, outfitted with high-tech
radar and receivers, were specialized for electronic surveillance. Over time, these ships
20
were deployed to the Taiwan Strait to carry out electronic intelligence. Their missions
were to give warning of any PLA troop buildup that might turn into an invasion and
to gather valuable intelligence on the readiness of the PRC military forces. Signalsintelligence vessels did not conduct simple, straight-line patrols in the middle of the Taiwan Strait but had to approach much closer to the PRC so as to pick up stronger signals:
“The route we would steam at sea was an oval pattern that occasionally would take the
ship within three miles or less of the Red China coast. The ship was outfitted in addition
to air and surface search radar with height finding radar, electronic support gear, quali21
fied aircraft controllers.” Not only was this duty potentially hazardous, but it was more
tedious for the crew, who had to monitor the equipment around the clock.
In the late 1950s the number of signals-intelligence missions increased. During the fall
of 1959, for example, Buckley conducted a barrier patrol and an electronic intelligence
(ELINT)–gathering mission. The CIC team searched for radar transmissions from
22
ashore, which when detected were analyzed and plotted for future reference. (Almost
exactly ten years later, Hissem would again conduct the same type of operation.) For best
reception, the ship would run close to shore to pick up radar sites. Because the Navyissued reel-to-reel tape recorder was cumbersome, the crew members sometimes used
their own Hong Kong–bought electronic equipment, including cassette recorders, which
were smaller and easier to operate. Using this makeshift equipment they would produce
tape after tape of radar emissions, which they identified, logged, and analyzed. Their
23
reports were then sent on to Japan for further analysis.
The ships were not just passive receptors, however, and on occasion they actively tested
the PRC’s response times. According to CIC officer Paul Romanski, from time to time
his ship, Hissem, would go to emission control (EMCON) condition Alfa—that is, turn
off all of its transmitting equipment. This meant the ship was no longer electronically
“visible,” except by direct radar illumination. Whenever this happened, the Chinese
24
would send out aircraft to locate the destroyer; the crew could get a feel for the
PRC’s defensive posture and readiness by measuring how long the plane took to arrive overhead. If U.S. vessels strayed too close to Chinese waters, the PRC would issue a
25
“serious warning.”
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Initiating Antisubmarine Warfare Exercises
The potential Communist Chinese submarine threat greatly concerned the U.S. Navy.
When the PRC was founded in 1949, it did not have a well trained surface-ship navy,
much less a submarine force. But on 19 June 1954 the northern fleet of the PLAN, called
26
the North Sea Fleet, created China’s first submarine corps. Between 1953 and 1955 the
USSR transferred to the PLAN a total of thirteen submarines, twelve large submarine
chasers, and over fifty motor torpedo boats. By 1956 the ONI was warning that China’s
growing submarine fleet “undoubtedly constitutes its greatest offensive potential as a
27
Far Eastern naval force.” This made it more difficult for American submarines to operate with the impunity that they had previously enjoyed.
Throughout the mid-1950s Moscow continued to provide crucial assistance to Beijing’s
28
submarine program. By early 1958 the Royal Navy had estimated that there were
29
twenty submarines in the PLAN and that the USSR had 112 of its own in the Pacific.
By 1960 the PRC’s active submarine fleet had grown to twenty-five. China’s submarines
were mainly based at Qingdao and Shanghai, with the exception of a few training vessels far to the north at Lüshun. But Chinese submarines were observed as far south as
Yulin, on Hainan Island, and so were most likely transiting the Taiwan Strait, as well as
30
operating in waters near Taiwan.
From the early 1950s onward, the United States conducted naval exercises in and near
the Taiwan Strait with the intention of sending a clear signal to the PRC that it was
ready to repel any invasion of Taiwan led or supported by submarines. According to
USN battle-plan assumptions, any PRC invasion would be preceded by air and sub31
marine attacks against surface ships. Submarine attacks were particularly deadly, so
plans directed that “unidentified submarines may be attacked and driven off by all
means available in self-defense or when offensive action against our force is indicated.
Continued submergence of any unidentified submarine in position to attack our force is
32
considered to indicate offensive action.”
Since the rules of engagement (ROE) allowed attacks on unidentified submarines,
combined antisubmarine exercises were particularly important. In the event of a real invasion there could be chaos and confusion if American and Nationalist crew members,
particularly pilots and communication personnel, had not had opportunities to famil33
iarize themselves with local conditions. Later, Shark Hunt exercises were adopted to
practice antisubmarine HUK operations.
By the mid-1960s, combined exercises between U.S. and Nationalist ships were being
regularly held, and they continued even after routine patrols were discontinued in 1969.
USS Caliente (AO 53) conducted a training exercise on 22 June 1972, Shark Hunt
II, with ships from Taiwan. Wiltsie followed suit from 22 to 28 July 1973: during early
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summer, the destroyers Wiltsie, Southerland (DD 743), and McKean (DD 784) sailed
to Taiwan, where they participated in Shark Hunt III with Nationalist destroyers.
These U.S.-Taiwan combined exercises continued until the late 1970s. During May 1977,
for example, USS Buchanan (DDG 14) was ordered to proceed to Kaohsiung to partici34
pate in exercise Shark Hunt XXII.
The final exercise of this series, Shark Hunt XXVIII, took place on 6 November 1978.35
This event proved to be one of the final combined U.S.-Taiwan surface and antisubmarine warfare exercises of any kind. With the American decision to recognize the PRC in
1979, they had to be called to a halt. But other important strategic concerns, such as the
possible use of atomic weapons, continued to have an enormous influence on U.S.-ROC
relations. From the early 1950s onward there was almost constant debate in Washington
over whether nuclear weapons could be used in response to a PRC invasion of Taiwan.
The Nuclear Option
During the early 1950s atomic bombs were often thought of as being much like regular
bombs. The use of the A-bomb was considered in Korea and later in Vietnam, during
the Dien Bien Phu crisis. With regard to Taiwan, during July 1950 Truman authorized
the movement of B-29 bombers to Guam. They were capable of carrying atomic bombs,
and their unit in Guam was given control of nonradioactive atomic bomb components,
though the nuclear core was to be provided only during an emergency. This information
36
was leaked to the New York Times so as to give the PRC pause.
It is still unclear whether the U.S. government would have actually used A-bombs to
halt an invasion of Taiwan. In 1950, MacArthur evidently told Averell Harriman during
their talks on 6–8 August that if there were an invasion attempt, Seventh Fleet ships,
fighters from the Philippines and Okinawa, B-29s, and other aircraft could destroy it. It
would be, he stated, a one-sided battle: “Should the Communists be so foolhardy as to
37
make such an attempt, it would be the bloodiest victory in Far East history.” Although
use of the A-bomb may not have been specifically discussed during these meetings, the
fact that MacArthur mentioned B-29s suggests he had that in mind.
Even if MacArthur was not referring to the A-bomb in 1950, its use was certainly
considered later in the decade. On 12 September 1954, during the first Taiwan Strait
crisis, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) recommended consideration of nuclear weapons against China. On 10 March 1955, Secretary of State Dulles stated at a National
Security Council (NSC) meeting that the United States might use nuclear weapons
against China, and on 16 March Eisenhower publicly confirmed that “A-bombs can
be used . . . as you would use a bullet.” About ten days later, on 25 March, the CNO,
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Adm. Robert B. Carney, stated that the president was planning to destroy “Red China’s”
38
military potential, which certainly implied use of the atomic bomb.
If these statements were intended to reach the ears of China’s leaders and influence
their thinking, they succeeded. In February 1955, Mao Zedong warned the Finnish
ambassador to China that “if the Americans atomic-bombed Shanghai or Peking, ‘they’
[meaning the Soviets] would retaliate by wiping out American cities, which would cause
the replacement of the present leaders of the United States.” The Finn checked with
the Soviet ambassador and was assured that “if the Americans bombed the Chinese
mainland, the Soviet Government would give the Chinese all possible support under the
39
Sino-Soviet Agreement.” Certainly, the use of the phrase “all possible support” implied
that the USSR might resort to nuclear weapons.
Due to its close proximity, Japan was particularly concerned about the retaliation that
might result from an American first use of atomic weapons. A 1955 USN memorandum
summarizing a longer report by the U.S. ambassador to Tokyo even warned that while
the Japanese would support American efforts to defend Taiwan and the Penghu Islands,
they would expect hostilities to be localized and nuclear weapons not to be used. If
fighting broke out over the smaller offshore islands, including Jinmen or Mazu, the
Japanese public would be far less supportive. USN involvement in such offshore-island
disputes could jeopardize America’s entire position in Japan, especially if “we were to
40
employ nuclear weapons.”
The implied Soviet threat led the U.S. Navy to hold a special atomic-warfare exercise
from 9 to 18 December 1955. Its purpose was to evaluate the readiness of the Seventh
Fleet to deliver a major atomic offensive. In what was called Exercise Jack Pratt, a
total of twenty destroyers, three cruisers, and four attack aircraft carriers acted as the
enemy force, while the Taiwan Patrol Force was ordered to conduct air and subsurface
41
reconnaissance in the defense of Taiwan’s airfields and military installations.
The exercise plan called for the “enemy” task force to move south from Okinawan
waters toward the Philippines. The training operation order for the “defenders” stated
that the enemy’s air force would be its primary weapon. The number of jet and propeller aircraft was approximated at sixty per carrier. Some of these, it would be assumed,
would be equipped to deliver atomic weapons. It was the goal of the friendly forces to
search and locate the enemy task force. Once the enemy was located, aircraft carriers
under CTF 72 would conduct a series of attacks in order “to simulate destruction of the
enemy forces.” 42
The concept of this atomic-warfare exercise was “realism within reason.” Shortcuts
would be the exception, not the rule, since the goal was to obtain statistical data on the
delivery of “special weapons.” Of particular interest was that the exercise was designed
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to include U.S. allies, and the Nationalist forces would also be conducting routine air
and surface patrols. The one artificiality that was accepted, because there was no way
around it, was that the commander of the Taiwan Patrol Force was embarked on the
ship that controlled the Attack Force (enemy) seaplanes and so necessarily employed
43
many of the same facilities.
As Adm. Harry Felt, then Commander in Chief, Pacific Command (CinCPac), later recounted, by the end of the 1950s these exercises had made many military options available, and “at that time we had plans for use of tactical nuclear weapons.” 44 Many military
officers during this period did not believe that the use of tactical nuclear weapons,
unlike larger A-bombs, would lead to a larger war. On 2 September 1958, Gen. Nathan F.
Twining, chairman of the JCS, explained to Dulles that a seven-to-ten-kiloton airburst
would have a lethal range of three or four miles but that there would be “virtually no fall
out.” If tensions over the Taiwan Strait got out of hand, Twining believed, it might be
necessary to use tactical weapons against the PRC: “The initial attack would be only on
45
five coast airfields (with one bomb being used per airfield).”
During 1958, the U.S. Navy even began to deploy the Mark 101 nuclear depth bomb
(code-named Lulu), with an eleven-kiloton payload, intended to destroy deeply sub46
merged submarines. In January 1958, Vice Adm. Austin K. Doyle, Commander, U.S.
Taiwan Defense Command, reported that Matador missiles had been stationed in Taiwan and were ready for action. Although Doyle refused to say whether atomic weapons
had been stockpiled in Taiwan, it was public knowledge that the Matador missiles were
47
capable of delivering nuclear payloads in the forty-to-fifty-kiloton range.
Many civilian leaders in Washington were not as optimistic as their military counterparts about using atomic bombs as if they were conventional weapons. But as Dulles
told Prime Minister Harold Macmillan of the United Kingdom in September 1958, “It
seems that the Sino-Soviet strategy is designed to put strains upon us at many separate
places and our various commitments to N.A.T.O., in Korea, to individual allies, are
spreading our forces too thin for comfort—certainly unless atomic weapons are to be
used.” 48 Nonetheless, due to fears that first use of atomic weapons could lead to reprisals,
Admiral Felt was eventually directed to draw up a plan envisioning use of conventional
49
weapons only.
Without a doubt, the U.S. nuclear policy had a direct impact on Taiwan as well. During
the mid-1960s, the Nationalists began their own nuclear weapons program. According
to some later declassified reports, the U.S. military stored atomic bombs in Taiwan, and
50
these weapons were not removed until the early 1970s. In 1976, under pressure from
the U.S. government, Taiwan agreed to dismantle its nuclear program. Following the

I:\__WIPfromC032812\_NewportPapers\_NP_38_TawianPatrol_Elleman\InDesign\05NP_38Chapter3.inddMarch15,201211:47AM

42   the

newport papers

1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis, President Lee Teng-hui proposed reactivating Taiwan’s
nuclear program, but he later backed down.
Although the nuclear aspect of American policy toward the Taiwan Strait was kept
highly secret at the time, it was clear from 1950 onward that atomic weapons were available in the region should they be needed to prevent a PRC invasion of Taiwan. Over
time, however, conventional weapons began to replace atomic ones. To what degree
Taiwan was able to make use of American help to build its own nuclear weapons is still
unclear. Certainly, this lack of clarity contributes to the continued importance of keeping tensions in the Taiwan Strait under tight control.
Conclusions
The Taiwan Patrol Force operated in a highly sensitive part of Asia. Special strategic
concerns included possible attacks by the PRC on the surface, in the air, and under water, as well as use of nuclear weapons by China’s Soviet ally and—after Beijing exploded
its own atomic bomb in 1964—by the PRC itself. USN vessels conducting patrols had
always to be aware of the PRC’s intentions. As the early-warning pickets, these USN
ships had to remain in continuous radio contact. Loss of contact could indicate that an
attack was in progress.
The USN crews had to be on constant watch for signs of an impending PRC cross-strait
51
attack. They were the first barrier in the defense of Taiwan. James Barber probably put
it best: “The patrol’s primary purpose was symbolic, to indicate an intention to come to
Taiwan’s aid if it were threatened by mainland China. Two DERs with two three-inch
guns apiece did not constitute much of a military presence, but as a symbol of commit52
ment the Patrol undoubtedly had value.” Or, as another veteran of the patrols, Doug
Hatfield, would wryly recall, “Chinese communists would have to go through us (Lots
53
of Luck!) to invade Taiwan.”
It was fairly certain that the first USN ship to be attacked would be severely damaged,
if not destroyed. As Paul Romanski, who served as CIC officer in Hissem during late
1968 and early 1969, later recounted, the Taiwan Patrol Force’s ROE clearly stated that
the ships could use their weapons only to defend themselves. This meant that the first to
be attacked by Communist forces would necessarily become the proverbial “sacrificial
54
anode.” Once the first USN ship was attacked, others could respond in force. Although
the two sides never engaged each other in actual sea battles, U.S.-PRC tension remained
high for more than two decades. Every sailor on a U.S. ship in those years knew very
well that World War III might erupt from an incident in the Taiwan Strait. This situation was made even more tense by significant policy differences between the United
States and United Kingdom regarding trade with the PRC.
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CHAPTER FOUR

U.S. and British Disputes over
Trade with China
During the early 1950s, the United States and the United Kingdom carried out nearly
continuous discussions on whether a formal naval blockade against the PRC should
be instituted or a more limited strategic embargo was sufficient. The U.S. government
supported a policy of refusing to recognize or trade with the PRC at all, but the British
were obliged to be concerned about the fate of their colony of Hong Kong. At any point,
Beijing could send in troops and take Hong Kong by force. The colony’s vulnerability
led to the British decision to recognize the PRC on 6 January 1950 and to adopt a more
liberal trade policy with it.
As argued persuasively by A. E. Franklin during January 1951, “Hong Kong and its
population of over 2,000,000 Chinese are largely dependent on trade with China,” and
a complete embargo “would inevitably lead to serious discontentment and possibly even
1
to loss of the Colony to China, which clearly would be harmful all round.” Furthermore, Hong Kong’s strategic location could provide the West crucial leverage over the
PRC. It was of great value that Hong Kong should continue without undue economic
dislocation as part of the free world and the West “must therefore insist on the importance of preventing economic distress which would foster popular unrest that might
2
easily precipitate a dangerous state of affairs.”
Washington was not immediately convinced by this reasoning, however, and ordered
the U.S. Navy to conduct a number of studies on how effective a total American naval
blockade of the PRC might be. Completed during 1951, these studies tended to confirm Hong Kong’s crucial strategic role and warned that any blockade of the PRC that
did not close Hong Kong’s trade with the mainland was bound to fail. So as to avoid
undermining Anglo-American relations, it was eventually decided to rely more on the
U.S. embargo of strategic goods, with help from the Nationalist navy to enforce it, to put
economic pressure on China.
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The British Decision to Recognize the PRC
In sharp contrast to the gradual support of the United States for the Nationalist blockade, the British government saw the continuation of trade between Hong Kong and the
PRC as leaving the door open for China to move closer to the West. Unlike the United
States, which had no empire to protect, Britain had to be concerned with the safety of
its colonies in India (before 1947), Singapore, and Malaya. Hong Kong’s geographic
position, just a stone’s throw from the PRC, made diplomatic talks between the UK
and China particularly important. As a result, Britain broke with the United States and
recognized the PRC.
Hong Kong was vulnerable to any fluctuations in trade. Its population thrived on international commerce with the mainland, and approximately 45 percent of all of Hong
Kong’s own exports went to China. A complete embargo would devastate these commercial enterprises. During the first eleven months of 1950, for example, Hong Kong’s
exports to China equaled 460 million Hong Kong dollars; another 235 million went
to Macao, where much was reexported to China. According to Hong Kong’s governor, without this trade the “thriving, trading, financial and insurance entrepot of the
3
Colony” would become “an economic desert.”
Another factor to keep in mind was Hong Kong’s strategic maritime location. Should it
fall to the Communists, Hong Kong would provide the PRC a first-class naval base with
valuable repair facilities, as well as one of the best airports in South China. If Russian
forces were stationed there, it could quickly become a threat to the U.S. bases in the
Philippines. Finally, Hong Kong’s fall would have huge propaganda value and would as4
sist the spread of communism into Southeast Asia. One British memo even warned that
if Hong Kong fell into China’s hands it “would be a useful base for operations against
5
Formosa.”
There was always a chance, however, that China would reject monolithic communism.
As long as it could expect to obtain certain supplies from the West, Beijing would not
6
be completely dependent on the USSR and its East European satellites. Britain’s longrange goal vis-à-vis Hong Kong accordingly was to maintain a commercial and cultural
7
foothold so as to keep Western influence alive in the PRC. Where the American policy
might throw China into Russia’s arms, British recognition strengthened Mao’s leverage
8
in his negotiations with Joseph Stalin. The British warned that the West’s policy should
9
not solidify against it the seven hundred million Russians and Chinese. At some point,
they hoped, Britain’s more friendly policy toward China might even pay the dividend of
10
“driving a wedge” between the PRC and the USSR.
The U.S. government, in turn, was forced to turn a blind eye to Hong Kong’s commercial relations with China, since the danger of losing Hong Kong was greater than any

I:\__WIP from C 032812\_Newport Papers\_NP_38_Tawian Patrol_Elleman\InDesign\06 NP_38 Chapter4.indd March 15, 2012 11:55 AM

high seas buffer   47

possible trade benefits to the PRC. Meanwhile, U.S. policy toward the PRC was moving
closer to the Nationalists. Since the summer of 1949 and intensifying through early
1950, the United States adopted a policy of sealing the Communists into their continen11
tal territory through trade embargo. During 1950, Dulles, the future secretary of state,
began to argue that the best defense against Sino-Soviet military cooperation “lies in
exploiting potential jealousies, rivalries, and disaffection within the present area of the
Soviet Communist control so as to divert them from external adventures.” Eisenhower
later acknowledged that “trade might be a very useful tool” to “weaken the Sino-Soviet
12
alliance.”
In sharp contrast to British recognition of the PRC, therefore, the U.S. government
continued to recognize the exiled Nationalist officials on Taiwan. Beginning in January
1950, the United States imposed a strategic embargo on shipping certain goods to the
PRC, but Washington did not want to become involved in a cross-strait war. Nonetheless, with the outbreak of the Korean War, and in particular after the PRC’s military
intervention in November 1950, the U.S. government for a short time considered instituting a naval blockade of its own.
Debates over Establishing a U.S. Navy Blockade of the PRC
As the Korean War heated up during the fall of 1950 and Chinese forces intervened,
the JCS ordered the U.S. Navy to study the prospects for adopting a full naval blockade
13
of China. The CNO was to estimate both the effects of a naval blockade on China and
the USN force requirements to conduct it. It soon became apparent that a full naval
blockade of China might easily result in increased tension not only with the USSR,
which continued to occupy the ports of Lüshun and Dalian in Manchuria, but also with
America’s staunchest European ally, the United Kingdom, since such a blockade could
be truly effective only if it cut off trade between Hong Kong and the PRC.
On 6 January 1951, the CNO, Adm. Forrest Sherman, submitted to the JCS the final
study, entitled “Estimate of the Effects of a Naval Blockade of China.” It concluded that
an effective naval blockade of China would have to be applied equally to Hong Kong,
the Portuguese island of Macao, and the Soviet-controlled ports of Lüshun and Dalian.
Blockading Manchuria would undoubtedly cause serious repercussions in the USSR, but
otherwise the blockade would absolutely have to include Hong Kong and Macao, which
would negatively impact American relations with Britain and Portugal. It would need to
cut off all petroleum supplies, machinery and machine tools, railway equipment, rubber,
and chemicals. Of course, many of these items could still be imported by land, and it
was assumed that China would continue to receive economic and military assistance
from the USSR, but given the available land routes, “prevention of such imports by sea
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would leave China dependent upon the Soviet Bloc for these materials which are like14
wise in short supply in those countries.”
The U.S. Navy would need to close the ports of Hong Kong and Qingdao, plus Korea
Bay, the Bo Hai Gulf, and the mouth of the Yangtze River. For such a massive operation,
a minimum of thirty-six destroyers or other patrol vessels would need to be allocated
full-time, to be supported by five VP squadrons and from four to six submarines for
occasional patrols as “opportunity, reconnaissance needs and other circumstances
dictate.” An operation of this magnitude would also require huge logistical support,
15
including at least four tenders on station at all times.
In his conclusion, the CNO reiterated that if ports in Manchuria were not included in
the naval blockade, then Hong Kong and Macao would have to be blockaded. He listed
nine possible outcomes. Such a blockade operation would
a. Aid in the restoration of the prestige of the United States in the Far East and throughout the
world.
b. Reduce the threat of amphibious invasion of Formosa, Japan and other Far Eastern areas.
c. Keep Chinese Communist Forces under surveillance and provide early warning of any movement by sea.
d. Permit the strengthening of Japan and Formosa without undue fear of Chinese Communist
attack.
e. Impose an economic strain on the war making potentialities of the Chinese Communists.
f. Overload and reduce the efficiency of the Chinese transportation system and place an additional
strain on Russian transportation.
g. Encourage the Nationalist guerrilla forces now operating in south China and probably cause
them to intensify their efforts while reducing Chinese Communists’ ability to resist them.
h. Force the USSR to supply the major part of the equipment required by the Chinese Communists,
thus interfering with the Russian armament program for her satellites in Europe.
i. Force certain United Nations members to recognize the fact that the United States refuses to
continue the present conflict upon a “business-as-usual” basis.16

The CNO’s nine concluding points were highly positive in nature, but the political reality was that a U.S. blockade would have to be focused either on the Soviet Union or on
the United Kingdom. Any American naval blockade of Hong Kong would immediately
undermine the long-standing Anglo-American alliance that was so important for the
NATO security system in Europe and the UN military effort in Korea. For this very
reason, USN vessels patrolling the Taiwan Strait were warned beginning in December
1950 to interrogate passing vessels discreetly, since too thorough an interrogation might
17
appear to be part of a blockade. One USN study even cautioned that because the PRC
was almost sure to retaliate with force were a full blockade to be adopted, it was essential
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that “before establishing it [naval blockade,] insure that Hong Kong is adequately
18
defended.”
Given the assumption that a full U.S. blockade might lead to a break in diplomatic relations with Britain, on the one hand, or a PRC invasion of Hong Kong, on the other, it
was not a coincidence that the CNO submitted his report to the JCS on 6 January 1951,
the first anniversary of the British recognition of the PRC. Thus, even though the CNO
began his letter by stating that it would not deal with political issues, the glaringly obvious political importance of retaining friendly British relations virtually guaranteed that
the U.S. Navy would never be ordered to institute a naval blockade of China that would
include Hong Kong. Additionally, a strict naval blockade of the USSR’s military bases in
Manchuria might result in Soviet efforts to expand “Chinese Communist capabilities in
19
submarine, air and mine warfare.”
British Discussions of a Full Trade Stoppage with the PRC
While the United States and Britain fought side by side in Korea, the British traded
freely with the PRC, but the Americans did not. During early 1951, largely in response
to China’s armed intervention in the Korean War, but with due consideration for the
Nationalist blockade, the British government considered halting trade with the PRC.
This question was discussed in some detail by W. P. S. Ormand, a Ministry of Transport
official, in a 16 January 1951 report. He concluded that the large ocean-liner companies
would not be too badly hurt by a stoppage, especially considering the drop in port visits
to China in any case due to political friction, but that local tonnage, mainly based in
Hong Kong, would “undoubtedly suffer severely from any stoppage and would have dif20
ficulty in finding alternative employment.”
Further, not only could such a stoppage lead to the permanent loss of land in the PRC
owned by British shipping companies, valued at an estimated eighteen million pounds in
1941 but probably considerably more valuable in 1950, but without sufficient warning—
a minimum of five days but preferably ten—many British ships might be stuck in PRC
ports, thus risking confiscation by China. Ormand estimated that at any one time there
could be as much as 120,000 tons of British-owned shipping in Chinese ports, which re21
inforced the need for notice to British vessels if they were not to fall into Chinese hands.
Another long-term consideration was the future of British trade with China. In 1936,
British shipping had accounted for 36 percent of all ocean entrances and clearances and
an even higher 41 percent of China’s interport clearances, excluding the junk trade. If
British trade with China were cut completely, Ormand concluded, “the abandonment
now of the important overseas and local trades with China and of the local agencies
would be a grave set-back to the eventual recovery of a trade in which British shipping
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has had a preponderant stake—a set-back from which our shipping interests in those
22
trades would be hardly likely to recover.”
Considering its large share in the China market, British shippers felt compelled to
continue to trade. But this meant British ships had to challenge the Nationalist navy’s
aggressive blockade. The Nationalists were using offshore islands to mount attacks
against the mainland ports, Communist-held islands, and convoys escorted by junks
armed with small artillery pieces, mortars, and automatic weapons. Whenever possible,
Nationalist ships would attack, surround, and sink the convoys. The Nationalists also
used various offshore islands as listening posts to collect intelligence and as sanctuaries from which to send agents into China, in preparation for the Nationalists’ hoped-for
return to the mainland.
The economic impact of the Nationalist blockade operation was significant, since, in
combination with the U.S. embargo on strategic goods, it accounted for a high percentage of China’s international trade. Between 1950 and 1952, the Nationalists halted and
searched some ninety ships heading for Communist ports, two-thirds of them Britishflagged ships registered in Hong Kong. The British government was particularly vocal
in protesting the seizure of cargo, arguing that these ships were complying with U.S.
23
limits on strategic goods and so were carrying only nonstrategic cargoes.
As noted, a number of pro-Nationalist guerrilla groups occupying Nationalist-claimed
islands helped enforce the economic aspects of the blockade. After May 1950 the only
remaining full-time Nationalist blockade base was on Jinmen Island, but the other
Nationalist offshore islands, such as Yushan Island, the Dachen Islands, and the socalled Dog Islands, were all under the control of guerrilla forces. The degree to which
the Nationalists interacted with and controlled their guerrilla allies was intentionally
left unclear. For example, in the Dachen Islands naval interdiction was carried out only
by the guerrillas, allowing the Nationalists to avoid any blame for their actions. When
the guerrillas’ actions were potentially embarrassing Taiwan denounced them, but as
the ONI assessed, “even though the Nationalists have the capability, they probably do
not wish to suppress the guerrilla activities because it would undoubtedly lose them the
24
guerrilla support in the coastal islands.”
To motivate the guerrillas, the Nationalists decided early on that the crew of each blockading vessel would share in the prize money earned from capturing blockade-running
25
ships. Not surprisingly, many of the guerrillas were more intent on lining their pockets
than carrying out an effective naval blockade. In one case, a guerrilla junk raiding a
26
Panamanian ship, Taluei, reportedly sank under the weight of the confiscated loot.
For this reason, it was essential that the Nationalist blockade be backed up by a U.S.-led
embargo of strategic goods.
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U.S.-Led Strategic Embargo of the PRC
A full American naval blockade of the PRC was politically infeasible, due to the possible
retaliation of the USSR, on the one hand, and to Hong Kong’s sensitive strategic position, on the other. Beginning in December 1950, the U.S. government instead began to
impose a complete embargo on strategic goods to the PRC. This policy fell under the
COCOM trade-control regime, which had been adopted in January 1950. Although the
strategic embargo was a less effective option than a full naval blockade, Washington
worked closely with the Nationalists to help enforce it.
The COCOM group was composed of the United States, all of the NATO countries
(minus Iceland), plus Australia and Japan. To convince other countries to conform to its
proscriptions against China, Congress adopted the Mutual Defense Assistance Control
Act of 1951. Commonly called the Battle Act, after its sponsor, Congressman Laurie
C. Battle, this legislation would terminate economic and military aid to countries that
27
refused to cooperate with the control program. During the fall of 1952, the China
Committee (CHINCOM) of the Paris Consultative Group of Nations instituted controls
that were even tighter, embargoing industrial machinery, steel-mill products, and metal
of all types. Meanwhile, the American embargo recruited more countries into COCOM
and CHINCOM, such as Greece and Turkey in 1953, and the embargo was further
bolstered by pledges of cooperation from Sweden and Switzerland, both important
28
neutral countries.
The Nationalist navy fully cooperated in enforcing the U.S. sanctions program. For
example, in early 1951 a Norwegian-owned ship, Hoi Houw, was reported to be carry29
ing U.S.-made medicines and other manufactured items to China. These goods had
originally been shipped, on American-flagged vessels from the United States to Bombay,
before the total embargo was instituted. They had then been reloaded at Bombay onto
the Norwegian-owned ship for transport to the PRC. The United States asked Britain to
intercept the cargo when the ship docked in Hong Kong and halt its delivery to the PRC.
But instead the governor of Hong Kong arranged with the Norwegian consul so that Hoi
30
Houw would not call at Hong Kong. Hoi Houw’s failure to stop in Hong Kong ignited a
widespread search. Four USN destroyers and planes swept the Taiwan Strait, and three
Nationalist destroyer escorts and planes looked east of Taiwan, the latter intercepting
Hoi Houw sixty miles east of the island on 11 February 1951. Its cargo was impounded at
31
Keelung; ship and crew were released on the 20th.
Because Hoi Houw had not stopped in Hong Kong as originally planned, the only
British interest in this seizure was possible insurance liability. Lloyd’s of London was
concerned that it would have to reimburse the owner for losses of over a million pounds
32
sterling, having insured the cargo prior to the adoption of U.S. sanctions. The British
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government’s viewpoint was that this was the insurer’s problem, since “either the underwriters took the possibility of seizure by the Nationalists into account and demanded
a correspondingly high premium—in which case they went into this with their eyes
open; or they did not underwrite against this sort of eventuality, in which case they are
33
presumably not liable.”
As reported by Cdr. M. E. Lashmore of the Royal Navy, the interception and detention
of Hoi Houw showed the close cooperation between the Americans and the Nationalists:
“There can be little doubt that the Americans were behind the seizure and whatever the
cargo was, were determined to stop it reaching China. They were in the happy position of being able to get the Chinese Nationalists to do their work for them, and thus in
34
theory being in no way connected with the incident.”
Later, American government officials took their “ingenuous bluff,” as Lashmore called
it, even farther by asking authorities in Hong Kong for information on what was happening to Hoi Houw on Taiwan, “on the grounds that the U.S. authorities there did not
35
know anything about her!” According to a report from the British consul in Taiwan,
when asked about the matter U.S. government officials said they could not “officially . . .
approve the interception which contravened both International Law and the agreement
between Nationalist China and America over the protection of Formosa, [but] they
consider it most unlikely that they will be instructed to make any protest as American
36
public opinion obviously approves of the Nationalist action.”
Although a confidential 1955 USN report admitted that the strategic embargo was
incomplete and that China obtained many goods through triangular deals and transshipments, the overall success of the embargo was shown by the facts that China’s
procurement was seriously hampered and that higher costs reduced the total amount
37
purchased. A British report from February 1951 likewise concluded that the American
sanctions program was quite effective and had inflicted a great shock on the mainland
38
Chinese economy. The Swedish ambassador confirmed that the strategic embargo was
having the desired effect, inasmuch as international “shipping was the Achilles heel of
China and that if the amount of shipping engaged in trade with China would be drasti39
cally reduced it would have a serious effect on the Chinese economy.” The embargo’s
effectiveness had a negative impact on British trade with China, however, and led to a
sharp increase in tension in the strait.
Heightened Trade Tension in the Taiwan Strait
As a direct response to the Nationalist blockade, beginning in 1953 Royal Navy warships were ordered to protect British commercial ships employed in legal trade from
interference by Nationalists under the guise of what the British considered to be an
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illegal blockade of the mainland.40 London’s decision to form a Formosa Straits Patrol to
protect British shipping put its naval forces at odds with Nationalist ships attempting to
enforce the blockade. While the British were allied with UN forces in Korea, their decisions to recognize and continue trade with the PRC broke with the American embargo.
To some, this policy appeared contradictory. During one October 1953 incident, for
example, the captain of a Nationalist warship even signaled the British captain, “You
should leave here at once. You were the enemy against the Communists in Korea, here
you are their friends. Don’t you feel ashamed of your honourable dead in Korea.” 41
In October 1952 the British government was considering changes to its export control
policies, and it was suggested that this opportunity be used to stop the illegal attacks
42
on British merchant ships. But American support for the Nationalist blockade had
shifted from opposition to lukewarm support to more active support for an air-based
blockade in 1953. The Nationalists largely depended on guerrillas in the Dachen Islands
to enforce the blockade in the north, with the energetic assistance of the United States.
On Lower Dachen Island, for example, a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)–funded
organization, Western Enterprises, Incorporated (WEI), sent American advisers to train
the guerrillas. Lon Redman, a WEI adviser, even attempted to bulldoze an airstrip so
that C-46 cargo planes could land. But this plan had to be abandoned once it became
clear that a strip long enough for a C-46 could not be built without bulldozing almost
43
down to sea level.
The Nationalists portrayed these guerrilla bands as anti-Communist fighters. But
to many foreign shippers, the pro-Nationalist guerrillas appeared little better than
modern-day pirates. As reported by one British official in 1952, “Indications are that
most of the piracies are done by Nationalist guerrillas not under the effective control of
Taipei. The border line is obscure. In 1948 it was respectable for bandits to masquerade
as Communist Liberation forces; in 1952 it is respectable for pirates to masquerade as
the Nationalist Navy.” 44
The Office of Naval Intelligence provided a good example of how the Nationalistguerrilla blockade functioned. On 8 September 1952, the British merchant ship Admiral
Hardy was intercepted by guerrillas trying to enter Fuzhou. The guerrillas took the
ship to White Dog Island, where they claimed it was carrying strategic goods and so
impounded the entire cargo. A $2,300 bribe was necessary to win the release of the ship
and its crew. Before allowing the ship to leave, the head of the guerrilla group indicated
that there would be no interference with that ship during any future trip if fifteen thousand dollars were paid in advance to his agent in Hong Kong. This arrangement was to
be secret; the guerrillas were apparently “apprehensive lest the Nationalist Navy learn of
this transaction.” 45
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Sometimes these guerrilla units attacked the wrong ship, as occurred on 11 February
1951 when the British-registered Wing Sang, sailing from Hong Kong to Taiwan, was
boarded and looted by Nationalist guerrillas. The Nationalist government immediately
denied any connection with the guerrillas. After British protests via the U.S. embassy
in Taipei, however, the Nationalists announced that the guerrilla leader responsible for
the attack had been captured and executed. As one source noted, “In this case the [proNationalist guerrilla] attackers made the mistake of attacking a ship engaged in trade
with Formosa.” 46
The British government repeatedly protested against the Nationalist blockade policies, in particular against the illegal interference of Taiwanese warships and guerrillas
47
with British merchant shipping. During the three years from 1951 to 1953 there were
141 reported incidents, including attacks from the sea (sixty-one), from land batteries
(fourteen), and from the air (three) that resulted altogether in four casualties and one
48
death. These numbers gradually decreased following the creation of the Royal Navy’s
Formosa Straits Patrol, but the Nationalist air blockade actually became tighter, as
U.S.-built, Nationalist-piloted planes harassed and even damaged British-owned ships.
As one British master complained, “I can handle any two Nationalist warships. I don’t
mind their guns or their old planes. But I hate these jets! They come screaming out of
49
nowhere, blast you and then they’re gone. You don’t have a chance.”
With Chinese coastal shipping blocked by the Nationalists, much of the PRC’s domestic north–south trade was diverted inland and carried by train. Meanwhile, China’s
international maritime trade was largely conducted by either foreign-registered or Hong
Kong ships, which—in theory at least—were neutral vessels. The bulk of China’s foreign
trade now had to be conducted overland, either with the Soviet Union directly or via the
USSR with a number of friendly Eastern European countries. This put enormous strains
on China’s own railway system, not to mention the trans-Siberian railway, but by the
50
late 1950s over half of China’s foreign trade was with the USSR.
Conclusions
In 1951, a full American blockade of the PRC was discussed by U.S. Navy planners,
but fear of undermining the Anglo-American alliance both in Europe and in Korea
overshadowed any possible benefits. During late 1953 and early 1954, therefore, the U.S.
government provided the Nationalists with better equipment to enforce the blockade
from the air. About half of China’s trade was at that point being conducted overland,
mainly with the USSR; an estimated thousand foreign ship arrivals per year accounted
for the rest of its foreign trade. The U.S. government hoped that with American training, equipment, and financial backing to build up Nationalist naval and air forces the
51
partial blockade would grow even more effective.
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During 1953–54, the Nationalist enforcement of the blockade gradually shifted away
from patrol vessels toward airpower, mainly provided by the United States. In April
1953 Taipei also adopted more stringent shipping regulations, largely in line with those
already promulgated by the U.S. Maritime Shipping Association, which would prohibit
any government-chartered foreign vessel from proceeding to any communist coun52
try within a “60-day period after it had discharged its cargo at ports in Free China.”
Incidents involving Nationalist ships steadily decreased, even as airplane patrols became
more common. During 1954, for example, there were a total of thirty-two incidents in
53
which the Nationalist air force attacked British shipping.
The British were upset by American support for the Nationalist blockade of China. In
54
particular, they feared that too strict an embargo might spark a war with the PRC. But
an even greater concern to London was that increasing Anglo-American friction might
prejudice the two nations’ worldwide cooperation, with possibly serious consequences
55
for the security of Western Europe. Given British reluctance to break openly with the
U.S. government, however, it would be up to the PRC to stop the Nationalist air attacks. In 1954–55, during the so-called first Taiwan Strait crisis, one of the PRC’s most
important objectives was to force the Nationalists to end their blockade of the Chinese
coastline. U.S. Navy ships assigned to the Taiwan Patrol Force were destined to play a
crucial role during this crisis.
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CHAPTER FIVE

The First Taiwan Strait Crisis, 1954–1955
By the summer of 1953, the Korean conflict had ended in an apparent stalemate. There
were numerous reasons for signing the armistice, but Stalin’s death on 5 March 1953
helped break a negotiating deadlock over the status of North Korean defectors. The
Korean armistice was finally signed on 27 July 1953. Soon afterward, the PRC began to
redeploy troops from north to south. Tensions gradually grew throughout the south,
particularly in the Taiwan Strait region, where conditions were, as Dulles described
1
them, equivalent to “living over a volcano.”
On 11 August 1954, Zhou Enlai stated that the PRC had to liberate Taiwan. Three
weeks later, on 3 September 1954, PLA forces began to bombard Jinmen Island, killing
two American military advisers, Lt. Col. Alfred Mendendorp and Lt. Col. Frank W.
Lynn. This renewed focus on the Taiwan Strait was intended to show Mao’s independence from Moscow. But another important PRC goal was to interrupt the Nationalist
blockade. During November 1954, Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru reported
that Chinese leaders had told him during a recent trip to Beijing that the Nationalist
blockade was a major problem and that they were “faced with continuous pin-pricks and
2
irritations of cumulative effect.”
The shelling of the offshore islands was also a cover to attack other Nationalistcontrolled islands, in particular the most northerly Nationalist-held group, the Dachens.
Rapid response by the U.S. Navy helped to resolve this crisis. Chiang Kai-shek agreed to
evacuate the Dachens, and the U.S. Navy provided ships, training, and protection during the evacuation operations. During this crisis, the Taiwan Patrol Force remained the
first line of defense against any possible PRC cross-strait invasion.
The Changing Goals of the Taiwan Patrol Force
Soon after the Communist victory in China and with the beginning of the Korean
War, the U.S. government had instituted the Taiwan Patrol Force to neutralize the
Taiwan Strait region. But as the ongoing conflict in Korea had already shown, what the
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Communist forces lacked in technology and ordnance, they could more than make up
in sheer numbers. During the early 1950s it was generally conceded that the Chinese
Communists could take the disputed offshore islands along China’s southeastern coastline whenever they wanted, if they were willing to devote the necessary manpower. The
relatively small size of the Taiwan Patrol Force would, at the most, represent a temporary obstacle to any such invasion.
From 1950 through early 1953, the Taiwan Patrol Force was ordered to stop attacks from
either side of the strait. In this operation, USN ships were intended to play a neutral
role, acting as a buffer between the PRC and ROC. While the PRC clearly resented the
presence of USN ships in its offshore waters, at some point Beijing leaders must have appreciated the fact that the Nationalist forces were being actively dissuaded thereby from
attacking the mainland. The neutralization order, however, specifically did not include
the many offshore islands controlled by the Nationalists; on 7 October 1950, it was clarified in Operation Order 7-50 that Seventh Fleet vessels were not to participate in the
“defense of any coastal islands held by the Nationalist Chinese nor will they interfere
3
with Nationalist Chinese operations from the coastal islands.”
Shortly after Dwight D. Eisenhower won the 1952 presidential election, the focus of the
Taiwan Patrol Force began to change. At least at the beginning of his administration,
4
Eisenhower heeded a call by hard-liners to unleash Chiang Kai-shek. A Gallup poll
from early in 1953 showed widespread public support, with 61 percent of Americans in a
nationwide survey in favor of supplying more warships to Taiwan for use in blockading
5
the Chinese coastline and more airplanes to bomb the Chinese mainland.
Tensions were already high in the Taiwan Strait. During 11–15 April 1952, for example,
the Nationalists and Communists fought over Nanri Island, off Fujian Province, about
seventy miles south of Fuzhou. The Nationalists were eventually forced to abandon the
island. But later that year, during the early morning of 11 October 1952, approximately
four thousand regular Nationalist Fifth Army troops and about a thousand guerrillas
from Jinmen attacked it. The raid failed, largely because the civilian junks the guerrilla army used as amphibious lift dropped the troops too far at sea and then left them
6
stranded there. The Nationalists were forced to withdraw on 14 October, and in retaliation Communist forces attacked and took Nanpeng Island, part of the Lamock group
of islands, off the port of Shantou, in fighting that lasted from the 18th to the 20th. This
Nationalist loss proved to be permanent, breaking the blockade of Shantou and leaving
7
Jinmen as the southernmost Nationalist island base.
Carrying out his campaign promises, on 2 February 1953, Eisenhower lifted the U.S.
Navy’s previous orders to restrict the Nationalist forces. According to a U.S. government
statement, the Seventh Fleet would “no longer be employed as a shield for the mainland
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of China.”8 One immediate result was that the commander of the Seventh Fleet was
instructed that the Taiwan Patrol Force was no longer to prevent the use by the Nationalists of Taiwan or the Penghu Islands as bases for operations against the Chinese main9
land. Predictably, this change led to the immediate amendment of previous orders. In
particular, on paper copies of Operation Order 20-52, “Special Patrol Instructions,” the
sentence “Large forces moving from Formosa toward the mainland will be reported to
10
CTG 72.0” was stricken through.
During April 1953 talks were held in Taipei between Adlai Stevenson, a recent presidential candidate who had lost to Eisenhower, and Chiang Kai-shek. During this meeting
Chiang promised Stevenson that with continued American military support his forces
would be ready to return to the mainland within three years at the latest and that once
they had returned to China they would gain a significant domestic following within
11
“three to six months.” The U.S. government agreed to support this plan. One purpose
later given by Dulles to the British ambassador was to “free the United States Navy from
12
the obligation to protect the mainland against attack from Formosa.”
But another major reason for this U.S. policy change was to open a new peripheral
theater in the south so as to put pressure on Beijing to sign a peace treaty ending the
13
Korean War. Washington’s goal was to “make a diversionary threat at a time when
fighting was going on in Korea so as to cause the Chinese Communists to transfer forces
14
away from Korea towards Formosa.” Dulles even told a New Zealand delegation that
“unleashing Chiang” would “encourage the Chinese [Communists] to retain substantial
15
forces opposite Formosa.” That is, Washington’s strategic objective was to put additional military pressure on China’s southern flank so that it would feel compelled to
reduce the PLA troops in Korea.
The Nationalists seemed eager to carry out this new policy. The first raid mounted
directly from Taiwan following Eisenhower’s February 1953 de-neutralization order was
against Dongshan Island, which had been taken from the Nationalists on 11 May 1950
by over ten thousand PLA troops. In mid-July 1953, the Nationalists tried to retake the
island with approximately 6,500 guerrillas, marines, and paratroopers. Airplanes from
the Nationalist air force dropped paratroopers on the northwest coast. Meanwhile, the
Jinmen-based amphibious force—called the “Sea Guerrilla Task Force”—landed on the
16
northeast coast and occupied Dongshan City. This attack ultimately failed, however,
and the Nationalist forces were forced to retreat, but the threat to the PRC was real.
The pressure that Eisenhower’s decision to open a peripheral campaign in the Taiwan
Strait put on Beijing played a crucial role in the PRC’s decision to come to terms in
Korea. After the armistice was signed on 27 July 1953, the PRC immediately began to
move troops south and station them across from Taiwan. This led to escalation on both
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sides of the Taiwan Strait, and during August 1954 Chiang Kai-shek ordered additional
deployments of fifty-eight thousand troops to Jinmen and of fifteen thousand to Mazu.
These movements had all the outward appearances of preparation for a Nationalist
invasion of mainland China. The PRC was sufficiently concerned to authorize attacks
against the Nationalist-held offshore islands, in particular the northernmost islands of
Yijiangshan and the Dachens.
The Beginning of the 1954–1955 Taiwan Strait Crisis
When China intervened in the Korean War in the fall of 1950, the United States actively
helped the Nationalists tighten their naval blockade of the PRC. It hoped that American military equipment, training, and financial backing would make the blockade of
strategic goods even tighter. The blockade was highly effective, and during November
1954 PRC leaders explained to the visiting prime minister Nehru that the Nationalists
from their offshore bases were conducting nuisance raids and interfering with shipping.
Upon his return, Nehru immediately warned the British high commissioner in India
17
that China was “determined not to tolerate this situation any longer.”
During the early 1950s, U.S. Navy and other military representatives helped equip
18
Taiwan’s navy and air force to conduct a more effective blockade. But by late 1953 immediately before tension erupted over Jinmen and Mazu Islands, the Nationalists held
19
only twenty-five islands, down from thirty-two the year before. The U.S. Navy sent aircraft carriers to the region. For example, USS Taussig (DD 746), which had been in early
July 1950 one of the first USN destroyers on the Taiwan Strait patrol, departed on its first
peacetime deployment to the western Pacific on 3 March 1954 to escort the aircraft carrier USS Boxer (CV 21). The destroyer remained in the region for the next three months,
screening Boxer, conducting various HUK antisubmarine warfare (ASW) exercises, and
patrolling the Taiwan Strait.
On 3 September 1954, the PRC, having relocated troops from north to south following
the end of the conflict in Korea, began to shell Jinmen. PLA attacks also began
against the Dachen Islands, where there was an important guerrilla base for the
Nationalist blockade. These attacks were aimed mainly at halting guerrilla activity;
taking the northernmost of the offshore islands in order to stage an invasion made little
sense, since they were too far from Taiwan. According to Rear Adm. Samuel Frankel,
“From the viewpoint of protecting Taiwan, I think that these islands have no signifi20
cance at all.”
As early as 15 July 1953, Adm. Arthur W. Radford, dual-hatted as the Commander in
Chief, U.S. Pacific Command and Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, had warned
Chiang Kai-shek to bolster the sagging defense of the northern islands, but as he
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reported back to Washington, Chiang was reluctant to deploy adequate forces. Radford
was concerned that retaining the islands was important psychologically to Taiwan’s
defense and strategically for gathering intelligence on the PRC. For a time, Radford even
21
considered proposing that they be put within the “U.S. defense perimeter.”
On 21 July 1953 the Eisenhower administration concluded that “although the importance of these islands to Taiwan’s defense is generally recognized here, the prevailing
view is that the responsibility for their defense must remain with the Government of
22
China.” On 25 September 1953, Adm. Joseph J. “Jocko” Clark, commander of the
Seventh Fleet, clearly stated that his instructions to protect Taiwan and the Penghus
23
from aggression did not embrace the Nationalist-held islands close to China’s coast.
Beginning in December 1953, ONI began to warn that “the Nationalists now hold these
coastal islands by default,” and only because the “Communists have not yet thought
them of great enough value to tie down the necessary forces to take the area.” This ONI
report even suggested that “there has been some indication that the Nationalists are
trying very hard to get the U.S. to make a statement obligating the Seventh Fleet to the
24
protection of the offshore islands as well as Formosa.”
As the U.S. military advisers had warned from July 1953 onward would happen, on 1
November 1954 PRC planes began to bomb and strafe the Dachens. During early 1955
the PLA focused its attention on a small island, Yijiangshan, only eight miles north
of the Dachens. Using tactics that reflected Soviet training, on 18 January 1955 over
fifty PLA Air Force (PLAAF) planes attacked Yijiangshan. High winds disrupted
the first attack, but the second was evaluated as a “well-planned, well-organized, and
well-executed operation.” Yijiangshan fell on 18 January (map 5). On 19 January 1955,
25
the PLAAF began to attack the Dachen Islands, with seventy aircraft. This new attack
spurred an American decision to convince the Nationalists to abandon the Dachens.
The Decision to Evacuate the Dachen Islands
During mid-January 1955, the Nationalists requested that the Seventh Fleet be moved
26
closer to the Dachens to expedite the delivery of crucial supplies. Later that month,
they also asked for USN air support, a request that the American ambassador to Taiwan
27
backed in order to avoid undermining confidence in American determination. But
defending the Dachen Islands permanently would be difficult, requiring two full-time
USN aircraft carriers plus supporting ships. According to Dulles, the Dachens “were too
far from Formosa, too vulnerable, and insufficiently important from the strategic point
28
of view to justify an American commitment to defend them.”
On 23 January 1955, the United States recommended that the Dachen Islands be evacuated. Chiang agreed to withdraw only reluctantly, in particular because giving up a
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MAP 5

PLA January 1955 Yijiangshan Landing Campaign

Reproduced by permission.
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strong position like the Dachen Islands without a fight would “gravely affect troop and
civilian morale.” To avoid the impression that he was backing down, Chiang refused to
29
agree to a cease-fire of any kind. Facing overwhelming odds, however, the Nationalists
finally agreed to evacuate. The PRC was warned not to interfere, and USN forces were
ordered “not to accept any tactical disadvantages.” Or, put another way, U.S. pilots were
30
not to get “altruistically shot down.”
The evacuation, called Operation King Kong, proved to be a massive undertaking.
The 209-man party sent ashore included eleven USN personnel as part of a reconnaissance team; the majority were U.S. Marines, including members of the 3rd Shore Party
Battalion and 3rd Marine Division, supported by eighteen Nationalist interpreters. An
on-island Command Group (twelve Americans), supported by a Radio Relay Group
(four) on USS Henrico (APA 45), commanded two groups, the larger of them (110 men)
on North Island, the other (eighty-three) on South Island. There were two evacuation
beaches on each island. Tank landing ships beached during high tide, loaded, and got
under way again twelve hours later, during the next high tide. From 8 to 12 February
1955 the Marine teams evacuated “over 15,000 civilians, 11,000 military, 125 vehicles,
5300 tons of material, 7600 tons of ammunition and 165 artillery pieces,” sustaining
31
zero casualties to either U.S. or Nationalist personnel.
To protect this massive evacuation, the Seventh Fleet assembled seventy warships,
including a “backbone” of six attack aircraft carriers (CVAs), one antisubmarine aircraft
32
carrier (CVS), and many escorts, like USS Boyd (DD 544). During the early days of the
crisis, Carpenter patrolled the Taiwan Strait and helped convoy Nationalist forces being
evacuated. A total of twenty-two vessels, including the seven aircraft carriers—Bennington (CVA 20), Hancock (CVA 19), Lexington (CVA 16), Midway (CVA 41), ShangriLa (CVA 38), Ticonderoga (CVA 14), and Princeton (CVS 37)—became eligible for the
33
Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal–Taiwan Straits.
While the evacuation was a success, control over the operation was overly centralized,
with local commanders “given grave responsibilities without the authority to exercise
initiative and freedom of action in the execution of same.” Poor vehicle maintenance
and inadequate traffic control were major problems; the commander of the Dachen
Defense Command Advisory Team, Gen. John C. Macdonald, spent “better than an
hour in the vicinity of Ta-Ao-Li personally unsnarling a traffic jam and acting as an
MP.” These shortfalls led to unexpected delays that could have jeopardized the entire
operation: “Had the evacuation been opposed by the Communists, failure might well
34
have been the result.”
After the evacuation, the flag of the Republic of China was lowered by Chiang Chingkuo, Chiang Kai-shek’s son. The Zhejiang provincial government, to which the island
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had historically been subordinate, was also abolished in the Republic of China. This
meant that Nationalist forces now held disputed mainland territory only in Fujian
Province. But rather than pushing the United States and Taiwan apart, as Beijing had
undoubtedly hoped would happen, the evacuation of the Dachens unexpectedly led to
closer relations between Washington and Taipei.
New U.S.-ROC Security Arrangements
The political impact of the PRC attack on the Dachens was to renew discussions of a
new U.S.-Taiwan security treaty; earlier in 1954, all such talks had ended in failure.
The new agreement reaffirmed the pledges made earlier by Truman and Eisenhower to
defend Taiwan and the Penghu Islands against Communist attack, but it was deliberately vague about the security status of the other offshore islands. Previous USN
operation orders had even specified that the term “enemy forces” did not include forces
35
attacking other offshore islands held by the Nationalists.
The international reaction to the Dachen evacuation was mixed. To the Australians,
the loss of the Dachens was comparable to the 1938 fall of Czechoslovakia, while a
PRC attack on Taiwan would be equivalent to the 1939 invasion of Poland. In a February 1955 Gallup poll, 66 percent of Australians favored joining the United States in a
war to prevent the Chinese Communists from invading Taiwan. In a letter from April
1955, Prime Minister Menzies argued the “desirability of giving Formosa military and
political strength to ensure the future will be decided peacefully and not as a result of
36
Communist policies of force.”
But public opinion in the UK opposed a war with China. Winston Churchill, in a
private letter to Eisenhower, warned him that “a war to keep the coastal islands for
37
China would not be defensible here.” The British ambassador to Washington further
emphasized that Britain, having recognized the PRC, necessarily “recognized that these
islands were part of China.” It was highly unlikely, therefore, that Britain could support the United States in any fight over the offshore islands. This greatly concerned the
British government, since if war broke out, “the Western alliance might be split.” The
38
British ambassador asked, “Were these islands really worth it?”
Taking into consideration the differing views of its allies, the U.S. government adopted
an intentionally ambiguous policy of keeping the Communists guessing about the true
39
defensive posture of the offshore islands. According to one press report, “The pact
will be deliberately vague about how the U.S. might react if the Reds were to invade any
of the other Nationalist-held islands off the China coast. The U.S. doesn’t want the
Reds to know which it will defend, and which it will simply write off. It prefers to keep
them guessing.” 40
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After lengthy negotiations, the United States and Republic of China agreed to very
specific, and in places deliberately ambiguous, wording. The treaty stated that the U.S.
security guarantee was also “applicable to such other territories as may be determined
by mutual agreement.” 41 This deferred any decision on whether the offshore islands
would be included in the security umbrella. The final U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty,
which was signed on 2 December 1954, contained this ambiguous language.
PRC attacks on the Dachen Islands during January 1955 led Eisenhower to request Congress to give him special powers to defend Taiwan. On 29 January 1955, the “Formosa
42
Resolution” was passed by Congress. This resolution gave the president enormous latitude; only the president, it declared, could judge whether a PRC attack on the remaining
43
Nationalist-held offshore islands was part of a more general assault on Taiwan. The
scope of the resolution was left unspecified; Congress agreed the president could authorize “securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area [as
44
are] now in friendly hands.” Soon afterward, on 9 February 1955, the Senate accepted
the defense pact; final ratifications were exchanged on 3 March.
Leaving the status of the offshore islands vague gave the president the widest possible
discretion in responding to future Communist attacks. In a top-secret letter Eisenhower
explained to Churchill that Chiang Kai-shek had agreed not to “conduct any offensive
operations against the mainland either from Formosa or from his coastal positions,
except in agreement with us.” This assurance would allow Washington to stop Chiang
from using his offshore bases to continue the “sporadic war against the mainland” or
to support an “invasion of the mainland of China.” According to Eisenhower, these
agreements showed that the U.S. government had “done much more than seems gener45
ally realized.”
The true challenge for American military and political leaders in the first Taiwan Strait
crisis was to convince Chiang Kai-shek to settle the dispute over the offshore islands
peacefully, preferably by abandoning them all completely, but without undermining the
international community’s faith in U.S. support for Taiwan. If the PRC took them by
force, Chiang Kai-shek would lose “prestige.” 46 In the Asian context, this meant losing
face. Eisenhower even reminded Churchill on 25 January 1955 that the United States
had to be concerned with the “solidarity of the Island Barrier in the Western Pacific,”
and deserting Taiwan might “risk a collapse of Asiatic resistance to the Communists.” 47
This in turn would undermine the American containment policy. However, if Chiang
withdrew from the offshore islands on his own volition, he would not lose face. During early 1955, various U.S. government and military officials attempted—without
success—to convince Chiang to do so.
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Failed U.S. Attempts to Force Chiang to Abandon the Offshore Islands
With his last foothold in his home province of Zhejiang gone, Chiang Kai-shek was
determined to retain the remaining offshore islands—of which the most important were
Jinmen and Mazu, where blockade bases had been set up—at any cost. Giving them up
might be interpreted by overseas Chinese as a sign that his resistance to communism
was collapsing. These concerns undermined prospects for a quick and easy settlement.
The United States made repeated attempts, however—in a little-known aspect of the
first Taiwan Strait crisis—to convince the Nationalists to abandon all the offshore
islands, including Jinmen and Mazu. To many in Washington, the forced evacuation of
the Dachens boded ill for the other Nationalist-occupied offshore islands.
In one such attempt, in early 1955, Admiral Radford, newly appointed as chairman
of the JCS, and Walter Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs,
met with Chiang Kai-shek. They promised that the United States would supply better
naval equipment for the Nationalist blockade if in return Chiang agreed to give up the
remaining disputed offshore islands. Chiang left the room, supposedly to pray in the
garden, returned, and said, “I just want to tell you that I have prayerfully concluded that
I cannot accept such a proposal because I do not have the faith in your government to
48
sustain it.”
Chiang’s refusal left Washington with few options: it had either to support Chiang
on his terms or risk losing Taiwan as a dependable ally and support of the Cold War
containment policy. During the spring of 1955 Washington once again asked Chiang
49
to consider giving up Jinmen and Mazu Islands, but he again refused. Eisenhower
even promised to create a joint U.S.-Taiwan defense zone, from Shantou to Wenzhou, in
which the movement of all maritime traffic of a contraband or military character would
be interdicted. In particular, the U.S. Navy would lay minefields that “would force
50
coastwise junk traffic to come out where it also could be intercepted and controlled.”
But Chiang vetoed this proposal as well, on the ground that relinquishing additional
offshore islands would make his government look weak. Furthermore, Chiang argued,
once he gave up Jinmen and Mazu the United States might soon halt any “effective shipping interdiction scheme in the face of strong and inevitable opposition by the British
51
and others.”
Certain USN leaders, including the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Arleigh Burke
(photo 4), agreed with Chiang that defending the islands was necessary. Burke even told
Eisenhower, “They don’t mean anything, it’s a purely symbolic thing, they don’t mean
anything except, who’s daddy? Who runs that part of the world, the Red Chinese or the
Nationalist Chinese? But physically it doesn’t make any difference. . . . These are Nationalist Chinese islands, and they have to be held, or they have to be abandoned voluntarily
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before they’re threatened, before they’re made to abandon them.”52 The big problem was
that once the United States committed itself to defending the offshore islands, it had
to be “prepared to follow through in event the Communists should decide to test U.S.
53
willingness actually to participate in the defense of the islands.”
Washington still hoped
to defuse military tension
and to focus instead on
longer-term goals. During a
10 February 1955 talk with
Taiwan’s foreign minister,
George K. C. Yeh, Dulles
explained that the solution
to the “two Chinas” problem
would take time. Instead of
trying to force Chinese unification, the United States
Photo 4
and Taiwan should capitalThe CNO, Adm. Arleigh A. Burke, greeted by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek during
a 1955 visit to Taiwan.
ize on “the vulnerability
Naval Historical Center, Photo NH 54905
of Communist regimes to
54
economic and other pressures.” His goal was to “strain the Sino-Soviet alliance by
compelling the Chinese to increase economic and military demands for Soviet support
55
to the point where Moscow would be forced to drop Beijing.” These economic and
other pressures were specifically designed to increase Sino-Soviet friction.
The Impact of Sino-Soviet Relations on a Taiwan Strait Resolution
The impact of Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations on the first Taiwan Strait crisis is too
rarely considered. Following Stalin’s death on 5 March 1953, the last thing the bickering
new Soviet leaders wanted was for tension in the Taiwan Strait to drag them into a new
world war, especially one that might escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. At the same
time that the U.S. government was attempting to restrain Chiang Kai-shek, therefore,
the USSR was actively reducing its military support for China. In fact, in the early
spring of 1955, just as the first Taiwan Strait crisis reached its peak, Moscow decided to
withdraw important defensive installations from its former naval base at Lüshun. This
action made Manchuria vulnerable to attack from the sea, which in turn put pressure on
Beijing to de-escalate its military operations far to the south in the Taiwan Strait.
These changes represented an important backdrop to the peaceful resolution of the
first Taiwan Strait crisis. In Moscow, an intense leadership struggle erupted soon after
Stalin’s death and continued until the 20 February 1956 Twentieth Party Congress,
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when Nikita Khrushchev, now First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, delivered his “secret speech” denouncing Stalin. During this three-year
period, Mao Zedong attempted to renegotiate some of the more onerous aspects of the
1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty and to assert leadership over the international communist
movement.
Even before Stalin’s death important alterations in the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty had been
made, especially concerning Lüshun and Dalian. A 1952 agreement scheduled all Soviet
military forces to withdraw from these Manchurian ports by 31 May 1955. Moscow also
agreed to transfer all Lüshun military installations to the PRC. For his part, Moscow
having agreed to return the Manchurian railway and the Lüshun naval base to China
without charge, Mao evidently thought that the USSR would also leave the large coastal
artillery pieces protecting that port. But at the last minute Khrushchev demanded that
China pay for the guns, and at full price: “These are very expensive weapons, we would
56
be selling them at reduced prices.”
Moscow’s decision to strip the naval base of its main defensive armament left China
highly vulnerable in Manchuria. Further, Khrushchev’s decision was a clear sign of his
unwillingness to back Mao in an offensive to retake the offshore islands. He further
57
hinted that the USSR’s nuclear “umbrella” might not cover the Taiwan Strait. The
PRC had little choice but to back down in the south. On 23 April 1955 Beijing stated
that it was willing to negotiate the status of Taiwan, and on 1 May it halted the shelling
of Jinmen Island. Three months later, on 1 August, as a sign of goodwill, China
even released eleven captured American airmen previously sentenced to lengthy
58
jail terms.
One can only speculate on the impact that the Soviet demilitarization of Manchuria
had on Beijing’s decision to halt the southern offensive against Taiwan. Certainly, linkages between north and south had been shown before, in particular by the impact of
Eisenhower’s “unleashing Chiang” policy on the successful negotiation of the Korean
armistice, which had in turn freed the PLA to redeploy troops to the south. In any case,
lacking firm Soviet support, Beijing called off attacks against the offshore islands. Given
the forces arrayed against it, the PRC leadership had no choice but to back down in the
first Taiwan Strait crisis. Ultimately, China’s coercive tactics against Taiwan did not
succeed in large part because the USSR “failed to come to the PRC’s rescue when it was
59
intimidated by the United States.”
Conclusions
In a show of force, the PRC initiated the first Taiwan Strait crisis during early September 1954. While shelling Jinmen Island, Communist forces overran Yijiangshan and
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attacked the Dachen Islands, which were evacuated by the Nationalists. During this
period Washington repeatedly urged Taipei to abandon all the offshore islands, but
Chiang Kai-shek refused. Not only would complete abandonment force Chiang to lose
face, but so long as the Nationalists held these islands, just off China’s coast, the Communists could not proclaim total victory on the mainland. In addition, Chinese history
had shown that the Nationalists could always stage a mainland invasion from these
offshore bases, thereby using the disputed islands as stepping-stones to retake control of
China.
Scholars have argued, however, that the PRC’s primary motivation to initiate this crisis
60
was to test American resolve to defend Taiwan. From that purely strategic viewpoint,
and although the PRC could claim a limited victory because Nationalist troops had
evacuated the Dachens and several other smaller offshore islands, the PRC’s attacks
backfired. In December 1954 Taiwan and the United States signed a mutual security
pact reaffirming that the latter would defend Taiwan and the Penghu Islands; Chiang
Kai-shek promised that no offensive operations would take place against the mainland
without America’s prior agreement. Four years later Dulles said that Chiang “had main61
tained that limitation and honourably maintained it.”
The 1954–55 Taiwan Strait crisis also had important domestic consequences in the PRC.
In December 1953, ONI had warned that Beijing’s threats to attack the offshore islands
and especially to invade Taiwan provided the Chinese leaders an important propaganda
62
“gimmick.” But, with the exception of regaining Yijiangshan and the Dachens, which
were not useful for an invasion of Taiwan, the PRC attacks had failed. Furthermore, the
Soviet government showed that it would not give its full support to Beijing’s military
actions. Finally, rather than pushing the United States and Taiwan apart, the attacks
brought about in the January 1955 Formosa Resolution even greater American security
guarantees to Taiwan and the offshore islands. Reflecting the new climate of improved
U.S.-ROC military relations, the U.S. Navy began to take on new responsibilities,
including more robust funding and a more intensive training regime for the Nationalist
navy.
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CHAPTER SIX

Funding and Training the Nationalist Navy
The Nationalist and Communist navies looked similar on paper during the early 1950s;
in any actual encounter the handling of the ships by officers and crews would make
the difference. Beginning in 1950, therefore, the U.S. Navy started to help train the
Nationalist navy. By summer 1952, the maintenance of Nationalist ships and equipment had dramatically improved. However, with the active support of the USSR, the
Chinese Communist navy was growing even faster and appeared likely to surpass the
Nationalists’.
In the early-to-middle 1950s, the USN assessments of the Nationalist navy’s capabilities were not optimistic. During actual Nationalist operations, the ONI reported, two
U.S.-provided destroyers, Tai Ho (DE 23) and its twin Tai Hu (DE 25), experienced
1
great difficulty working together. This showed that the Nationalist navy was still inca2
pable of effective joint operations. Until these problems were solved, the CNO, Adm.
Robert Carney, advised “no implied commitment on the part of the U.S. to provide
3
additional ships.”
Following the first Taiwan Strait crisis and in line with the new U.S.-ROC mutual
security pact, however, the U.S. Navy increased its funding and training efforts, particularly in the area of high-tech equipment. Over time, the Nationalist navy’s efficiency
increased, to the point where many American officers considered it nearly on a par with
4
the U.S. Navy. These improvements positively impacted the conduct of the Nationalist
blockade and kept the Nationalist navy prepared to fight off a PRC invasion.
Growth of the PLAN
At the outset the Nationalist navy represented perhaps half of China’s former navy
and had only to protect a small geographic area around the island of Taiwan. The PRC
created its own navy in April 1949, however, and once it began to acquire additional
ships and weapons from the USSR, the Nationalist navy’s lead began to slip. After the
first Taiwan Strait crisis, there was concern that the PLAN could now threaten, perhaps
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even defeat, the Nationalist navy. At this point the U.S. Navy stepped in with additional
equipment and training. Often it was ships from the Taiwan Patrol Force that were
tasked to conduct this training.
Throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s, the British and the Americans closely
watched the development of the Nationalist navy and of the PLAN. In November 1949
the British listed Nationalist naval assets as seven destroyers, twenty-one destroyer
escorts, and twenty-two gunboats, backed by a 300,000-man army and a 230-plane air
force (145 fighter-bombers, sixty medium bombers, and twenty-five heavy bombers).
Based on these numbers, the British Chiefs of Staff concluded that direct invasion of
Taiwan would be improbable for several months, provided the Nationalist naval and air
forces remained loyal, since the Communists had “inadequate naval and air forces to
5
support the passage of troops and transports.”
Meanwhile, a prime American goal was to keep the Nationalist navy roughly equivalent
to the PLAN, but not greatly superior, since it sought to avoid the possibility of a major
Nationalist attack on the mainland. In July 1951 the PLAN was still being described by
ONI as a “pick-up” fleet, the “youngest and weakest component of Red China’s armed
forces.” In particular, it was handicapped by the lack of modern equipment and trained
personnel. But the Communist ships’ firepower—even discounting the still inoperable
British cruiser Chongqing—included thirty-nine guns of diameters over three inches,
compared to the Nationalists’ twelve. Furthermore, the majority of China’s largest and
best ships were under the East China Military District Naval Headquarters and based in
6
Shanghai, which faced Taiwan.
During September 1952 USN analysts began to warn, moreover, that the Nationalist
navy was “at present incapable of being employed in any fleet maneuver should an occasion demand it.” A concept of “static zonal defense” had permeated the Nationalist navy
7
to such an extent that it had lost one of its primary assets, mobility. The Office of Naval
Intelligence further cautioned that all too soon the PLAN would have greater firepower,
plus a fleet of forty motor torpedo boats (MTBs): “It is difficult to conceive of any all-out
engagement between the two navies which would not be close enough to the coast to
enable some of the 40 Communist MTB to get into action, and the employment of MTB
8
would further increase the Communist advantage in fire power.”
The PLAN grew quickly during the mid-1950s with help from the USSR. Chongqing
was salvaged and renamed Beijing. Beginning in 1954, the USSR sold the PRC four Type
9
7 destroyers, known as the Anshan class in China. By the mid-1950s the PLAN had
largely caught up with the Nationalist navy in terms of ships, armaments, and training.
One ONI assessment even warned during the spring of 1953 that if the two navies were
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to meet in full-scale combat the “Communists’ superiority in fire power, discipline,
10
morale, and leadership would probably bring them victory.”
There were valid reasons, accordingly, for the U.S. concerns that the Nationalists could
not permanently retain their island bases along the PRC coastline, much less use them
to stage an invasion of the mainland. According to one ONI assessment from December
1953, the PLAN was more than a match for the Nationalists in the coastal waters of the
Chinese mainland, since the Communist forces now had sufficient land-based airpower
to control the sky over the area. In fact, it was unclear why the Nationalists had been
allowed to keep the coastal islands. The Chinese problem, from a military and strategic
viewpoint, was that the coastal areas of Fujian Province were almost entirely cut off
from the interior; troops stationed there would be in a “deep freeze,” “immobile as far as
the over-all disposition of military forces in China are concerned.” Therefore, any Communist invasion would require extremely large forces, enough to occupy each and every
11
offshore island.
Any PRC decision to attack the offshore islands also depended on the international
climate. A truce ending the Korean conflict could free up many PLA soldiers:
It is unlikely that the Chinese Communists will undertake to drive the Nationalists completely from
the coastal islands of China as long as there is a possibility that the People’s Liberation Army may
again become actively engaged in the war in Korea. If a peace is concluded in Korea, or if the PLA
is withdrawn from Korea, a campaign to “liberate” the coastal islands would have great value to the
Chinese Communists who have the capability to undertake and carry to a successful conclusion
12
such a venture against the Nationalists.

The PRC had previously used mass forces to retake several crucial islands, including
Hainan, but it needed to create a real navy if it hoped to take others so as to attack Taiwan itself. Early PLAN goals included destroying the sea blockade of liberated China,
supporting the PLA in defense of Chinese soil, and wiping out all “remnants of the
13
reactionary forces” on Taiwan.
During this PLAN buildup, the Nationalist navy continued to carry out its blockade of
the mainland. Through 1954 the Communists had little choice but to bear up as best
they could, since they did not have the naval assets necessary to stop the blockaders:
The Chinese Communists have undoubtedly been inconvenienced by this activity, but their military
activity in the coastal areas has been almost solely defensive in nature. They have from time to time
taken retaliatory action in reprisal for Nationalist activity, but with the exception of the disastrous
attempt by elements of the Third Field Army to recapture Quemoy [Jinmen] in October 1949, they
have made no concerted effort to retake these islands. Rumors that the Communists are very apprehensive of Nationalist landings on the mainland have persisted, and reports indicate that they have
made defensive preparations even including the razing of villages adjacent to the sea. Strategically,
the area is of secondary importance to the Communists. The important ports of Shanghai and Canton are unaffected by Nationalist activity, and although shipping into Wenchow, Foochow, Amoy,
and Swatow is interfered with, these ports have no accessibility to railroads and no significant
industrial development. It is probable that the Communists are content to endure the Nationalist
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nuisance activity until they are ready to assert naval and air superiority in the area in preparation
14
for an attack on Formosa.

While passively enduring the Nationalist blockade, the PRC continued to obtain military hardware from the USSR. In particular, China quickly increased the size of its own
navy in order to try to wrest control from the Nationalists of some of the northernmost
of the offshore islands, including the Dachens in 1955. In response, to help solve the
Nationalist navy’s operational problems, the U.S. Navy rapidly expanded its training
mission in Taiwan.
The U.S. Navy Training Mission
Throughout the 1950s, the most important factor stopping a possible PRC invasion
was the constant presence of the Taiwan Patrol Force, backed up by the full weight of
the Seventh Fleet. Between 1949 and 1955, as noted, the comparative strengths of the
Nationalist navy and the PLAN changed dramatically; at first the Nationalists were
dominant, but with support from the USSR the PLAN quickly passed them. By 1956,
soon after the first Taiwan Strait crisis, even the new air-based phase of the Nationalist
blockade began to lose headway, and the overall impact of the blockade was described by
15
one source as strategically “puny.” While PLAN assets now seemed capable of defeating
the Nationalist navy, the Nationalists were in no position to stage a major attack of the
mainland. Without the continued support of the U.S. Navy, therefore, the prospects for
the Nationalist regime on Taiwan would have indeed been bleak.
In May 1951, Washington created the Military Assistance Advisory Group for Taiwan
and began to allocate funds for it. One high estimate of U.S. military aid to Taiwan
16
between 1950 and 1969 was $3.19 billion. By 1951, the number of American advisers
on Formosa totaled about 650, about half of these associated with the MAAG, the other
half a variety of smaller organizations, including the aforementioned CIA-run Western
Enterprises, Incorporated, which was engaged in “guerrilla training and psychological
17
warfare.” At any one time about half of the American advisers—or from 250 to 300—
were assisting the Nationalist navy.
Almost from the beginning of the Taiwan Patrol Force, some basic training was provided for the Nationalist navy. The Nationalists hired civilian specialists, many of them
retired USN officers, to help them operate the ex-U.S. ships they had received. According to Rear Adm. Walter Ansel, USN (Ret.), when he arrived in Taiwan in the spring of
1950 as a civilian adviser to the Nationalist military, the State Department was not very
enthusiastic about his mission, but this soon changed after the beginning of the Korean
War. Ansel would later recount how as an operational liaison he often went to sea with
the Nationalist ships. While the Nationalists thought highly of their destroyers, going
to sea and actually shooting and “really getting down to slugging” was not very popular.
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Among other innovations, Ansel helped set up around-the-clock watches and developed
an English–Chinese signal book to be used in communications between American and
Nationalist ships. With the help of foreign advisers, the number of Nationalist destroyers available for operations rose from two of the eight to four, and finally to “six out of
eight that you could call on and send over to the mainland, for instance, and the islands
18
between Formosa and the mainland.”
A new training regime was adopted beginning in the fall of 1952. USN orders for the
conduct of the Taiwan Patrol Force provided for the “Training of Nationalist Government of the Republic of China Naval Personnel.” Training sessions were divided into
cycles of fifteen lessons, all conducted at Kaohsiung from 8:30 to 11:30 in the morning,
Monday through Friday; each cycle took approximately three weeks to complete. While
most of the training took place in port, several sessions were conducted under way. During these periods, the best-qualified personnel on each ship were assigned as teachers,
and they were reminded to maintain favorable relations with individuals representing
the Nationalist government of the Republic of China. Nationalist naval officers were
cleared to use restricted materials and were urged to participate in ship handling, gun
firing, and CIC plotting. Since many of the transferred USN vessels were more advanced
than the average Nationalist vessel, USN personnel were reminded that “the mere
demonstration of U.S. know-how, doctrines, maintenance measures, machinery records,
19
etc., will be of considerable value.”
Training the Nationalist navy became one of the Taiwan Patrol Force’s most important
missions. In addition to conducting patrols of the Taiwan Strait, during early 1953
20
Boyd’s duties included training Nationalist navy personnel in ship operations. On
13 January 1955, USS Orleck (DD 886) welcomed personnel from the Nationalist navy
21
on board for three hours of training, including damage-control drills. In May 1959
Taussig was assigned to the Fleet Training Group and operated as an engineering
22
school ship during the succeeding summer. All these training missions were simply
part of the regular duties of the Taiwan Patrol Force, thereby maximizing its strategic
impact.
Training became even more crucial in battle. Perhaps the most intensive training mission occurred during the various Taiwan Strait crises, when the Nationalist navy had to
resupply embattled islands. USN ships could escort the supply ships most of the way, but
they stopped before reaching the three-mile territorial limit, recognized by the U.S. government, to make sure that the isolated conflict did not turn into a larger war. Admiral
Burke, as CNO, asked Eisenhower whether the U.S. Navy could resupply the embattled
islands itself; Eisenhower emphatically replied no. However, the U.S. Navy was allowed
to train the Nationalists to conduct these operations (photo 5). According to Burke, “So
we gave them lots of training and we gave them lots of LSDs [dock landing ships] and
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ships, boats, to supply the thing.” With U.S. training and equipment the Nationalists
23
“reinforced their garrisons and put their supplies in caves.”

Photo 5
U.S. Navy equipment and training involved in Nationalist resupply of Jinmen Island.

Without additional training by the U.S. Navy, the Nationalists would have found it difficult if not impossible to fight off the attacks against the offshore islands. As CinCPac
Admiral Felt stated in a 1974 interview, the American and Nationalist navies “devised
ways and means and tactics, and successfully did the job over a period of time. But it
24
was touch and go there for a long, long time.” During these years, however, the USSR
was busy transferring modern naval equipment to the PRC. The PLAN’s capabilities
were rapidly improving. Therefore, Washington also agreed to provide a wide range of
new naval equipment to build up and sustain Taiwan’s military capabilities.
Transferring American Military Equipment
The Nationalist navy depended on the U.S. Navy for equipment and for training in how
to use that equipment. After initiation of a comprehensive training program, the next
step was better equipment, including more modern ships. There were still grave doubts
as to whether the Nationalist navy could effectively use the two USN destroyers that
were to be handed over to Taiwan in 1954. During the summer of 1953, a USN study
recommended that shallow-draft amphibious support craft would be a better choice.
Smaller vessels were thought to be useful in that they could maneuver in the shallow
25
waters between the islands and the coast to break up junk fleets and deploy troops.
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Public Law 188, signed on 5 August 1953, authorized the loan or donation of naval ships
to friendly nations in the Far East. In order to assist the Nationalists in defending the
offshore islands, the JCS allocated ten patrol-type craft, two landing-craft-repair ships,
26
about a hundred small landing craft, and approximately ten additional support craft.
The Nationalist need for more destroyers was questioned. A footnote in Admiral Carney’s previously cited memorandum to the JCS clarified that “delivery of any additional
destroyers . . . beyond the two now planned for FY [fiscal year] 1954, will be effected
only upon the clearly demonstrated capability of the [Nationalist government of the
27
Republic of China] to man and operate them.”
In addition, by the mid-1950s the U.S. Navy had given Taiwan two old diesel submarines. Vice Adm. Philip Beshany, Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command from
1972 to 1974, later recalled that handpicked Nationalist crews were trained in New
London, Connecticut. They were top caliber and excelled as students. Instructors later
recalled that the Nationalist officers took to submarine operations “like ducks to water.”
The United States did not provide Taiwan with torpedoes, since the two submarines
were intended only to help train the Nationalist navy in antisubmarine warfare, but
Beshany would thoughtfully observe, “I often wonder if they didn’t somehow get some
28
torpedoes from some other country.”
New airplanes too were crucial to Taiwan’s defense. Of the $132 million in equipment
deliveries between 1951 and 1954, fully two-thirds was aircraft and aircraft spares,
while another 18 percent comprised bombs, rockets, and ammunition. In 1954 alone the
United States shipped $48.3 million in equipment to Taiwan. By December 1954, 456
of the 657 aircraft promised to Taiwan had been delivered, 131 of them that year. These
29
included seventy-two F-84Gs, twenty-five F-86Fs, sixteen T-33s, and five RT-33s.
Another example of providing Taiwan with high-tech equipment was the American
decision to deliver F-104s to Taiwan by means of cargo planes. According to Admiral
Felt, it was the “first time it had ever been done, I guess. They took the little old stub
wings off of them and flew them out to Taiwan, unloaded them, stuck the wings on, and
30
there we had an F-104 squadron!” The first F-104s arrived in early 1960; eventually
Taiwan acquired 247 of them, mainly from the United States but also secondhand from
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, and Japan. One of their primary missions was to
patrol the strait. On 13 January 1967, Maj. Shih-Lin Hu of the ROC Air Force and Capt.
31
Bei-Puo Shih each shot down a PLAAF MiG-19, the first-ever F-104 combat victories.
The high-tech equipment and U.S. military training on how to use it proved indispen
sable. As Adm. George Anderson later recounted, “It was a fascinating job because, in
addition to everything else, you really had the Chinese Navy even if not under direct
command you had the primary influence on the Chinese Navy, and the great respect of
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32

the Chinese military, including their navy, including Chiang Kai-shek.” When
not actually engaged in patrol or training duties, USN ships scheduled combined naval
exercises with Nationalist vessels to make sure the two navies could cooperate in a crisis.
Combined U.S.-ROC Naval Exercises
While training individual Nationalist naval officers was a top priority of the U.S. Navy,
combined naval exercises were equally important, to ensure that American and Nationalist naval forces were ready for all phases of operations necessary to defend Taiwan
and the Penghu Islands. Commander, Task Force 72 laid down, “It is recognized that
combined training will be the best practicable means for determining deficiencies in
equipment, training standards, tactics, techniques, and procedural arrangements within
33
and between the respective armed forces.”
Combined exercises were held between the USN destroyers on the Taiwan Patrol Force
and several of the Nationalist destroyers. In one night exercise five U.S. ships tried to
penetrate the Taiwan Strait and were quickly intercepted by the Nationalist vessels. In
another exercise, the destroyers of the two navies grouped together and tried to protect
the flagship against a submarine attack, but the submarine managed to slip by twice and
“torpedo” the flagship. Adm. Paul D. Stroop, commander of the Taiwan Patrol Force
from 1957 to 1958, would later recall, “This was the first time I’d ever attempted to maneuver—work—combined operations with U.S. and Chinese forces, and I was pleased
34
that they were fairly successful.”
Beginning in 1954, many training duties initially carried out by the CIA through such
entities as WEI were transferred by presidential directive to the Department of Defense.
This new task required assigning about fifty additional USN personnel to the theater,
mostly to the MAAG in Taipei. For example, one top-secret memo noted that three officers and five enlisted personnel would be assigned to help train a 14,500-man marine
division and the three-thousand-man Guerrilla Parachute Command. It was expected
35
that some of these American naval advisers would be stationed on offshore islands.
The U.S. Navy actively assisted the Nationalist amphibious operations by participating
in combined landing exercises. According to Capt. Phil Bucklew, these exercises took
place along Taiwan’s southeast coastline, so as to keep the American officers away from
the actual staging areas on the west coast of the island. Still, Bucklew was impressed
with the Nationalist training, calling it “thorough” and “strenuous.” Bucklew felt that
“in many ways, their operation was even more demanding than ours in training and
qualifications.” As a result, he concluded, “their general capabilities, I thought, were
among the best in the Far East. The amphibious exercise in which we participated
36
jointly with them was a very good show.”
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While the U.S. Navy conducted shipboard training, the U.S. Air Force was assigned to
train Nationalist pilots. As Admiral Felt would recall,
We had an Air Force section of the MAAG down there, the Military Assistance [Advisory] Group,
which trained our Chinese friends and they were well trained, every bit as good tactically as the U.S.
Air Force or Naval Air fighters. They’d go out on these patrols, out over the straits, and just loiter
at their best fighting altitude, more or less presenting themselves as bait. The Chinese would come
out at higher altitudes and finally couldn’t resist the temptation to come down, and when they came
down they got took. Also it was the first combat introduction of the Sidewinder [air-to-air missile],
which had been given to the Chinese. I can’t remember the numbers, but I think it was something
like 21 of the Communist planes shot down and success for the Sidewinders, not 100 percent but a
very fine performance.

As a result of superior U.S. equipment and training, Admiral Felt continued, the Nationalist pilots exercised air control, and the “Red Chinese weren’t much interested in
37
challenging in the air.”
Finally, notwithstanding the U.S.-made destroyers, submarines, and airplanes, it was a
generally acknowledged fact the Nationalist navy did not have very much equipment.
In the event of war it would be “dependent, really, on the Seventh Fleet.” The decisions
to train better pilots and supply Sidewinder missiles were probably the most important
factors adding to the Nationalist military’s capabilities. In addition, American advisers
in Taiwan helped build airfields and provided better radar equipment. All of these U.S.
efforts would allow the Nationalists to assert a measure of air control should the PRC
38
decide to attack the offshore islands again.
Conclusions
With equipment and training from the U.S. Navy, the Nationalist navy gradually
improved. From the early 1950s onward, USN ships often joined with it to conduct
combined training exercises, both to pass on expertise and to ensure that the two navies
could cooperate if a war ever broke out. The U.S. government also authorized the transfer of high-tech naval equipment to Taiwan. Even after the United States recognized the
PRC in 1979 this aspect of the U.S.-Taiwan military-to-military relationship continued,
and it does so unchanged to the present day.
After the first Taiwan Strait crisis, 1954–55, the U.S. Navy’s training mission became
more intense. With American help the Nationalist navy was able to receive advanced
equipment, including additional destroyers and diesel submarines. More importantly,
the U.S. military transferred high-tech aircraft and Sidewinder missiles to Taiwan.
These technological advances were to allow the Nationalists to adopt a more offensive
policy, including on occasion using marine forces trained by U.S. Navy advisers to
mount attacks against the mainland and Communist-held islands.
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Better equipment and training for the Nationalist navy meant that it was no longer clear
that the PLAN could defeat it in a fleet-on-fleet battle at sea. These USN efforts largely
matched the Soviet Union’s ongoing attempts to build up the Chinese Communist fleet
and effectively denied Beijing the expected military benefits of its alliance with Moscow. To bolster Taiwan’s security further as well as to help build up its economy, USN
ships also carried out naval demonstrations, morale-building exercises, and frequent
R&R visits.
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CHAPTER SEVEN

Morale Building and Rest-and-Recreation
Visits
Throughout the Taiwan Patrol Force’s existence, morale building—for the Nationalists—and frequent R&R visits—for visiting USN crews—were important functions of
the patrols. As Eisenhower put it to Churchill in a March 1955 “Eyes Only Top Secret”
letter, the only way to avoid losing Taiwan, the loss of which would “doom the Philippines and eventually the remainder of the region” to communism, was to “sustain a high
1
morale among Chiang’s forces.”
During the early 1950s, morale was particularly low within the Nationalist navy. According to one ONI report, the attitude of officers toward shipboard life left something
to be desired; also worrisome was their “lack of interest in the training and advancement of their juniors.” Moreover, there was still a sense of “aimlessness and idleness”
2
among the Nationalist crews when under way. The American response of morale
building meant showing the flag, so as to prove that the U.S. Navy was backing Taiwan.
Morale building could also involve the participation of USN personnel in sporting
events, such as softball or baseball games, with local teams.
Taiwan’s morale was also closely linked to its economic well-being. U.S. government
financial aid and preferential trade rights were crucial for the ROC during the early-tomiddle 1950s. Since Taiwan was virtually cut off from mainland China, traditionally
one of its greatest trade partners, its businessmen had to conduct correspondingly more
trade with Hong Kong, Japan, and the United States. Military-to-military relations
directly added to Taiwan’s security, which indirectly enabled stronger trade and commercial links between Taiwan and the United States. In this way, USN vessels visiting
Taiwan contributed to the island’s economic growth.
Political and Economic Impact of U.S. Aid
Following their defeat on the mainland, the Nationalists were well aware of the precariousness of their existence on Taiwan. Tensions between the exiled mainlanders and
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the local Taiwanese were high. On 28 February 1947 Nationalist troops suppressed a
Taiwanese protest; estimates of the dead ranged in the tens of thousands. The Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) was urged by Washington to overcome these problems by
creating a hybrid government that mixed elements of democracy with one-party rule
and adopting a market-driven economy. To support this transition, between 1952 and
3
1960 approximately $100 million in economic aid was given to Taiwan each year. One
4
estimate of the total American economic aid between 1950 and 1969 is $2.2 billion.
Learning from its many mistakes fighting the Chinese Communists, the Nationalist
government on Taiwan ultimately succeeded in merging basic democratic principles
and anticorruption measures with economic growth and price stability. For example,
the Nationalists embarked on land reform in Taiwan in 1948, selling public land that
had formerly belonged to Japanese landlords. During the early 1950s, the percentage of
5
farmers on Taiwan owning land rose from 25 to 35 percent. This redistribution policy
paralleled the highly successful communist land practices on the mainland.
The U.S. government played a major role. In 1951 alone, its economic aid to Taiwan
6
amounted to 10 percent of the island’s entire gross national product (GNP). Between
7
1951 and 1954, American grants totaled $375 million. However, it was assumed that
this level of support could not last forever. During 1953, the U.S. embassy in Taipei
reported that the Nationalists had just adopted a four-year plan that sought to make the
8
ROC economically independent of the United States by 1957.
The Taiwanese economic plan was ambitious. To promote rapid industrial development,
the Nationalists focused on import substitution. By erecting a tariff wall to protect
infant industries, they aimed to substitute locally made consumer goods for imported
ones. In addition, they sought to develop export industries, so as to profit from valueadded processing of raw materials. Taiwan also emphasized light industry and the
production of consumer goods that would improve the local standard of living. It would
not focus on heavy industry until the 1960s. These economic policies stood in stark contrast to the Soviet model for industrial development followed by mainland China, which
emphasized heavy industry first.
American economic support had a dramatic impact on Taiwan. On 3 May 1951, E. H.
Jacobs-Larkcom, the British consul in Taiwan, reported on the positive benefits of this
American aid:
It was not until the accelerated American aid programme of 1949/50 that the Formosans found an
administration to their taste. The Americans have insisted on political and social reform—e.g. a
measure of democratic self-government has been granted, and land rentals have been reduced to
fair levels. In addition, American material aid really reaches the common people, and at fair prices. I
think it may be stated, therefore, that what the bulk of the native population desire is a continuation
of the present American colonial regime.9
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In March 1955, British observers remained impressed, noting approvingly that the
Nationalists were gradually bringing about a more democratic climate, although their
government was “still a dictatorship, albeit a benevolent and—in so far as the President
was elected and his emergency powers were approved by the National Assembly—a
10
constitutional one.”
Considering that these years of extremely high economic growth on Taiwan corresponded with the presence of the Taiwan Patrol Force, it is apparent that the security the
U.S. Navy provided helped promote the so-called Taiwan miracle. Among the most obvious contributions of the U.S. Navy were frequent naval demonstrations. These shows
of force sought to boost Nationalist morale, even while sending highly visible warnings
to the PRC not to attack.
Naval Demonstrations as Shows of Force
Throughout the 1950s, the United States sponsored periodic naval demonstrations in
the Taiwan Strait to show the flag. By doing so it sought to reassure the Nationalists
and the overseas Chinese community that their concerns were not being overlooked.
The full-time presence of the Taiwan Patrol Force was the most constant reminder to
the Nationalists of American support. In the view of one participant, “The Patrol was
a good idea and served well its purpose of demonstrating in a visible way the U.S. com11
mitment to the defense of Taiwan.” During “invasion season,” usually the late spring or
early summer of each year, the U.S. Navy organized special demonstrations as shows of
force and morale boosters in Taiwan—and just in case of actual PRC attacks.
On 8 April 1951, with Vice Adm. H. M. Martin, Commander, Seventh Fleet, on board
USS Philippine Sea (CV 47) and Adm. William G. Tomlinson in USS Boxer as officer in
tactical command, Task Force 77 left Korea and steamed south through the East China
Sea. On 11 April, just outside the three-mile limit off the Chinese mainland, a carefully
crafted show of force was staged. On the 13th Admiral Martin flew to Taipei to visit
12
Chiang Kai-shek. U.S. Navy planes flew over Taiwan, to “bolster Nationalist morale.”
In July 1952 it was the turn of USS Essex (CV 9), again with Philippine Sea, to conduct
this operation. Special Task Group 50.8, under the command of Rear Adm. Apollo
Soucek, included two aircraft carriers and eight destroyers. On 24 July, reconnaissance
airplanes flew over Communist military installations on the mainland and Hainan
Island. The Communists fired on the planes and sent up fighter aircraft, but with no
effect. CinCPac, Admiral Radford, later told the press that this demonstration proved
that the Navy could bomb the coastal cities of Xiamen, Fuzhou, and Shantou at any time
13
without “draining its forces in Korea.”
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Because the Seventh Fleet had such a wide range of duties to perform and could not concentrate all of its efforts on Taiwan, it was important that the Nationalists’ morale (and
therefore willingness to contribute to their own security) be kept as high as possible and
that the PRC be deterred from attempting an invasion. Of course, these demonstrations
were not equally successful. On 1 June 1954 the U.S. Seventh Fleet made a show of force
in the Dachens, and later that summer, on 18 August, other Seventh Fleet ships paid a
14
visit. The movements represented a calculated attempt to “create the impression that
15
the US is prepared to use force.” In this particular case, the PRC decided to call the U.S.
bluff: by early 1955 increased PLA attacks had forced the Nationalists to evacuate the
Dachen Islands.
Naval demonstrations could also be costly in terms of aircraft and pilots. In demonstrations carried out in September 1958, for example, the carrier air-group commanders
were too enthusiastic, and the “Navy paid a price for the show of force put on by the
combat air patrol over the Taiwan Strait, losing four planes and three pilots in acci16
dents.” Even though dangerous, naval demonstrations were nonetheless considered to
be highly important for building up Taiwanese morale.
USN Morale-Building Activities
It was feared that the 1955 decision to evacuate the Dachens would have a serious psychological impact on the Nationalists. The U.S. government had to be concerned about
these trends. Throughout the 1950s there were concerns that the morale of Taiwanese
citizens was waning; after all, they were a small island nation facing an enormous continental power. As Ambassador Karl L. Rankin explained to a British visitor in 1953, “The
Chinese Nationalists on Formosa represented the only case where a sizeable element of
a communist dominated country had escaped from behind the iron curtain and was
conducting his affairs as an independent government.” Taiwan’s success or failure could
have a dramatic effect on “the whole anti-communist problem . . . in the ultimate showdown.” Because of Taiwan’s “unique position” it required “great vision and foresight in
framing our future policy toward communism as a whole, and in particular, towards the
17
situation in the Far East.”
It was a delicate balancing act keeping the Nationalists happy, while not giving them too
much leeway. In a 10 February 1955 “Eyes Only Top Secret” letter, Eisenhower described
this problem to Churchill:
To defend Formosa the United States has been engaged in a long and costly program of arming and
sustaining the Nationalist troops on the island. Those troops, however, and Chiang himself, are not
content, now, to accept irrevocably and permanently the status of “prisoners” on the island. They
are held together by a conviction that some day they will go back to the mainland.
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As a consequence, their attitude toward Quemoy [Jinmen] and the Matsus [Mazus], which they
deem the stepping stones between the two hostile regions, is that the surrender of those islands
would destroy the reason for the existence of the Nationalist forces on Formosa. This, then, would
mean the almost immediate conversion of that asset into a deadly danger, because the Communists
would immediately take it over.
The Formosa Resolution, as passed by the Congress, is our publicly stated position; the problem now
is how to make it work. The morale of the Chinese Nationalists is important to us, so for the moment, and under existing conditions, we feel they must have certain assurances with respect to the
offshore islands. But these must be less binding on us than the terms of the Chino-American Treaty,
which was overwhelmingly passed yesterday by the Senate. We must remain ready, until some better
solution can be found, to move promptly against any Communist force that is manifestly preparing
to attack Formosa. And we must make a distinction—(this is a difficult one)—between an attack
that has only as its objective the capture of an offshore island and one that is primarily a preliminary
movement to an all-out attack on Formosa.
Whatever now is to happen, I know that nothing could be worse than global war. . . . I devoutly hope
that history’s inflexible yardstick will show that we have done everything in our power, and everything that is right, to prevent the awful catastrophe of another major war.18

As Eisenhower emphasized in a later letter to Churchill, in some ways the U.S. government had actually gained much less than it wanted in negotiations with Taipei, since it
had to be careful not to coerce Chiang Kai-shek lest it undermine the “morale and the
19
loyalty of the non-Communist forces on Formosa.”
The American embassy on Taiwan was primarily responsible for tracking morale. In a
31 March 1955 memo it reported that to an average native on Taiwan the recent U.S.Taiwan Mutual Security Treaty had increased the security of the island. But mainland
Chinese living in exile on Taiwan were upset over U.S. attempts to sign a cease-fire that
would permanently pacify the Taiwan Strait area, as well as over the American failure to
20
commit itself fully to the defense of Jinmen and Mazu Islands. An April 1955 assessment was more optimistic: “The Embassy believes we can count on the determination
and fighting spirit of the Nationalists until they are convinced the U.S. has abandoned
their cause.” 21 During June 1955, however, Chiang Kai-shek informed Dulles that he
wanted to reinforce the offshore islands by sending an additional division. But before taking action, he wanted to learn Washington’s view, since should the public and
military learn that Washington opposed reinforcing the island garrisons, they might
22
“deduce that we are thinking of urging another Dachen-like withdrawal.”
Concerns about low morale among the Nationalists also affected the overseas Chinese.
According to Eisenhower, millions of ethnic Chinese living in the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaya, and Hong Kong were looking to Chiang Kai-shek, and “if the Chinese
National Government should disappear, these émigré Chinese will certainly deem
themselves subjects of the Chinese Communist Government and they will quickly add
23
to the difficulties of their adopted countries.” A British report confirmed that overseas
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Chinese support for the West would disappear if Taiwan were completely neutralized
24
with “no stake at all in mainland China.”
U.S. Navy Ship Visits to Taiwan
Frequent U.S. Navy port calls were another highly visible method to boost morale on
Taiwan. Military exercises were held, usually accompanied by lavish banquets. Swimming and beach recreation parties were planned and carried out at every opportunity.
Ships would organize boxing teams to compete with Nationalist boxers; one match had
well over three thousand onlookers. Basketball and baseball games were also held. It was
generally found that the Taiwanese were good at American sports and fielded highly
25
competitive teams.
One important aspect of morale building was interactions of American naval personnel
as individuals. This seemed to convey convincingly that the U.S. Navy was there to help
the Nationalists oppose a PRC invasion, if the need ever arose. Military and naval exercises and accompanying banquets were good excuses to get together. On one occasion
officers of USS Manatee, led by Capt. W. G. Chapple, were invited to observe military
26
maneuvers. Almost all the high-ranking officers of the Nationalist army were present.
According to an account of a similar event,
The Nationalists worked at maintaining good relations. I remember being impressed that during
the times I served as CTG 72.1 my opposite number was a Taiwanese Vice Admiral. I was at the
time a Lieutenant Commander. They threw at least one banquet at which our wardroom officers
were guests, and they provided for our use of athletic facilities (tennis court and playing fields). We
met with the [vice admiral] and his staff to plan at sea exercises with units of the Taiwan navy, then
carried out these exercises at sea. I recall an exercise in which four Taiwanese destroyers operated
with our two DERs, with the Taiwanese Vice Admiral serving as the Officer in Tactical Command
(OTC) for half of the time, and me as a Lieutenant Commander exercising command the other half
of the time. If this rank imbalance bothered them they did not show it.27

There were some unavoidable cultural differences, however, between the Americans
and their Nationalist hosts. For example, Asian customs of how a good host should act
differed from those of the West. Providing female companionship was often considered
a common courtesy to visiting guests. Once Admiral Anderson, visiting a warlord in
charge of the Penghu Islands, was told by the Chinese gentleman, “Oh, you’re here. I
have a very nice Chinese girl for you.” When Anderson replied, “Thank you very much.
I live on my flagship,” the warlord replied, “Oh, that’s all right,” and kindly offered to
28
send the girl on board. On the grounds that allowing any civilians on board ship—
especially a female companion—was against USN regulations, Anderson was able to
decline the offer without insulting his host.
The generally good behavior of U.S. personnel visiting Taiwan helped convey a positive
image of Americans to the people on Taiwan. One glaring counterexample occurred in
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May 1957, when a U.S. Army sergeant was tried by court-martial and acquitted for
the death of a local Peeping Tom. When the court ruling was announced, crowds of
angry locals attacked the U.S. embassy in Taipei on 24 May. Ambassador Rankin was
out of the country, but thirteen American citizens were hurt, and the embassy building
was described as left “in shambles” (photo 6). The Taiwan Patrol Force flagship was
recalled to Keelung for possible evacuation of U.S. citizens, but the local police con29
tained the riot. There has been speculation that the riot was government sponsored,
perhaps to obtain access to
confidential notes housed in
30
the embassy.

Photo 6
U.S. embassy in Taipei looted by rioters on 24 May 1957.
Government Information Office, Republic of China (Taiwan)

It was more usual for Nationalist
newspapers to write flattering
articles concerning the fine conduct of USN crew members on
31
liberty. In July 1955, therefore,
a British observer was able
to report that “morale is high,
and Nationalist naval and air
32
strength growing.” Also, much
of the USN crew members’
pay found its way into the local
economy, which could not
help but make American
sailors popular.

U.S. Navy Crews Given R&R on Taiwan
In addition to other port calls, USN vessels assigned to the Taiwan Patrol Force were frequent visitors to Keelung and Kaohsiung, Taiwan, periodically pulling into one of these
two port cities to replenish supplies. As soon as it arrived, a destroyer would be met by
trucks carrying ship’s stores, and a fuel hose would be hooked up from the pier. Usually
a courier came on board with a large canvas bag containing classified and unclassified
publications and orders, mail for the crew, and official correspondence. The crewmen
were granted leave, during which they conducted morale-building activities and community service, and generally enjoyed the local R&R opportunities.
While in port, there were many ship responsibilities the crews had to carry out, such as
painting and repairing the ship, restocking, and refueling. Repairs were often delegated
to Nationalist contractors. At one point, Hissem’s supply officer attempted to get the
ship’s mess decks fixed up in Keelung, by having local workers install a false overhead
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to cover the cables and pipes. The job was almost complete when it was noted that the
contractor was using wood, an obvious fire hazard: “In the end, it all had to come out
33
and we were back to square one. Now we can laugh about it.”
When visiting Taiwan, ships gave special attention to sponsoring social events for the
crew. Beach parties were especially popular. In this regard, morale on the ships assigned
to Taiwan Patrol Force did not differ in any substantive way from that in other naval
assignments. By and large, team building, a sense of mission, and frequent R&R stops
contributed to high morale among the USN crews. Certainly this is what James Barber,
captain of Hissem, remembers:
I think that there were several contributing factors. In no particular order: the size of the crew,
about 130, meant that everyone could know everyone else, and contributed to a “we are all on one
team” feeling. The Executive Officer, then Lieutenant Ed Hart, was a former Chief Quartermaster
and beloved by the crew. We were fortunate to have outstanding officers and men in key roles. The
ship was consistently ranked at the top among our sister DERs. Before being deployed to the Seventh Fleet the ship had gone through a rough patch with inadequate resources and material failures.
Once this situation was remedied there was a sense of everything getting better. We had a variety of
interesting operations, including rescue of the crew of a burning U.S. merchant ship in the middle
of a typhoon, operations in every one of the Vietnam Market Time zones, and our Taiwan Patrol
assignments. We had some enjoyable liberty ports, including going up the river to Bangkok, Hong
Kong (where we had a stay as station ship), Brisbane, Pago Pago, Jesselton [in North] Borneo, Vung
Tau, and the Taiwanese ports. All of these things, and probably some other factors I have missed,
contributed to a sense of shared adventure.34

Certain ships offered to assist the Nationalists in building schools and other community
projects. For example, the crew of O’Brien (DD 725), which had assisted in the evacuation of the Dachens ten years before, completed several important building projects
35
during a visit in the mid-1960s.
As might be expected, much of the crews’ R&R time was spent in the local bars or at
the Officers’ Club. According to one account: “Nancy’s Harbor Bar and Grill served
as almost an American Club during our in port periods. Some of the crew alleged that
there was really just one set of bar girls in Taiwan, and they would appear in either Kao
hsiung or Keelung, depending on ship’s schedules, about which they were exceptionally
36
knowledgeable.” To assist in controlling the spread of venereal diseases, bar girls were
required by the Nationalist authorities to keep a logbook. U.S. naval personnel were
urged not to try to evade this system by giving false names, since only complete records
would allow a disease to be traced to its origin.
During R&R periods, the crew still had to be available for duty. Sometimes they were
interrupted by emergencies:
I mentioned Nancy’s Harbor Bar and Grill above. One night while we were in port Kaohsiung a
ship’s party took place at Nancy’s to celebrate the promotion of one of the crew. While this was going on we received a distress message from a U.S. Navy repair ship [USS Dixie (AD 14)] that had lost
all power and was adrift south of Taiwan. We did an emergency recall of ship’s personnel, which was
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aided by the fact that almost all of the liberty party was at Nancy’s, but was hindered by the fact that
some of them were two sheets to the wind. We got under way safely, but I have sometimes questioned my judgment in doing so. As I recall the only recommendation I received from Ed Hart,
who was serving as Navigator as we exited the harbor, was “Go out this way about a mile, Skipper,
and turn south.” As it turned out, the repair ship regained power and our assistance was
not required.37

Others recalled the same incident: “I still remember the night orders from the XO. They
simply said ‘Head south to Dixie’ in a drunken scribble.” The rescue was not necessary,
since Dixie was able to fix its problem before Hissem arrived. But the experience of getting the ship under way safely with a “limited but effective watch team” was unforget38
table: “We did good.”
Being assigned to the Taiwan Patrol Force was considered hazardous duty, in particular
since the first vessel to be attacked in a Taiwan Strait incident would be the trip wire
that brought in the rest of the Seventh Fleet. In addition to regular R&R visits to Southeast Asian ports, therefore, the U.S. Navy worked hard to keep spirits high on board
ships. American military personnel received medals for their service on various missions, including the China Service Medal for serving on the Taiwan Patrol Force. This
built morale and could mean monetary rewards, since certain awards gave the recipient
tax breaks or other financial benefits.
Since the beginning of fleets, naval personnel have vied for recognition through obtaining medals. Some have put much time and effort into maximizing their awards during
an assignment. A pilot stationed in the western Pacific explained, “We occasionally were
visited by officers from CinCPacFleet staff who had the requisite security clearances
to fly with us as observers. And, for their benefit, we created the ‘Instant Hero’ patrol
route. While I cannot offer the exact route, suffice it to say that it ran through the Taiwan Strait and nicked the Korean Combat Zone before retiring to Okinawa.” In this way
an observer could acquire in ten hours a China Service Medal, a Korean Service Medal
with a battle star, a United Nations Service Medal, and a Korean Presidential Unit Citation (map 6). This averaged one medal every two and a half hours. They also qualified
for a tenth or a twentieth of an Air Medal if there was enemy fire. According to one of
39
the pilots of the “instant hero” flights, “They loved us for our thoughtfulness.”
Medals could not only enhance careers but bring a two-hundred-dollar deduction on
income taxes. Over time there developed some highly elaborate methods for maximizing one’s medals and tax deductions, even though actual time in the particular war zone
might be measured in minutes rather than weeks or months. These activities, so long
as they did not break rules, were usually ignored, since they ultimately helped boost
morale.
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MAP 6

Flight Path Similar to the “Instant Hero”

I:\__WIP from C 032812\_Newport Papers\_NP_38_Tawian Patrol_Elleman\InDesign\09 NP_38 Chapter 7.indd April 2, 2012 10:25 AM

high seas buffer   97

Conclusions
With American political and financial support, Taiwan experienced rapid economic
growth from the early 1950s through the 1970s. By the mid-1980s, Taiwan’s GNP was
approximately half the PRC’s, even though it had less than one-fiftieth of China’s population. Taiwan was also well on its way to adopting a true democratic government. The
U.S. Navy played an important role during these years by helping to maintain Nationalist morale. One major morale builder involved coordinated naval demonstrations.
Another was the scheduling of frequent port calls and R&R opportunities for USN
crews. This was all part and parcel of a larger American economic program intended to
put Taiwan on its feet.
Rest-and-recreation visits might include sporting matches with local teams, interviews
with the press, and tourist travel around the island. Some crew members even brought
golf clubs and enjoyed playing on Taiwan’s world-class, Japanese-built golf courses:
when a golf ball went astray, the young female caddies would reportedly use their only
English phrase, “Oh bee-ah!” (Oh dear!), to express dismay. Many USN personnel remember fondly their liberty ashore in Taiwan, often revolving around a favorite restaurant or tavern. Social mores were relatively relaxed, and bar girls would often appear at
pubs frequented by foreigners. As one sailor recounted, there was always the “bar scene
40
with the girls pandering for our bucks.”
Considering Taiwan’s geographic isolation, the U.S. Navy was important for helping to
prop up local morale. Higher morale in Taiwan could, in turn, have a significant impact
on the overseas Chinese community throughout East Asia and Southeast Asia, which
was looking to Taiwan for moral and political leadership. The people on Taiwan clearly
appreciated U.S. Navy efforts to protect them from invasion across the strait. In fact,
during its decades-long existence the Taiwan Patrol Force was the most obvious and
visible sign of U.S. government support for the Republic of China. All of these political,
economic, and psychological factors were to play especially important roles during the
second Taiwan Strait crisis, in 1958.
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CHAPTER EIGHT

The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, 1958
Tensions between the PRC and Taiwan remained high after the first Taiwan Strait
crisis in 1954–55. The Nationalist blockade of the PRC continued, although it halted a
lower percentage of international shipping with the PRC, since it was now limited to the
southeastern Chinese coast. However, the blockade, together with the U.S.-sponsored
strategic embargo, which lasted through 1971, had a significant impact on the PRC.
One scholar has even concluded, “It is no exaggeration that the U.S. embargo in part
prompted the Three-Anti’s and Five-Anti’s campaigns, the Socialist Transformation,
the Anti-Rightist movements, and the Great Leap Forward, which precipitated both
1
economic disaster and political disorder in China.”
To make up for the loss of international seaborne commerce, the PRC was forced to
turn to the USSR, conducting an ever-larger share of trade via the trans-Siberian railway. China’s debts to the USSR grew to well over a billion U.S. dollars; one estimate of
2
China’s total debt was 1.5 billion rubles, or almost two billion 1962 dollars. During the
late 1950s, the PRC sought to break away from its overreliance on the USSR. In 1957 the
British tried to help China diversify its trade by shipping to it a wider range of goods. In
response, the Nationalist blockade tightened. On 7 June 1957, the Nationalist minister
for foreign affairs pledged that his government would stand firm on its mainland “port
closure order” even if the British sent warships to escort merchant ships into the Com3
munist ports.
Occurring as it did in the midst of the Nationalist retightening of the blockade, the
second Taiwan Strait crisis was linked to the PRC goal of halting the blockade once and
for all and thereby diversifying its international trade. To try to catch up with the West,
Mao Zedong adopted unsound economic policies like the Great Leap Forward, which
eventually produced a nationwide famine that killed millions of Chinese. Beijing’s
renewed attacks during 1958 on Jinmen—the Nationalists’ main blockade base—put
extreme pressure on Taiwan to end the blockade. As in the first crisis, during 1954–55,
the Taiwan Patrol Force was put right in the midst of this dispute.
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The Gradual Decline of the Nationalist Blockade
During the early 1950s, the U.S. government actively supported the Nationalist blockade, in particular when its enforcement helped to strengthen the U.S.-led strategic
embargo of the PRC. By contrast, the British government opposed the blockade with
its own Formosa Straits Patrol and in 1957 announced that it was planning to increase
trade with China. Meanwhile, in 1954, the Nationalist navy had unwittingly sparked a
diplomatic furor when it detained Tuapse, a Soviet-flagged tanker. Bad publicity about
the poor treatment of the Russian crew eventually led to a reduction in congressional
support for the Nationalist blockade.
By 1957, the blockade was under attack by the British, who protested its interference
with Hong Kong’s trade with China. During the year and a half between 1954 and mid1955, there were thirty-five reported incidents against British shipping; however, the
number of serious attacks dropped to a total of fourteen—nine from the sea, two from
4
the land, and three from the air—with no reported casualties or deaths. The Formosa
Straits Patrol, unlike its American counterpart, operated only sporadically during the
mid-1950s. Usually one Royal Navy ship was engaged on a patrol, and each patrol lasted
only two or three days. During a five-month period in late 1954, for example, only seven
British ships patrolled the Taiwan Strait, each for two or three days, which meant ships
5
were only present twenty-four of about 150 days, or about 16 percent of the period.
Unlike the USN vessels, whose complex duties included patrolling, training, and morale
building, the Royal Navy sought simply to protect British shipping from interference by
the Nationalists and their guerrilla allies. During a chance encounter in a Taipei bar, the
commanding officer of a British ship displayed his orders, signed by the First Lord of
the Admiralty: “You will uphold the Queen’s interests in the Formosa Straits.” Such orders differed from USN directives, which tended to outline every possible contingency,
prompting the American officer to conclude, “I presume he may also have been given
verbal guidance, but it was not in writing, so he had complete latitude in deciding how
to act. Now that’s the way to run a Navy!” 6
One sure sign of the British patrol’s impact became apparent on 8 September 1955, when
the Nationalist government’s Department of Defense ordered that attacks on shipping
off the coast of China must be confined to Communist vessels and that no neutral ships
should be molested unless it was necessary for self-defense. This sole exception would
appear to cover a hypothetical situation where a neutral vessel “happened to be in the
7
way of a bona fide attack on a Communist vessel.”
Although British-flagged vessels continued to be stopped and searched from time to
time, in July 1956 it was reported that so far that year no British ship had sustained
damage or casualties as a result of Nationalist air or naval action or by the fire of shore
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batteries on coastal islands.8 Almost a year after that, in May 1957, it was further reported that since December 1955 not a single British ship had been damaged, nor had
9
there been casualties.
The loosening of the Nationalist blockade against British shipping also corresponded
with a gradual decline in U.S. congressional support. This was largely due to the June
1954 seizure by the Nationalists of the Soviet tanker Tuapse. Moscow immediately protested that a U.S. destroyer had conducted the operation, but Washington denied this
accusation. Instead, as described by one specialist, the ship’s capture was Chiang’s “first
10
act of revenge” against the Soviet Union for supporting the Chinese Communists.
Tuapse was taken to Taiwan, where its crew was released. Most of the Russians were
eventually returned to the Soviet Union, but eleven elected to remain in Taiwan, and
nine later asked for and were eventually granted political asylum in the United States.
In 1956, the Soviet embassy requested that it be allowed to interview the nine defectors.
Initially, the U.S. government refused, presenting “letters from all nine crew members
11
stating they did not wish to talk with any Soviet official.”
When the nine crew members arrived in the United States, however, they met with
Soviet diplomats. Five of the nine were convinced to return home; perhaps family
members back in the USSR were threatened with punishment. Upon their return to the
USSR, the five sailors told the Soviet press that they had been little better than hostages
in Taiwan. They claimed to have asked to be returned home but had been put instead in
solitary confinement, where they had been “cruelly beaten and abused almost every day
12
for two months.”
The bad publicity surrounding this incident increased U.S.-Soviet diplomatic tensions,
which undermined congressional support for the Nationalist blockade. The Senate
Internal Security Subcommittee, in particular, blamed the U.S. government for letting Soviet officials put pressure on the sailors to redefect. The generally negative press
created a bad impression in the United States and abroad, since it seemed to many that
the Soviet crew members had been forced to defect first to Taiwan and then later to the
United States. After the Tuapse incident, there were far fewer cases of search, seizure,
and attack by Nationalist warships.
By 1957, the Nationalist blockade of the PRC had been in effect for almost ten years. A
combination of British protests and the presence of the Royal Navy gradually limited its
usefulness against British shipping. However, on 31 May 1957, the thirty-third anniversary of the 1924 Sino-Soviet Treaty opening diplomatic relations between the USSR and
China, a Nationalist naval squadron sank a 1,500-ton Communist transport ship off the
13
Xiamen coast.
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As late as June 1957, the Nationalist government publicly warned foreign ships enter14
ing Communist ports that they did so at their own risk. That month, however, after
years of internal debate and discussion, the British government finally decided to end
entirely its support for the U.S.-led embargo. Beginning in early 1958 Sino-British trade
increased dramatically, both in volume and in types of items. This prompted the American embassy in Taipei to warn during summer 1957 that “the Chinese Communists may
wish to neutralize it [Jinmen] in order to facilitate a greater use of the harbor following
15
the British action on trade controls.” The PRC did in fact attempt to neutralize Jinmen
Island, resulting in the second Taiwan Strait crisis.
The PRC Attack on Jinmen
As the U.S. embassy had predicted, one of the PRC’s top priorities in 1958 was to
increase its trade with Britain. The key was to eliminate the threat from the Nationalist base on Jinmen. Since the mid-1950s an estimated 750,000 PLA troops had been
permanently stationed along the mainland coast opposite the offshore islands. This
deployment had been a drain on the PRC and had definitely slowed any PLA probing
16
elsewhere. According to one historian, therefore, the PRC’s “first objective” during the
second Taiwan Strait crisis “was to deter the Nationalists from using the offshore islands
17
for harassment of the mainland, or as a base for a future invasion of the mainland.”
On 23 August 1958, Communist forces began shelling Jinmen Island, firing an estimated forty thousand shells during the first attack. Scholars have argued that the timing
18
of China’s attack was linked to the ongoing Lebanon crisis in the Middle East. While it
is true that Beijing hoped that the U.S. military would be too heavily committed in the
Mediterranean to respond to the Jinmen attack, the British decision to liberalize trade
with China was also an important contributing factor. For example, during August
1958, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, president of the Council of Ministers of Cambodia,
visited China to mediate with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, and in mid-September he
explained to Walter S. Robertson, assistant secretary to the U.S. mission to the UN, that
the PRC leaders were “concerned by the fact that the offshore islands are being used to
19
mount Commando attacks on the mainland and to impose a blockade.”
Immediately after the shelling began, the Nationalists requested full American military
support. Vice Adm. Roland N. Smoot, the commander of the U.S. Taiwan Defense Command from 1958 to 1962, had no choice but to tell Chiang that according to the U.S.ROC defense treaty the USN could not get directly involved. However, the U.S. military
assisted in other ways: “We could and did take over military defense of Taiwan itself,
20
thus releasing his military forces to defend and resupply the offshore islands.” Accordingly, the PRC attack on Jinmen immediately drew in the Seventh Fleet. A direct SinoU.S. conflict was narrowly avoided when on 24 September 1958 USS Hopewell (DD 681)
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went to the assistance of a Nationalist LST being attacked by Communist torpedo boats.
Hopewell’s orders were to remain clear of the fighting and not to fire unless fired on.
The Communist patrol boats circled the destroyer but elected not to fire. As one account
of this standoff concluded, “Thus, caution on both sides averted the first potential clash
21
between Communist and American forces in the Strait.”
By mid-September 1958 the U.S. Navy had positioned five carriers and their escort ships
near Taiwan, and another two were on their way. A clear message was sent to the PRC
when it was revealed on 1 October that a number of eight-inch howitzers, capable of
22
firing nuclear shells, had been delivered to Jinmen Island. In addition, it was on this
occasion that the Nationalist air force was provided with advanced Sidewinders. In one
air battle on 24 September 1958, Nationalist F-86s shot down an impressive ten MiGs,
23
plus two other probable hits, without sustaining a single loss. These were the first-ever
24
kills by these air-to-air missiles.
Most importantly, the U.S. Navy helped protect the shipping lanes supplying Jinmen.
In early September 1958, the Taiwan Patrol Force was ordered to assist the Nationalist
effort to resupply Jinmen by providing landing ships, plus escort and support forces to
protect the Nationalist convoy. On 6 September, the first U.S.-escorted Nationalist convoy, code-named Lightning, reached Jinmen with crucial supplies. The Taiwan Patrol
Force escort included four destroyers and two cruisers, including USS Helena (CA 75).
With USN assistance, Nationalist supply ships began to reach Jinmen in sufficiently
large numbers that by mid-September they had broken what was being called a PRC
artillery blockade of the island. By 19 September a total of nine convoys had reached Jin25
men; the final four were able to land an average of 151 tons of supplies.
Of particular importance was safeguarding the supply ships’ arrival in and withdrawal
from the area. Aircraft were provided for antisubmarine and surface reconnaissance
within twenty-five miles of Jinmen Island. U.S. aircraft were told to stay at least twenty
miles off the Chinese coastline and USN vessels to remain at least three miles from
26
shore. U.S. Navy ships were particularly warned not to shoot at the mainland. However, special ROE were issued stating, “US Commanders are authorized to engage hostile
surface vessels in territorial or international waters if they are attacking the RCN [Re27
public of China Navy] forces.” Meanwhile, intensive training was undertaken by USN
personnel to ensure that the Nationalists could carry out a successful convoy operation.
A 15 September 1958 map shows how USN ships—stationed in the dotted boxes—protected Nationalist ships resupplying Jinmen (map 7).
Washington’s support for the Nationalists was not unconditional. For example, when
Chiang told Admiral Smoot that he wanted to use Taiwanese planes to bomb the mainland, Washington was concerned this might escalate the conflict. According to Admiral
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MAP 7

U.S. Navy’s Jinmen Convoy Operations
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Smoot, “We [U.S. Navy] developed a study which proved to them that for every one of
those guns that they might silence by the type of bombing they had available, they’d
probably lose almost a squadron of planes. This, of course[,] was too big a price to pay,
and they were convinced of the proposal’s infeasibility.” 28
During late September 1958, the PRC sent a message through Indian intermediaries that
if the Nationalists withdrew from the islands they would not be attacked, and Beijing
29
would not press immediately its claims to Taiwan. The Chinese leaders, clearly concerned about further U.S. intervention, ordered the artillery units firing on Jinmen to
30
be sure that “no strike should be aimed at American ships.” However, Mao refused to
31
accept American demands that a cease-fire precede Sino-U.S. talks to resolve the crisis.
For this reason, a negotiated settlement appeared unlikely.
Growing Sino-Soviet Economic Tension
Behind the scenes, several important diplomatic factors contributed to the second crossstrait crisis. The PRC was determined to break the Nationalist blockade. This aim was
linked to growing Sino-Soviet tension over the PRC’s recently adopted economic plan,
the Great Leap Forward. Mao’s decision to shell Jinmen without first seeking Soviet approval has thus been described as “a challenge not just to Taipei and Washington but to
32
Moscow’s domination of the international Communist movement as well.”  
Due in large measure to the U.S.-led economic embargo of China, the PRC’s economic
dependence on the USSR had grown rapidly throughout the 1950s. Since 1950, when the
PRC had borrowed three hundred million American dollars from the USSR, a sum that
was clearly insufficient to solve China’s many economic problems, it had gotten progressively deeper in debt to Moscow. The PRC’s intervention in the Korean War led not only
to huge military losses but to even greater debt to the USSR, since, to “add insult to in33
jury,” Stalin demanded that China pay for all Soviet military equipment sent to Korea.
During August 1958, Mao initiated a new phase of the Great Leap Forward; Soviet
imports rose by an “astounding 70 per cent in 1958 and 1959” to support his industri34
alization plans. But Beijing’s constant demands on Moscow entailed political costs.
During summer 1958, when Mao requested nuclear submarines, Khrushchev in turn
pressured Mao to agree to allow Soviet submarine bases in China. This proposal was
a clear throwback to tsarist Russian imperialism, undermining China’s sovereignty.
Proposed Soviet bases and the artillery attack on Jinmen were major factors in the Sino35
Soviet dispute.
When the PRC refused the USSR’s request for basing rights, Khrushchev asked how
China could pay for the submarines; Mao responded that China had unlimited supplies
of grain. True to his words, beginning in 1959 the PRC began to export millions of tons
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of grain, worth an estimated U.S.$935 million, largely to fund its purchases from the
36
USSR. About three-quarters of all famine-related deaths in China during 1959–61 oc37
curred in 1960, which corresponds to the highest grain exports.
To increase grain sales to pay for the Great Leap Forward, Beijing desperately needed to
increase its maritime trade. PRC officials attempted to exploit Anglo-American differences in trade policy to achieve this goal. Mao also put pressure on Taiwan to give up its
last offshore island bases, the only parts of the mainland the Nationalists still con38
trolled. Not only would this undermine Chiang’s goal of returning to the mainland,
but when it happened, the PRC would finally be able to claim to have reunified all of
mainland China. All of these foreign-policy, economic, and political factors contributed
to Mao’s decision during August 1958 to attack Jinmen Island.
Dulles Halts the Nationalist Blockade
Washington, concerned that fighting in the Taiwan Strait might escalate into all-out
war, tried in 1958 to persuade Chiang to reduce the Nationalist forces on the islands so
39
as to halt the commando raids. Although it was left unstated, any decision to cut forces
on the offshore islands would also necessarily result in the termination of the Nationalists’ decade-long naval blockade of China.
40

In October, Dulles flew to Taiwan. During private talks, Chiang refused to withdraw,
rejecting any proposal that seemed to him to suggest “retreat from his position as head
41
of the only legitimate Chinese Government.” Dulles instead urged him to renounce the
42
use of force to reunify China. Included in this plan would be a substantial reduction of
43
forces on Jinmen and Mazu.
Decreasing forces on the offshore islands would mean the end of the Nationalist
blockade. Dulles told the British Foreign Office immediately before he left for Taiwan
44
that ending the blockade was one of his goals. The blockade was no longer necessary,
since the PRC was experiencing an economic implosion due to the Great Leap Forward.
Meanwhile, it was well-known in Washington that Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations
45
were already under increasing stress. It was to be no coincidence that the Nationalist
blockade ended just as the first hint of what would soon be called the Sino-Soviet split
46
appeared.
On 6 October 1958, after forty-four days, the PRC halted the shelling. Civilian casualties were 138 dead and 324 injured; the dead and wounded soldiers numbered close to
three thousand. In addition, an estimated seven thousand buildings on Jinmen had been
47
either damaged or destroyed. The cessation was not permanent; artillery fire continued for the next twenty years, ending for good only in January 1979 after the United
States and the People’s Republic of China recognized each other. Firing would take place
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on alternate days of the week, with the shells mainly containing propaganda leaflets.
An estimated one million steel shell casings were fired at Jinmen, in what would be the
48
longest sustained artillery barrage in world history.
Nonetheless, even after the October 1958 pause, all American attempts to resolve PRCTaiwan differences peacefully failed. On 27 October 1958, British foreign secretary
Selwyn Lloyd wrote to Dulles that the Chinese seemed to be in no hurry to make peace
with Taiwan and would pursue their aims by whatever political means they could think
of: “They do not want mediation and their ultimate goal appears to be some direct arrangement with the Nationalists.” Lloyd concluded by predicting—with great accuracy,
from the viewpoint of half a century later—“We are, therefore, likely to be in for a fairly
49
long period of such tactics.”
The Economic Impact of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis
Following the end of the Nationalist blockade, China’s international maritime trade
gradually began to recover. Between 1957 and 1959 there was almost a doubling of im50
ports from Britain and nearly a tripling of imports from West Germany. The fact that
much of China’s foreign trade with Europe was still being funneled through the USSR,
by means of the trans-Siberian railway, gave a false appearance that Sino-Soviet trade
was continuing. But once the Sino-Soviet split occurred, beginning in August 1960,
51
there was a complete shift away from the Soviet Union toward the West.
By 1960, the PRC was facing a domestic financial disaster as a result of the Great Leap
Forward. As soon as the Sino-Soviet split became public, however, Beijing insisted on
repaying its estimated billion-ruble-plus debt to the USSR. Mao was reportedly desper52
ate to break away from the USSR-dominated economic system. Enormous Chinese
grain exports in 1959 and 1960 helped fund these repayments—at the cost, as noted,
of nationwide famine. During 1961, the PRC finally began to import more grain than
53
it exported. But according to one study, almost half a billion rubles was repaid to the
USSR during 1960–62, as tens of millions of Chinese were dying of hunger. By ignoring
the plight of the Chinese people, Beijing managed to repay its entire debt to Moscow by
54
1965, ahead of schedule.
In the aftermath of the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis, Sino-Soviet trade began to decline,
just as China’s trade with the West began to grow. According to one view of the U.S.
embargo,
China’s dependence on Soviet assistance inevitably created heavy economic burdens on Moscow
and could slow down Soviet development, thus making the Moscow-Beijing alliance quite costly.
On the other hand, Sino-Soviet economic leverage placed the Kremlin in a politically favorable
position from which to dictate relations within the alliance and influence the CCP’s [Chinese Communist Party’s] domestic and foreign policies. This paradoxical situation turned out to be a major
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contributor to the collapse of the Soviet economic cooperation and the eventual deterioration of the
alliance between the two Communist powers.

Thus, in this view, the indirect and long-term effect of the U.S. strategic embargo was
to create tension in Beijing’s economic relations with Moscow sufficient to help lead by
55
1960 to the disintegration of the Sino-Soviet alliance. This political outcome largely
achieved one of Dulles’s prime strategic goals of pushing the USSR and the PRC together so as to tear them apart.
Conclusions
The second Taiwan Strait crisis ended the Nationalist blockade of the PRC. The
blockade had already lasted ten years and, in combination with the ongoing American
strategic embargo, had exerted extreme economic pressure on the PRC. Sino-Soviet
economic tension eventually forced a major realignment in the PRC’s foreign trade. In
the immediate aftermath of the Sino-Soviet split, Chinese trade with the USSR dropped
sharply, just as imports—especially much-needed grain from Canada and Australia to
offset the effects of the Great Famine—soared.
During the 1958 crisis the Taiwan Patrol Force “accomplished one of the most important missions of her career by playing a major role in aiding the Chinese Nationalists.” 56
But according to Dulles, the real dispute was not one of geography but of human will. If
the United States “seems afraid, and loses ‘face’ in any way, the consequences will be farreaching, extending from Viet Nam in the south, to Japan and Korea in the north.” 57 Periodic PLA attacks against Jinmen were intended to make it a whipping boy for Taiwan
58
itself. In Dulles’s view, the PRC leaders were pursuing mainly a political, not a military,
strategy and intended to play a cat-and-mouse game with the offshore islands. The PRC
announcement that shelling of Jinmen might switch from even-numbered days to oddnumbered days seemed to substantiate this assessment: “This rather fantastic statement
seems to confirm,” Dulles observed, “our analysis of the Chinese Communist attitude as
being essentially political and propaganda rather than military.” 59
Meanwhile, the U.S. government’s announcements remained intentionally vague about
its decision not to use military force to support the Nationalist bases on Jinmen or
Mazu. However, a secret 26 December 1959 operation order, while acknowledging that
the offshore islands were not covered under this agreement, stated that the United States
had committed itself to the defense of Taiwan, the Penghu Islands, and—most importantly—the offshore islands of Mazu and Jinmen, insofar as a threat to these islands was
60
considered to threaten Taiwan and the Penghus. The U.S. government decision to defend any offshore island the loss of which would pose a direct threat to Taiwan virtually
guaranteed that the Taiwan Patrol Force would continue for some time to come.
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CHAPTER NINE

The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis and the End of
the Taiwan Patrol Force
With the public acknowledgment of the Sino-Soviet split in 1960, the PRC’s main source
of advanced military equipment disappeared. There was a third, belated Taiwan Strait
crisis in 1962, which was settled diplomatically rather than by fighting. Over time,
however, the military rift with the USSR so negatively impacted the PLAN’s technical
capabilities as to undermine the PRC’s ability to invade Taiwan. The chaos surrounding
the 1966–76 Cultural Revolution exacerbated this situation, as resources available for
naval development became scarce.
This reduction in threat level produced significant changes to the Taiwan Patrol Force
during the 1960s, including assignment of fewer and smaller warships. However, USN
ships remained on patrol duty in the Taiwan Strait throughout the 1960s and until late
in the following decade. With the escalation of U.S. actions in Vietnam, the Taiwan
Patrol Force became closely linked with the interdiction program off North Vietnam.
Sino-U.S. tension also remained high throughout most of the 1960s because of the
Vietnam War.
The 1969 Sino-Soviet dispute represented a long-awaited opportunity to improve SinoU.S. relations. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger ordered the American ambassador in
Taiwan to tell Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo that modifications to the Taiwan Strait
Patrol would occur in November 1969. When Taiwan protested, Kissinger replied that
“the decision to change patrol from permanent to intermittent status is not subject to
1
change.” This naval de-escalation sent a potent message to Beijing, as did Washington’s
simultaneous decision to modify the American embargo on strategic goods. Accord2
ing to Kissinger’s memoir, these were messages that “Peking . . . understood.” However,
not even Richard M. Nixon’s historic 1972 visit to Beijing brought an end to the Taiwan
Patrol Force; it continued for another seven years, until the establishment of official
Sino-U.S. diplomatic relations in 1979.
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The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis
Tension in the Taiwan Strait remained high after 1958. During the 1960 American election, the offshore islands became a hotly debated issue. Richard Nixon accused John F.
Kennedy of lacking the resolve to protect the offshore islands with force. By the early
1960s there was a significant PLA buildup across from Jinmen Island; during the spring
of 1962 the PRC began to deploy additional troops to the Taiwan Strait region. This
sparked what is often referred to as the third Taiwan Strait crisis and prompted a rapid
U.S. diplomatic response.
The background to this third incident was the severe famine brought about by Mao’s
determination to pay back China’s debts. Estimates vary, but tens of millions of Chinese
died in the Great Famine between 1958 and 1961. Food shortages continued into 1962.
Beginning in May of that year over a hundred thousand refugees flooded across the border into Hong Kong. Taking advantage of this crisis, the Nationalist government agreed
to accept all refugees who wished to move to Taiwan. Two days later the U.S. govern3
ment agreed to accept several thousand Chinese refugees.
When the Kennedy administration came into office, it considered relaxing trade
controls with China in light of the unfolding Sino-Soviet split and the humanitarian
4
crisis caused by the famine, but it rejected the suggestion. In fact, as Admiral Smoot
later admitted, the Nationalists were doing all they could to exacerbate the crisis.
For instance, and with U.S. approval, teams were transported to the PRC to conduct
sabotage missions: “They’d take a midget submarine and 20 or 30 men ashore at night,
then they’d go over where the communists had a bunch of guns annoying the offshore
islands. The men would go and cut the throats of all the gun crews and then disappear.
The communists would wonder why the guns weren’t firing, and in their investigations
would find all the crews with their throats cut.” But these sabotage missions were meant
simply to harass the enemy; they were not part of a Nationalist attempt “to return to the
mainland in force.” 5
In reaction to the flood of refugees, and fearful that Taiwan might be contemplating
offensive operations against the mainland to take advantage of the general collapse of
the Great Leap Forward, the PLA moved additional divisions to the zone facing Jinmen
6
and Mazu. During the spring of 1962, Secretary of State Dean Rusk was able to confirm
that American intelligence services had determined that the PLA had moved six or eight
divisions to coastal areas opposite Taiwan. However, there was as yet no sign that junks
were assembling, so he concluded that the Chinese moves were probably precautionary
7
in nature.
On 23 June 1962, the American ambassador to Poland asked his Chinese counterpart
in Warsaw about this unexplained buildup. The Chinese diplomat claimed it was a
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response to the threatening posture of the Taiwan authorities. Averell Harriman, the
former American ambassador to the USSR, immediately warned the Soviet ambassador
to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin, of the extreme dangerousness of any attempt
by the Chinese Communists to attack the offshore islands. Harriman asserted that
Washington was giving Chiang Kai-shek no encouragement to pursue reckless policies against the PRC. Dobrynin questioned whether America would support Taiwan
in a conflict, especially considering that Kennedy had argued during his presidential
campaign that offshore islands need not be defended, only Taiwan itself; Harriman
cautioned this would be a most unwise conclusion to draw and that any move against
8
the islands by the Communists would run “terrible risks.”
On 27 June 1962, the twelfth anniversary of the founding of the Taiwan Patrol Force,
Kennedy warned—having apparently decided since his campaign that the security of
Taiwan depended on that of the islands—that if the PRC attacked the offshore islands,
his administration would stand by the 1955 Formosa Resolution to guarantee the
defense of Taiwan: “Any threat to the offshore islands . . . must be judged in relation
9
to its wider meaning for the safety of Formosa and the peace of the area.” Meanwhile,
Beijing was also reassured by American officials that Washington would not support
a Nationalist attack against the mainland. The American ambassador to Taiwan even
warned Chiang Kai-shek that the U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty did not say the
United States would support a Taiwanese counterattack against China, and it would be
“a mistake to create [an] impression in the minds of the people that [the] US has any
10
such obligations.”
Tension remained high, but there was no military conflict. Arguably, the crisis was resolved by the Kennedy administration with diplomacy, backed by the USN forces in the
region. By utilizing the ambiguity in the wording of the Mutual Defense Treaty, Washington succeeded in de-escalating the dispute. However, to help ensure that Taiwan
could adequately defend itself, during the early 1960s the United States also began to
provide the Nationalist military with more powerful missiles. Highly visible Nationalist
missile tests were intended to send a warning to the PRC not to attempt a cross-strait
invasion.
Nationalist Missile Tests over the Taiwan Strait
In 1962 the U.S. military transferred to Taiwan additional high-tech weaponry, including Nike and Hawk surface-to-air missiles. The Nike Hercules missile had a range of
11
about a hundred miles and was considered a highly effective air-defense weapon. By
contrast, the MIM-23 Hawk missile was a low-to-medium-altitude air-defense missile
12
with a range of about fifteen miles. Together, these two missile systems gave Taiwan
unchallenged air control over the strait.
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To send a highly public warning to the PRC not to attack, a series of missile tests were
announced by the Taiwanese government during the spring of 1965. In April the Nationalist military carried out tests under the technical guidance of American experts.
Taiwan announced that for a fifteen-day period in mid-April ships should stay clear of
13
the “danger area.” During this period Taiwan fired four missiles to the north (map 8).
Most international shipping companies ignored these missile tests, but Alfred Holt and
Co. of Liverpool complained to the British government that they violated freedom of
the seas. On 29 October the Ministry of Defence determined that while these tests were
a hindrance to shipping and therefore appeared to violate the principle of freedom of
the seas, a formal protest did not seem necessary. Instead, it recommended that further
questions be directed
MAP 8
to either the Chinese
Missile Testing Zones North of Taiwan
Nationalists or to the
Americans. It also asked
the Board of Trade to
inquire whether any
other British shipping
companies had been
14
adversely affected.
Working through the
British Chamber of
Shipping, which took a
poll of shipping companies impacted by the
missile tests, the Board
of Trade reported,
“Although we cannot
claim there has been
actual inconvenience
to our shipping so far
there is no doubt that if
the range is used more
extensively in the future
it will cause inconvenience.” Depending
on when the tests were
conducted, British ships
could experience delays
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of up to ten hours or be forced to “proceed by way of the east coast of Taiwan, incurring
extra distance and time.” The board recommended that Nationalist authorities be requested to change the direction of the tests so as to fire over a comparatively little-used
section of the China Sea and to circulate warnings of future tests well in advance, both
15
by Notices to Mariners and by radio broadcasts.
In the end, nothing seems to have been done; there are no copies of official protests in
the British archives. However, it is important that the British Foreign Office considered
these tests to be violations of freedom of the seas. The Foreign Office determined that
the Taiwan missile range as declared in 1965 appears “to violate a principle, and every
reasonable endeavour should be made to prevent such violations. Even if their immediate practical effects are not great they all add nails to the coffin of the freedom of the
16
high seas.”
China’s comparative naval weakness helped Taiwan during the 1960s, since it allowed
the Nationalist government to allocate fewer maritime resources to protecting Taiwan
from a naval invasion. Still, the PRC had a large force opposite Taiwan, and cross-strait
relations remained tense. Against the backdrop of fundamental differences over Taiwan’s international status, the U.S. strategic embargo continued throughout the 1960s.
Meanwhile, the Taiwan Patrol Force was called on to broaden its patrol duties to include
waters off Vietnam.
The U.S. Navy during the Vietnam War
By the mid-1960s, U.S. intervention in Southeast Asia had a major impact on the Taiwan
Patrol Force. Although the U.S. Navy began to assign substantial naval assets to waters
off Vietnam, the Taiwan Patrol Force continued to function, and it was to do so even at
the height of the Vietnam War. In November 1965, while patrolling the Taiwan Strait,
USS O’Brien arrived near Wuchiu Island just after an attack on two Nationalist patrol
boats by PLAN torpedo boats and gunboats. One Nationalist vessel, PCE 61, had been
sunk. O’Brien rescued survivors and transported them back to land. The PRC’s 14 No17
vember “serious warning” about the incident was number 395.
With the escalation of the Vietnam War, the Taiwan Patrol Force became more closely
linked with ongoing naval operations there. During 1965, Operation M arket Time
was undertaken to interdict the delivery of supplies and weapons to the Vietcong by infiltration trawlers. This operation was destined to impact the Taiwan Patrol Force, since
many of the same USN vessels were assigned to carry out both duties.
One of the Navy’s greatest concerns was not to antagonize the PRC. Its ships were
ordered, “Operations could not be conducted within thirty nautical miles of the Chinese

I:\__WIPfromC032812\_NewportPapers\_NP_38_TawianPatrol_Elleman\InDesign\11NP_38Chapter9.inddMarch15,20123:12PM

116   the

newport papers

border, for fear of provoking Chinese intervention in the war.” 18 Strict orders were given
to all USN vessels in these waters not to enter China’s territorial waters:
While Hissem was assigned to M arket Time, I would guess in February of 1968, U.S. Navy P3s had
been tracking a trawler in the South China Sea headed for Vietnam. The trawler, aware that he was
being tracked, reversed course to return home, and the American commanders wanted to discover
where his home was. Hissem was assigned to take an over-the-horizon radar turnover from a P3,
and follow the trawler home without his knowing he was being tracked. We followed him around
the southern side of Hainan island, up the eastern side of the island, and into the channel between
Hainan and the mainland. As we approached Chinese territorial waters three high-speed gunboats
came out to look us over. Since this was shortly after the Pueblo incident, things were a bit tense. We
were at General Quarters, but did not train our weapons to avoid looking threatening. Our orders
were to not enter Chinese territorial waters, but to track the trawler as long as we could. This we did
until the trawler disappeared from radar.19

According to Captain Barber, even after Hissem disengaged Chinese gunboats continued to follow the ship but finally broke off. During this incident the ship was
bombarded by an enormous volume of communications from everyone in the chain
of command, including the “national command authority.” The operations officer,
Meredith Musick, did a “superb job of managing this inundation, and bringing to my
attention only those things I really needed to see. Otherwise it would have made my primary job of being ready to fight much more difficult.” The ship was especially vulner20
able because there was no air cover.
Since the PRC was the real focus of both operations, the United States and Taiwan
worked closely during the Vietnam War. Because of the huge logistical needs of the U.S.
Navy, Taiwan became a major support base. In October 1962, a memorandum of understanding was signed allowing the U.S. Air Force to build bases on Taiwan. The largest
was outside of Taizhong, in central Taiwan, and was called Ching Chuan Kang (CCK).
Beginning in 1966, three squadrons of C-130 transport planes were deployed to CCK on
a permanent basis, and by 1972 the number of squadrons had grown to four. By the end
of the 1960s quite a few different air assets were operating out of Taiwan, including several squadrons of F-100 fighter aircraft, EC-121 electronic-warfare aircraft, and KC-135
21
tankers, intended for midair refueling.
During the late 1960s and early 1970s the Nationalists also acted as an unofficial military depot. In the final years of the Vietnam War, for example, about fifty F-5A aircraft
donated by Taiwan were flown to South Vietnam to help prop up the failing govern22
ment; Taiwan was later reimbursed with more modern F-5Es. As Admiral Beshany
later recalled, “I can tell you this, that every plane was there exactly on schedule. They
didn’t miss one flight of some fifty-odd aircraft that they transferred which was a big
part of their Air Force. It was all the modern aircraft that they had. That was a personal
sacrifice on their part, and it’s one we can’t kid ourselves about.” In November 1972,
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Secretary of State Kissinger sent a letter of thanks to the Nationalists for their “help and
assistance in getting those aircraft over to Vietnam.” 23
As part of the global Cold War to contain the spread of communism, Taiwan reportedly
became an important, albeit unofficial, U.S. nuclear base in the western Pacific. Recent
declassifications have confirmed that the U.S. military stored nuclear weapons at Tainan
24
Air Base, Taiwan. When called on to assist, the Nationalist government could also be
counted on to support other Asian countries fighting their own communist insurgencies. But beginning in 1969, this close U.S.-ROC defense relationship began to change
as a result of border clashes between the PRC and USSR. These events soon led to a
dramatic warming in Sino-U.S. diplomatic relations.
Opening Sino-U.S. Diplomatic Relations: The Taiwan Patrol Connection
By the late 1960s, Sino-Soviet tension had gone from bad to worse, including active
fighting along the lengthy common border. Facing the threat of nuclear war with the
USSR, in 1972 Mao invited Nixon to Beijing to open Sino-U.S. diplomatic relations.
Seven years later, on 1 January 1979, Jimmy Carter completed the gradual transition
in relations from Taiwan to the PRC by officially recognizing Beijing. Recognition also
marked the official termination of the Taiwan Patrol Force.
During the late 1960s, increased Sino-Soviet tension gave Washington a long-awaited
opportunity to combine forces with China to exert military and economic pressure on
the USSR. As early as 1956, the British embassy in China had speculated on the possible
effect of a Sino-Soviet dispute on Sino-U.S. relations. It concluded that any relaxation
of PRC ties with the Soviets was likely to lead to improved relations with the United
States, rather than with Britain. In support of this view, the paper cited the “traditional
American friendship for China as opposed to the traditional British imperialist role in
25
China.”
The Sino-Soviet monolith publicly split in 1960, but American leaders patiently waited
until matters reached crisis stage. After all, Washington’s policy was not simply to break
26
apart China and the USSR but to force China to follow international law. A historical account confirms that Washington’s measured response to the Taiwan Strait crises
played a role in this gradual PRC transition: “It is also likely that the restrained use of
US power during the various Taiwan Strait crises of 1955, 1958 and 1962, somewhat
moderated Chinese fear of US attack.” 27 On 4 August 1969, at the height of the SinoSoviet border conflict, the time finally seemed ripe. President Nixon made his intentions
to Beijing clear by calling Moscow the main aggressor in the dispute and suggesting that
the PRC’s defeat would not be in the best interests of the United States. This statement
indicated a dramatic shift from the former American policy of isolating China.
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Next, Kissinger sent the PRC a potent signal by ordering the suspension of the Seventh
Fleet’s regular patrols of the Taiwan Strait. The official USN explanation was that the
U.S. government had ordered a hundred-ship reduction in worldwide deployments due
28
to a three-billion-dollar reduction in defense expenditures. On 15 November 1969, a
U.S. Navy order changed the Taiwan Strait Patrol “from a continuous patrol composed
of DD types permanently assigned to Task Group 72.1 to a random patrol composed of
various combatant and auxiliary units.” 29
These highly public changes in U.S. policy greatly concerned Taiwan. In response to
Nationalist protests, CinCPac privately assured Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense
that an average of fifteen U.S. Navy ships per month would still transit the Taiwan
30
Strait. On 17 December 1969, Ambassador Walter P. McConaughy explained to Chiang
Kai-shek that most of the USN ships in the Far East would also be ordered to transit
the strait rather than travel along the east coast of Taiwan. This would mean a higher
number of transits than before, and therefore “a more thorough naval observation of
31
the Strait under the new procedure than when the two DE’s were on regular patrol.”
In addition, the primary duty of the patrol would remain the same: “Detect and report
Communist Chinese . . . shipping preparing for, or actually attempting an invasion of
32
Taiwan and/or the Penghu Islands.”
The true reason for changing the Taiwan Patrol Force was to send an unmistakable
signal to Beijing that Washington was willing to open talks. The State Department also
sent this message via unofficial discussions in Warsaw, and it wanted to make the same
“pitch” to a Chinese official in Hong Kong, just to “make sure that Peking gets the mes33
sage.” To ensure further that the PRC did not misunderstand what the United States
intended, “Kissinger told Beijing, via Pakistani President Yahya Khan, that the basic
U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s defense remained unchanged.” The termination of the
34
patrols was intended more as a “gesture intended to remove an irritant in relations.” In
fact, Kissinger’s offer to end the patrol was intended more to give Beijing leaders “face”
35
than to make any substantive change in the operations of the Taiwan Patrol Force.
This diplomatic ploy proved highly successful, and in 1971 Henry Kissinger made a
secret trip to Beijing in order to prepare for Nixon’s historic visit the next year to meet
Mao Zedong. As a further concession to Beijing, the U.S. embargo on strategic goods,
36
which had been adopted on 8 December 1950, was terminated on 10 June 1971. In
February Washington had publicly reiterated, however, that America’s commitment to
37
Taiwan’s defense remained unchanged. USN ships still visited Taiwanese ports, and
combined exercises between the U.S. Navy and Nationalist ships continued throughout
the 1970s. Intermittent patrols were still conducted by the Taiwan Patrol Force, but
the new “Commander U.S. Taiwan Patrol Force [was] largely a planning function,” an
entity whose job was to plan and provide “designated forces as the Naval Component
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Commander of the Taiwan Defense Command, in the event that wide ranging hostilities break out between the Communist and Nationalist Chinese.” 38
Nixon’s visit to China resulted in a rapid change in U.S. foreign policy toward Taiwan.
During Sino-U.S. meetings in 1972, the United States and China signed the Shanghai
Communiqué. In this agreement, Washington acknowledged that there was only one
China and that Taiwan was part of China. This led to the PRC’s obtaining Taiwan’s seat
at the United Nations. Nixon next visited Moscow, where he warned General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev that attacking China would adversely affect American interests.
Beginning in the mid-1970s, the U.S. and Chinese militaries began to work together
against the Soviet Union. Increased military and naval cooperation enabled China and
the United States to encircle the USSR on the east and west, forcing on the Soviet Union
higher rates of militarization than its woefully inefficient economy could support.
With Jimmy Carter and Deng Xiaoping’s mutual-recognition instrument of 1 January
1979, the U.S. 1955 Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan was unilaterally terminated.
39
This elicited an angry Nationalist statement on 2 January 1979. USS Midway was the
last U.S. Navy aircraft carrier to visit Taiwan, as part of a combined exercise known as
Bluesky on 18 November 1978, less than six weeks before the United States officially
40
recognized the PRC. Shark Hunt exercises between U.S. and Taiwanese warships
ended the same month. All future combined exercises involving the U.S. Navy and the
Nationalist navy were canceled, marking 1 January 1979 as the termination date of the
41
Taiwan Patrol Force.
Conclusions
42

The American embassy in Taipei closed its doors on 28 February 1979. Although it appeared that the United States had abandoned Taiwan, on 10 April 1979 Congress passed
the Taiwan Relations Act. This codified Taiwan’s unique position as part of “one China”
and yet existing outside of PRC sovereignty claims. A Sino-U.S. communiqué signed
on 17 August 1982 appeared to promise that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan would gradually
diminish, but no date was set for ending the sales. Secretly, the Ronald Reagan administration reassured Taiwan that it would continue to monitor PRC military deployments
and that if the PRC attacked Taiwan, “U.S. commitments [to Beijing] would become
invalidated.” 43
Meanwhile, U.S. recognition of the PRC in 1979 allowed for a two-front strategy, with
NATO on the USSR’s western flank and China on the eastern. During the late 1970s
China’s new leader, Deng Xiaoping, announced an open-door policy that promised
greater economic interaction with the West, largely on American terms. The PRC also
44
began to adopt its own version of Taiwan’s earlier, highly successful trade program.
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China’s shift to a more market-oriented economy ultimately validated the U.S. policy,
first proposed during the summer of 1949 and later supported by the creation of the
Taiwan Patrol Force, of using the U.S. Navy to exert military, economic, and political
pressure on that nation.
The combination of this new East–West strategic threat and China’s rapid economic
growth based on free-market reforms put enormous pressure on the Soviet Union to
reform as well. During the mid-to-late 1980s, Mikhail Gorbachev tried but failed to
adopt similarly successful westernizing measures in the USSR. Among its other successes, Sino-American military cooperation has been cited as one of the major factors in
45
forcing the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan during February 1989. This military
failure was correctly perceived by the USSR’s client states in Eastern Europe as a sign of
weakness. With the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the December 1991
collapse of the USSR, the Taiwan Patrol Force’s original strategic purpose appeared to
have disappeared for good. However, during the mid-1990s tension over the Taiwan
Strait once again mounted.
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CHAPTER TEN

The U.S. Navy’s Continuing Strategic Impact
in the Taiwan Strait
From 1979 through 1989 the United States and the PRC actively cooperated against the
1
USSR, with Washington authorizing sales of high-tech naval equipment to China. This
helped to limit tension in the Taiwan Strait. In fact, the need for the Taiwan Patrol Force
itself seemed to be long past. However, the U.S. government maintained a strong interest
2
in Taiwan’s defense and continued to sell it weapons. With the end of the Cold War in
1989, followed soon by the 1991 collapse of the USSR, the delicate balance of power in
the Taiwan Strait began to shift once again.
These events gave China an unforeseen opportunity to expand its influence in Asia. It
rapidly began to build up its naval forces, in part to fill the military vacuum left by the
Soviet Union’s retreat. With the help of the new Russian Federation—mainly sales of
advanced naval equipment, including Sovremennyy destroyers and Kilo submarines—
3
the PLAN began a long period of growth. The PRC also developed a large missile force,
deployed mainly against Taiwan. Arguably, it has been this rapid military growth that
has in recent years upset the PRC-Taiwan military balance.
The growth of the PLAN has, in turn, created a strategic shift that has produced in a
sense an unofficial reinstitution of the Taiwan Patrol Force. During 1995–96, as a result
of PRC missile testing off Taiwan, the U.S. Navy responded by sending aircraft carriers and destroyers into the region. This naval demonstration was similar to the USN’s
response to the Taiwan Strait crises of the 1950s and early 1960s. In fact, these events
4
represented the fourth Taiwan Strait crisis.
The Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis
The July 1995 missile tests by the PRC are often portrayed as a response to the granting of an American visa to Taiwan’s President Lee Teng-hui for an unofficial visit to
Cornell University in early June. However, the real issue was the PRC’s concern over
Taiwan’s rapid democratization and the growing separatist claims by large numbers of
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Taiwanese. On 18 July 1995, China announced that ballistic missile tests would take
place between 21 and 28 July. These dates corresponded to the fiftieth anniversary of the
1945 Potsdam Treaty, by which China was to regain all territories it had lost to Japan,
including Taiwan, after World War II.
In connection with the tests the PRC declared an exclusion zone, a ten-nautical-mile
circle, which ships and planes could not safely enter. This zone was about eighty-five
miles north of Taiwan, outside ROC sovereign waters but in a location that actively
interfered with flight paths and shipping lanes. Beijing’s announcement warned other
states “against entering the said sea area and air space” during the firing period. Six
DF-15 (CSS-6/M-9) short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) were fired, two each on 21,
22, and 23 July. Unlike similar tests by Taiwan itself during the mid-1960s, which were
5
generally ignored, this one diverted hundreds of commercial flights heading for Taipei.
The following month, from 15 to 25 August, the PRC held military exercises involving
about twenty warships and forty aircraft in a large area to the northwest of the SRBM
splash zone; both antiship and antiaircraft missiles were fired. In November 1995, just
prior to Taiwan’s December parliamentary elections, the PLA staged further naval,
amphibious, and air-assault operations, near Dongshan Island. The scenario included
blockade tactics, which made it appear that the PRC was planning to mount a naval
blockade against Taiwan.
The PRC’s use of a missile firing as an occasion to create an exclusion zone around
Taiwan was not new, in that it essentially copied Taiwan’s own Nike and Hawk tests in
April 1965. Those tests had elicited no public protest, but due to the higher number of
airplanes now overflying these waters, the PRC’s 1995 exclusion zone put intense pressure on Taipei. It has accordingly been referred to as representing a new form of “missile
6
blockade.”
In response, the U.S. Navy sent USS Nimitz (CVN 68) through the Taiwan Strait on
19 December 1995 on its way to the Indian Ocean. The stated reason for transiting the
strait rather than going east of Taiwan was poor weather, and the PRC did not seem to
know about, or at least did not acknowledge, the transit. But on 27 January 1996 the
United Daily News and New York Times reported it. This was the first time an American
aircraft carrier had transited the Taiwan Strait since the late 1970s. Whether intentionally or not, it sent a sharp signal to Beijing not to interfere in Taiwan’s domestic politics.
In many ways, the December 1995 transit by a U.S. aircraft carrier of the Taiwan Strait
paralleled the 29 June 1950 visit by Valley Forge, which had signaled the establishment
of the Taiwan Patrol Force. The Nimitz transit, even if serendipitously, sent a similar
hands-off message and in fact has been described as “a carefully controlled and minimally provocative use of military power which allowed the United States to reemphasize
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the ‘ambiguous’ policy of previous U.S. presidents designed to maintain a balance in
7
U.S. relations with both sides of the strait.”
In response to what it now perceived as an American show of force, Beijing warned the
U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense, Charles W. “Chas” Freeman, Jr., that the PRC would
launch a missile per day against Taiwan for a period of thirty days if Taipei continued
on its path toward formal independence. A Chinese official, in an almost exact repeat of Mao’s 5 February 1955 meeting with the Finnish ambassador in which he had
threatened the United States with Soviet nuclear retaliation, even warned Freeman that
Washington should not intervene in a cross-strait crisis, because American leaders “care
8
more about Los Angeles than they do about Taiwan.” China’s missile-a-day strategy and
implied nuclear threat against the United States were also reminiscent of similar PRC
pressure tactics during the 1950s in connection with Jinmen.
Sino-U.S. tension was now high. On 5 March 1996, the forty-third anniversary of the
death of Stalin—one of the three world leaders at Potsdam—Beijing announced that
it would conduct a new series of ballistic missile exercises during 8–15 March, which
corresponded with the run-up to Taiwan’s first presidential elections under universal
suffrage. This time there were two missile splash zones. One was a square just thirty
miles from Keelung, close to air and sea-lanes serving Japan and Korea. The other, also
square, lay about forty-seven miles west of Kaohsiung, close to air and sea-lanes to Hong
Kong (map 9).
The tests were clearly intended to cut trade routes from Keelung in the north and
Kaohsiung in the south. These two ports accounted for about 70 percent of Taiwan’s
commerce. Between 8 and 13 March four dummy missiles landed in the target areas.
On 9 March the PRC warned ships and aircraft to avoid a live-fire exercise from 12 to
20 March in the southern part of the Taiwan Strait. The rectangular zone declared for
these exercises was just south of Jinmen Island. A further exercise was announced on 15
March, to be carried out 18–25 March, continuing the military pressure until after the
presidential election. Although this new zone was smaller, it was strategically located
9
between Mazu and Wuchiu. The PRC tests were timed to influence Taiwan’s presidential election, scheduled for 23 March, in such a way that the pro-independence candidates would not win.
In response, the USN dispatched the USS Independence (CV 62) aircraft carrier battle
group to the area. Its aircraft patrolled about a hundred miles off Taiwan. The USS
Nimitz group was ordered to return to the strait from the Persian Gulf at high speed.
Other naval assets included two Aegis guided-missile cruisers and Air Force RC-135
10
Rivet Joint electronic surveillance aircraft.
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MAP 9

Location of PRC Missile Tests during 1995–1996

CinCPac, Adm. Joseph Prueher, decided to put Independence east of Taiwan and to assign the Aegis cruisers north and south of Taiwan: “Got them there fast. Got them there
quietly. But nobody knew that they were there, so we had to tell the media in Okinawa
and Japan. Media switch is not vernier switch but on/off switch. Pictures in the press
began to appear.” Apparently as a result of the presence of Independence and the recall
of Nimitz from the Persian Gulf, the Chinese fired only five missiles, three in the north
11
and two in the south, instead of the much larger number originally planned. As noted
by Adm. Lyle Bien, Commander, Carrier Group 7, “ordering Nimitz to sail all the way
from the Gulf at flank speed was an unmistakable signal to the PRC that we were serious and it was noted by all onboard Nimitz that the missile firings stopped only when
12
we approached on-station.”
The United States also sent official protests to the Chinese government, Secretary of
State Warren Christopher calling the PRC’s actions “reckless” and a White House
spokesman stating that Washington was “deeply disturbed by this provocative act.” 13
Congress resolved that in the face of overt threats by the PRC against the ROC and consistent with its commitment under the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States would
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continue to supply defensive weapons systems, including “naval vessels, aircraft, and air
defense, all of which are crucial to the security of Taiwan.” Congress further resolved
that the “United States is committed to the military stability of the Taiwan Straits and
United States military forces should defend Taiwan in the event of invasion, missile at14
tack, or blockade by the People’s Republic of China.” Not only did this closely parallel
congressional resolutions during the first Taiwan Strait crisis, of 1954–55, but its wording matched almost exactly the stated goals of the long-gone Taiwan Patrol Force.
The U.S. Navy’s intervention gave the PRC pause. Washington’s decision to send not one
but two aircraft carriers—plus the two Aegis cruisers and other naval assets, including
O’Brien (DD 975), namesake of the 1950s destroyer that helped in the evacuation of the
Dachen Islands and later rescued Nationalist sailors—to the Taiwan Strait constituted
the largest demonstration of American naval diplomacy against China since the first
15
two strait crises of the 1950s. The strategic rationale was much the same as in 1950: to
neutralize this region so as to not allow a cross-strait invasion. While not officially part
of a new Taiwan Patrol Force, therefore, Independence and Nimitz carried out a similar
function. Seen in this larger historical context, Washington’s decision to send in the U.S.
Navy was a direct continuation in spirit of that earlier operation. That spirit continues
to the present day.
The 1 April 2001 EP-3 Incident
U.S. Navy patrols in the Taiwan Strait have played a continuing and important role
since the turn of the twenty-first century. After remaining fairly quiet since the 1995–96
events, U.S.-Chinese relations became extremely tense following a collision on 1 April
2001 between Chinese and American planes and the resulting unauthorized landing of the damaged U.S. aircraft, an EP-3 surveillance aircraft, on Hainan Island. The
subsequent standoff over the return of the EP-3 crew led to discussion in Washington
about whether to send yet another aircraft carrier to China. While USN vessels were not
sent into the area, the suggestion shows that the same calculations that had led to the
creation of the Taiwan Patrol Force still existed in 2001.
To resolve the standoff, Joseph Prueher, now the U.S. ambassador to China, worked
closely with two Annapolis classmates, Richard Armitage, who was Secretary of State
Colin L. Powell’s deputy at the State Department, and Adm. Dennis C. Blair, CinCPac.
At one crucial stage Admiral Blair offered to send an aircraft carrier to the waters off
China. This would normally have been Prueher’s favored solution, as shown by his own
actions in 1995–96, but the ambassador declined this suggestion, fearing that too strong
16
a signal might backfire and lead to the prolongation of the incident.
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Rather than turning to the U.S. Navy, then, Prueher urged the administration to ease
17
tension and instead to negotiate a way out. Early in the talks the Chinese tried to get
the United States to say it had invaded China’s airspace, but Powell refused: “We’re not
going to take that charge to the President, and we’re not going to accept it.” Prueher,
however, having originally offered to express the “regret” of the United States for the unauthorized landing, shifted significantly to saying that his government was “sorry” for
18
it, then “very sorry.” This language made it seem to the Chinese public that the United
States was taking responsibility for the collision. After ten days of tense negotiation,
this ambiguous apology helped break the diplomatic impasse. After the “two sorrys”
letter was signed and delivered by Prueher, the EP-3’s twenty-four crew members were
released.
Resolving the EP-3 crisis peacefully was largely possible thanks to Prueher’s qualifications as an aircraft carrier pilot with actual combat experience in the region, as a test
pilot familiar with the capabilities of the airframes involved, and as a recent CinCPac
with experience dealing with China. As he later explained, the dispute was not about an
19
airplane but about “face,” and China needed a “signal that it is taken seriously.” Prueher
wanted to find a graceful way for Beijing to back down from its untenable position. His
solution was the “two sorrys” letter, which the Chinese could interpret as a “formal apol20
ogy” but the U.S. government could portray as “merely a polite expression of regret.”
Ultimately no aircraft carrier was sent into the region during 2001, but the fact that
it was seriously considered emphasizes the flexibility inherent in having USN forces
within easy reach of the Taiwan Strait. During the following eight years, Sino-U.S. naval
relations remained outwardly calm, and there were few publicly acknowledged maritime
disputes. This situation changed in March 2009, when two survey ships were accosted
while conducting operations in international waters near China.
The 2009 Impeccable and Victorious Incidents
For almost a decade after the EP-3 incident, Sino-U.S. military-to-military relations
seemed friendly. This situation suddenly changed during March 2009, however, when
PRC ships confronted the civilian-manned U.S. ocean surveillance vessel USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS 23) while it was conducting maritime research in international waters
21
in the South China Sea. Two months later, in May 2009, American defense officials
announced that Chinese vessels had surrounded a second surveillance ship, USNS
Victorious (T-AGOS 19), in the Yellow Sea. These two incidents prompted a strong USN
response.
On 8 March 2009, five PRC ships harassed Impeccable in international waters about
seventy-five miles south of Hainan Island. Two of the Chinese vessels came within
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fifty feet, and its sailors were observed “waving Chinese flags and telling the U.S. ship
to leave the area.” The State Department lodged a protest with Chinese officials, and
spokesman Robert Wood later told reporters, “We felt that our vessel was inappropriately harassed.” 22
The U.S. Navy’s reaction to these Chinese provocations was rapid. Within days a
guided-missile destroyer, USS Chung-Hoon (DDG 93), “armed with torpedoes and mis23
siles,” was sent to protect USNS Impeccable. The Chinese government condemned this
USN action as provocative. One Chinese scholar declared, “The ‘Impeccable Incident’
constitutes the most serious friction between China and the United States since the col24
lision of their military aircraft near Hainan Island in April 2001.”
At about the same time as the Impeccable incident, another surveillance ship, Victorious,
operating 120 miles off China’s coast in the Yellow Sea, was harassed several times on
4–5 March 2009 by Chinese patrol ships and aircraft. On 1 May American defense of25
ficials announced the confrontation. Pentagon officials claimed that two Chinese ships
had come within thirty yards of Victorious, which had been forced to use water hoses to
warn them off. Once again protesting, the U.S. government reiterated that it would not
26
“end its surveillance activities in the region.”
Both incidents took place in international waters. As part of the U.S. government’s longtime support for freedom of the seas, U.S. Navy officials emphasized that it should not
27
be necessary to send armed ships to protect USNS survey ships. The fact that the Impeccable incident took place in the South China Sea, south of Taiwan, and the Victorious
incident in the Yellow Sea far to the north gives an impression of testing the U.S. Navy’s
readiness and resolve at the geographic extremes of the Taiwan Strait. The USN’s rapid
responses to these PRC provocations were largely in line with operational procedures
first adopted by the Taiwan Patrol Force, beginning in late June 1950.
Conclusions
Although the Taiwan Patrol Force officially ended on 1 January 1979, the American reaction to the 1995–96 PRC missile tests proved remarkably similar to those to the earlier
Taiwan Strait crises. In 2009 there was even a “touch of irony” in assigning Chung-Hoon
to guard Impeccable, since that vessel was “named for a Chinese-American naval officer
awarded the Navy Cross, the nation’s second-highest combat decoration, for heroic ac28
tion against Japanese kamikaze pilots during World War II.” Assigning this particular
ship to patrol duty could not help but remind the PRC that the two countries had been
close allies in World War II against Japan. It also showed American resolve not to cede
freedom of the seas.
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Even today the lingering effects of the Taiwan Patrol Force can be felt. While fixed patrols have not been carried out in the strait since 1979, the USN’s presence in the region
remains strong. There is a compelling argument to be made, therefore, that the Taiwan
Patrol Force never really ended. In fact, the 1995–96 decision to send in aircraft carriers
was part and parcel of the same 1950s buffer operation mounted to ensure that PRCROC tension did not escalate into a larger war.
The 1995–96 “missile blockade,” the 2001 EP-3 incident, the U.S.-Chinese naval incident
during spring 2009 in the South China Sea, and the similar incident in the Yellow Sea all
occurred either in or at the ends of the Taiwan Strait. The similarity of the U.S. Navy’s
reactions to all of them highlights not only the continuing strategic value of this region
but also the importance of the U.S. Navy’s maritime presence to peace in the Taiwan
Strait. In this sense, all these recent USN deployments to international waters near
China have carried on the historical legacy of the Taiwan Patrol Force.
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Conclusion: The Taiwan Patrol Force as a Continuing Maritime Buffer Operation
The Taiwan Patrol Force was a maritime buffer operation, initially intended to keep two
belligerents from attacking each other and thereby precipitating a larger war, perhaps
even a global war. But the Taiwan Patrol Force’s regular and intermittent patrols in the
Taiwan Strait from 1950 to 1979 did much more than simply separate the two Chinas.
Acting as moving trip wires that if threatened could quickly call in massive reinforcements from the Seventh Fleet, these USN patrols could also themselves exert varying
degrees of military pressure on the PRC along the strategic strait. When necessary, tension could be ramped up along the strait to divert China’s attention from other theaters,
as happened during the summer of 1953, when Beijing was pressured to agree to an
armistice ending the Korean War. In helping attain this goal the Taiwan Patrol Force
contributed to an enormously important military objective.
The Taiwan Patrol Force produced valuable economic effects as well. The combination
of the ten-year Nationalist naval blockade and the twenty-one-year-long U.S. strategic
embargo limited the PRC’s foreign maritime trade, forcing Beijing to rely more heavi
ly on the USSR, as both a trade partner and a conduit—by way of the trans-Siberian
railway—to trade partners in Eastern Europe. Over time, China’s economic overreliance
on the USSR exacerbated underlying political disputes that eventually resulted in the
collapse of the Sino-Soviet monolith. The 1960 split met Washington’s expectations:
forcing the two communist countries to work together had produced increasingly bitter
tension that eventually ripped them apart. By 1960, therefore, the American goal of using an economic weapon to break up the Sino-Soviet alliance had been achieved, even as
Taiwan was well on its way to creating its own economic miracle. Both outcomes were to
a large degree aided by, and in some measure were direct results of, the presence of the
Taiwan Patrol Force.
Finally Washington’s political signal in 1969 changing the Taiwan Patrol Force from
a constant to an intermittent patrol helped bring about the decades-long diplomatic
realignment of the PRC leaders toward the United States. By June 1971, the strategic
embargo had ended, ushering in President Richard Nixon’s historic visit in 1972, the
gradual opening of diplomatic relations with the PRC, and finally President Jimmy
Carter’s recognition of the nation in 1979. Arguably, this political reorientation allowed
China and the United States to cooperate in exerting pressure on the USSR from both
east and west—representing what was historically the Russians’ worst fear, the prospect
of a two-front war. This policy deepened the Soviet Union’s domestic and international
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problems and contributed to the eventual collapse of its empire, the end of the Cold
War, and the demise of the USSR.
Military Impact of the Taiwan Patrol Force
The military impact of the Taiwan Patrol Force is obvious enough usually to escape
comment: neither the PRC nor the ROC ever mounted a major attack across the Taiwan
Strait. It was precisely the neutralization of the strait that was behind the creation of the
Taiwan Patrol Force in the first place. This objective remained important during most
of the patrol’s existence, since all attempts to urge a peace agreement on the PRC and
Taiwan failed. In April 1955, during the first Taiwan Strait crisis, the U.S. government
even proposed to Beijing that the Nationalists would evacuate all disputed offshore
islands if the PRC would promise not to liberate Taiwan by force. Zhou Enlai flatly rejected this proposal, instead insisting that Chiang Kai-shek and his military forces first
1
“leave the island” of Taiwan.
Given the PRC’s refusal to guarantee Taiwan’s security, an ongoing and robust U.S.
Navy presence in the Taiwan Strait was essential. The existence of the Taiwan Patrol
Force not only undermined any PRC plans to invade Taiwan during the early 1950s
but allowed Washington to exert military pressure—by means of threats of unleashing
Chiang—to force the PLA to move units from the north to the south. In this regard, the
Taiwan Patrol Force acted much like a vernier switch, allowing the USN to increase or
decrease cross-strait tension in measured amounts that suited the U.S. government’s
larger policy objectives.
In March 1956 the British intelligence services gave the Taiwan Patrol Force credit for
keeping the peace throughout the region. Their report concluded that although the
Communists were capable of launching a full-scale attack on the offshore islands, it
was “highly improbable that they will conduct military operations of this magnitude
as long as the Seventh Fleet remains in the area.” Instead of trying to stage an invasion,
therefore, the PRC was obliged to assume (incorrectly) that time was on its side, that “it
would be pointless to fight for areas which they hope to acquire in due course through
subversion and propaganda.” 2
An equally important military goal of the Taiwan Patrol Force was to reassure America’s
East Asian allies, including Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia, that the
PRC could not invade the First Island Chain (which, in PRC geostrategic theory, stretches from the Aleutian Islands through the Kurile Islands, the main islands of Japan, the
Ryukyu Archipelago, Taiwan, and the Philippines to the Greater Sunda Islands). The
Japanese especially were worried about Chinese expansionism. During 1955, a Japanese
official in Taipei explained that it was the physical location of Taiwan, dominating the
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sea-lanes from Japan to the south, that mattered most to Tokyo: “For the future the
real problem of Taiwan was the strategic value of the island itself and the importance
of keeping it from the Chinese Communists rather than the Chiang Kai-shek govern3
ment.” During 1958, discussing his upcoming talks with Chiang, John Foster Dulles
emphasized that the Japanese were watching to see whether the United States would
give way to China on the issue of the disputed offshore islands. Dulles even expressed
concern that if the Japanese should decide the United States was weaker than the PRC,
“they would go over to the Chinese Communists just as quickly as they could.” 4
The Taiwan Patrol Force supported America’s Asian alliances and coalition partners
by making it more difficult for the PRC to invade Taiwan. One method to dissuade the
PRC from attacking was to provide the Nationalists a dependable source of military
equipment and training with which to defend themselves, but not sufficiently advanced
equipment to allow them to attack the PRC of their own volition. According to an
American intelligence advisory committee report from April 1957, in the near term
the “Nationalists are very unlikely to launch an invasion or, in the absence of Chinese
5
Communist provocation, to initiate other major military action.” On 25 June 1962 Rusk
reminded the British foreign secretary, Lord Home, that Chiang Kai-shek would not
have American support if he attempted to attack the mainland; the two agreed that the
British chargé d’affaires would tell PRC leaders that the “United States had done and
6
were doing everything possible to restrain the Nationalists from provocative action.”
Meanwhile, the Taiwan Patrol Force also contributed to high morale in Taiwan. In
February 1955 a report from the British consulate in Tamsui, Taiwan, concluded that
the morale of the Nationalist troops was excellent and that the PRC had no chance of
7
winning Taiwan by “subversion alone.” For the overseas Chinese community, a strong
Taiwan served as a viable alternative to the PRC. In October 1956, a U.S. intelligence
advisory committee correctly predicted that “morale on Taiwan probably will not
weaken critically so long as the people there remain confident of firm U.S. support for
the defense of Taiwan.” 8
The Taiwan Patrol Force was truly a maritime buffer between the PRC and Taiwan,
and it succeeded in neutralizing both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Constant patrols were
replaced with intermittent ones in 1969, but USN vessels continued to transit the Taiwan
Strait on a regular basis through the mid-to-late 1970s. Following Nixon’s 1972 visit to
China, however, it became clear to many American naval officers that the patrol would
eventually be terminated. In preparation for this day, advisers redoubled their efforts to
assist the Nationalist navy. Admiral Beshany would later observe, “I believe that there
was a very deep feeling there—and there’s no question about the Chinese Military and
the American counterparts on the island—that [there] was a very strong bond and
a desire to work together. I think all of us, and I don’t know of any of my officers who
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didn’t have a strong and motivated feeling to help these people to be able to defend
9
themselves.”
That no war broke out between the PRC and Taiwan was directly due to the certainty of
military intervention by the Seventh Fleet. Maintenance of the military balance between
the PRC and Taiwan has kept the peace for the past sixty years, during which time
economic development became the most important measure of success of the PRC and
Taiwan. From the earliest days of the Taiwan Patrol Force, its goals included exerting
economic pressure on the PRC.
Taiwan Patrol Force’s Economic Impact
The Korean War may have been the initial catalyst for the Taiwan Patrol Force, but the
U.S. policy of isolating the PRC economically had arguably already started during the
summer of 1949, increasing in January 1950 with the adoption of an embargo on strategic goods. Beijing’s decision to intervene in the Korean War resulted in China’s further
economic isolation, as the U.S. government adopted a full strategic embargo. Faced with
the Nationalist naval blockade, on the one hand, and a U.S.-led embargo on the other,
the PRC had to make up its trade losses by turning to the Soviet Union. Before World
War II, only 1 percent of China’s foreign trade was with the USSR; by 1957 this figure
10
had skyrocketed to over 50 percent.
Following the June 1950 creation of the Taiwan Patrol Force, the PRC immediately
condemned the U.S. neutralization policy as aggressive and demanded the Seventh
Fleet’s withdrawal from the strait. Beijing claimed that American policy favored Taipei.
But according to British statistics covering the first nine months of 1950, the value of
PRC imports from Hong Kong was three and a half times that of imports during all of
1949. Therefore, prior to China’s decision to intervene in Korea during November 1950
the U.S. neutralization plan actually helped promote international trade with China, by
stabilizing cross-strait relations. As reported by British officials, Anglo-Chinese trade
boomed during most of 1950; there was active trade between Hong Kong and the major
PRC coastal ports, at first running the Nationalist blockade but more freely after “Presi11
dent Truman’s declaration neutralizing Formosa” (see chapter 2).
After the PLA’s intervention in the Korean War, the JCS considered a total naval blockade against the PRC. However, Hong Kong’s strategic vulnerability had to be considered,
so instead the U.S. government tightened the embargo on strategic goods. The Nationalist blockade secretly helped enforce the American embargo. Washington’s long-range
goal was to deny the PRC a wider range of trade partners. Over time, it was hoped, this
would add friction to the already tense Sino-Soviet relationship.

I:\__WIP from C 032812\_Newport Papers\_NP_38_Tawian Patrol_Elleman\InDesign\13 NP_38 Conclusion.indd March 15, 2012 2:34 PM

high seas buffer   137

By the mid-1950s, the PRC was forced to turn increasingly to the Soviet-bloc countries.
It signed over a hundred trade treaties and agreements with the USSR and Eastern
European countries, as compared to twenty or thirty with the rest of the world. The
Nationalist blockade and the U.S. strategic embargo had their intended collective
impact. On 18 July 1953 the U.S. consulate general in Hong Kong reported that Chinese
officials were admitting that the embargo had slowed down their industrial program,
causing the sudden loss of an estimated 75 percent of China’s foreign trade. As a result,
China was “forced to turn to the USSR as a source of supply and as their prime market,
which resulted in highly adverse terms of trade and required an increase in the over-all
12
volume of trade in order to maintain the desired pace of industrialization.” Due to
these economic factors, by the late 1950s China’s debts to the USSR had grown to almost
two billion dollars, roughly equal to the U.S. government’s economic grants to Taiwan
between 1950 and 1969.
While they represented an extremely long-term policy, one that was to take well over
two decades to complete and therefore brought no immediate benefit to Washington,
the Nationalist blockade and American strategic embargo were highly effective in aggravating the Sino-Soviet rift. One Dutch official confirmed in 1957 that there had been
a profound deterioration in the PRC’s economic situation and in living conditions since
he had arrived in China eighteen months before. This sharp decline could not help but
create tension between China and its Soviet advisers; “The Russians [the Dutch official]
met while traveling in China were very frank about their contempt for the Chinese, their
dislike of their assignments in China and their eagerness to return to the USSR as soon
13
as possible.”
By the late 1950s, relations between the PRC and the Soviet Union had worsened dramatically. In order to begin to pay off China’s enormous debt to the USSR, Mao Zedong
adopted economic policies that, like the Great Leap Forward, produced a nationwide
14
famine. Some historians have argued that the resulting Sino-Soviet rift took Washing15
ton by surprise, that it did not adopt policies to widen it. But others have confirmed
that Dulles actively sought to split the Chinese and Russians by driving them closer
16
together. Washington had to be careful this plan did not backfire; Eisenhower, for
instance, refused even to talk about Sino-Soviet tension, to avoid saying something that
17
might undermine trends that Washington desired. In fact, the collapse of the SinoSoviet monolith in 1960 was fully in line with Washington’s strategic objectives.
Meanwhile, with American assistance, Taiwan took a completely different development path. British officials reported in 1955 that Taiwan was prospering, due to U.S.
aid, and that its standard of living was higher than that of most other Asian countries.
While political rights in Taiwan were negligible, the British consulate found no largescale corruption, so the average person on Taiwan could “enjoy considerable freedom
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otherwise.”18 Eschewing a simple military approach to unification, Chiang Kai-shek prophetically told an Australian newspaper that Taiwan would focus on economic develop19
ment: “We shall continue to build up Taiwan as an example of what free men can do.”
American support was absolutely crucial to what is often referred to as the Taiwan
economic miracle. In fact, it has been largely overlooked that Taiwan’s GNP grew 72.7
percent between 1953 and 1961, an average increase of 7.1 percent per year, with a high
of 8.4 percent growth in 1954. Even more importantly, Taiwan’s industrial growth rates
between 1953 and 1978 averaged 15.9 percent annually, 25.4 percent in 1978 alone.
Without a doubt, Taiwan’s enormous growth rates were made possible by the security
provided by the U.S. Navy, backed up by a large infusion of American economic aid and
20
scientific expertise. In large measure, the PRC’s huge growth rates since the adoption
of an open door in the 1980s have merely replicated Taiwan’s experience of 1950–78.
In the final analysis, Beijing’s overwhelming reliance on Moscow restricted China’s
economic options, thereby exacerbating friction within the international communist
movement. The end result was a shift away from the Soviet bloc and closer to the West.
Following the 1960 split, the PRC’s army and naval forces became focused on not just a
domestic foe—Taiwan—but a foreign one as well, China’s former ally the Soviet Union.
During the middle and late 1960s, border conflicts helped prompt the PRC government’s political decision to begin to open diplomatic relations with the United States.
The Taiwan Patrol Force’s Political Impact
The U.S. Navy’s defense of the offshore islands, beginning with the formation of the
Taiwan Patrol Force in 1950, denied the PRC the opportunity to invade Taiwan and
21
politically unify all of China. By ensuring that no invasion could succeed while intensifying the PRC’s increasingly tense relationship with the USSR, the Taiwan Patrol Force
contributed to a seminal political shift in the PRC’s foreign diplomacy. Within little
more than a decade after the Sino-Soviet split, the PRC moved from a Soviet alliance
to diplomatic relations with the United States. Nixon’s visit to Beijing in 1972 led to full
U.S. recognition of the PRC under President Carter in 1979, an essential component of a
two-front strategy against the USSR.
The Taiwan Patrol Force was a necessary compromise in the context of the U.S. Cold
War alliance with the United Kingdom. On the surface, American and British economic
policies toward the PRC differed dramatically. But they sought the same goal, that
of bringing the PRC into the Western camp. The British thought that it was better to
leave the door open to China than to cut it off from international trade. This difference
caused friction in Anglo-U.S. relations. In 1962 Rusk told Harold Macmillan that “it
was not comfortable for the United States when the United Kingdom traded with China
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and the United States provided the gendarmes to keep the Chinese in their place.”22 In
private, however, Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd reassured Dulles, “Your troubles are
our troubles”; he even asked Dulles, “Is there any way in which we can help?” 23
Over time, this carrot-and-stick approach contributed to Beijing’s political decision to
move closer to the West. During late 1959, the U.S. State Department felt compelled to
remind the Defense Department of the Taiwan Patrol Force’s political role. After the
Seventh Fleet authorized on 14 September 1959 a shift in the patrol pattern without first
consulting State, the latter issued a critical memorandum. Emphasizing that the free
world expected the United States to adhere strictly to a “posture of restraint vis-à-vis
the Chinese Communists” and “eschew unnecessary actions that could lead to, or give
a plausible pretext for, Communist counteraction,” this memorandum concluded, “It
is therefore requested that in the future, the Department of Defense inform the Department of State of any contemplated change in the Taiwan Strait patrol pattern in
an inshore direction sufficiently in advance that its political implications may be fully
24
assessed and given due weight in the final decision.”
Clearly, the Taiwan Patrol Force was seen by the State Department as a political tool,
a means to influence the PRC’s behavior. Sino-U.S. relations remained particularly
unfriendly throughout the 1960s, due to the Vietnam War. However, in March 1969
a series of border incidents along the Ussuri and Amur Rivers pitted the PLA against
25
26
the Soviet army. There was real concern that they might escalate into a nuclear war.
Although neither side was victorious, the 1969 clashes gave the PLA confidence that it
could counter the Soviet army. For China’s leaders this set the political stage for a new
foreign-policy initiative aimed at opening diplomatic relations with the United States.
The Nixon administration’s 1969 decision to change the Taiwan Patrol Force from a
permanent to an intermittent basis sent a potent signal to Beijing. Although Taiwan was
told that this change was due to economic necessity, it was in fact a political decision.
This first, small step in opening relations with the PRC eventually led to Nixon’s historic
21–28 February 1972 trip to Beijing. Following this much-publicized visit, Mao Zedong
endorsed a major military modernization program that involved developing an oceangoing navy. Naval modernization, which had started in the 1950s with Soviet assistance,
had ground to a halt in the early 1960s; without foreign help, China’s production of
naval vessels had slowed almost to a standstill. Beginning in the early 1980s the PLAN
27
began to grow again, largely with American assistance. However, the PRC’s military
forces were now almost entirely focused not on Taiwan but on the USSR and its allies,
including the recently reunified Vietnam, a firm supporter of the Soviet Union.
On 1 January 1979, Jimmy Carter and Deng Xiaoping brought this lengthy political
process to its ultimate conclusion when they extended mutual recognition. As a result of
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this Sino-American rapprochement, the USSR suddenly had to be concerned about war
with not only American-led NATO forces in the west but Chinese forces in the east as
well. Throughout the 1980s, the United States and China cooperated in efforts to undermine the Soviet Union. By 1989 these policies had helped precipitate the collapse of the
Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, followed two years later in 1991 by the breakup
of the Soviet Union.
China’s gradual reorientation from membership in the Soviet bloc to cooperation with
the United States against the USSR was just one result of the constant political pressure
put on Beijing by the containment policy of the United States and its allies. The USN’s
impact on these epochal political events was largely outside the public view. To a large
degree, however, the Taiwan Patrol Force was the tip of the spear, as best shown by its
1969 role in signaling to Beijing Washington’s desire to open talks. Thus, a relatively obscure naval operation helped to produce enormous consequences far out of proportion
to the scope of its daily activities. Using similar methods, the U.S. Navy has continued
to shape the military, economic, and political environment in East Asia.
Concluding Thoughts
As this study has sought to show, while the Taiwan Patrol Force’s buffer operation
formally ended in 1979, the task that it was ordered to accomplish—the neutralization of
the Taiwan Strait—arguably continues to this day. The U.S. Navy does not now operate
ships on a daily basis in the strait, but during 1995–96 a number of USN warships, in28
cluding the aircraft carriers Nimitz and Independence, conducted patrols near Taiwan.
It is widely believed that American intervention may have “closed out the option” of
29
PLA escalation.
The U.S. Navy also signaled Washington’s opposition to PRC missile tests. The Chinese
certainly interpreted the decision to send Independence once again as a political signal
that the Americans supported Taiwan’s independence from China. According to Admiral Prueher’s later recollection, Independence just happened to be nearby and available—it just “happened to be that ship. I tell the Chinese [that they] give us better credit
30
for planning” than we deserve. “It was just there in the Philippines.” The Nimitz carrier
group, for its part, did not reappear in the vicinity of Taiwan until the Chinese missile
31
tests were almost over, on 21 March 1996. The U.S. government reportedly delayed
32
Nimitz’s arrival when the PLA began to ratchet down the demonstration.
As in the Taiwan Strait crises during the 1950s, the decision in 1995–96 to send in
aircraft carriers clearly had a profound effect on Chinese strategic thinking. According to Vice Admiral Bien, who was embarked in Nimitz during the events of 1996, the
Chinese were “very embarrassed by their inability to respond to our presence and so
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much of their antiaccess capability developed since 1996 is precisely in response to this
33
event.” Rear Adm. James P. Wisecup, in 1996 the commanding officer of the guidedmissile destroyer USS Callaghan (DDG 994) and later President of the Naval War College, imagines the meeting that might have occurred in Beijing after the incident, with
China’s leaders demanding of the PLAN’s commanders, “I want to know what you are
34
doing to make sure that never happens again.”
The PRC’s failure to halt American intervention in the Taiwan Strait in 1995–96 has
almost certainly contributed to the PLAN’s subsequent program of buying and building
a formidable arsenal of area-denial capabilities. These include ballistic missiles, conventional submarines, modern combat aircraft, and guided-missile destroyers equipped
with supersonic antiship missiles. These high-tech sea-denial weapons have increased
the risk to USN forces, and the U.S. Navy has arguably been used more selectively since
the mid-1990s. It was not incidental that no aircraft carrier was called in during the
2001 EP-3 standoff: there were legitimate fears that doing so might backfire. Prueher,
after achieving a successful diplomatic outcome, concluded that negotiating with the
PRC is really a job of “building ladders for Chinese to climb down”; he was careful not
35
to make China “lose face.” Later, during March 2009, the U.S. Navy responded more
forcefully to the Impeccable incident, deploying Chung-Hoon. This sent a potent political
signal to China, since to fire on a U.S. warship named after a famous Chinese American
could easily reverberate among overseas Chinese groups still wary of the PRC.
The Taiwan Patrol Force, then, has enjoyed an existence—if sporadic, and if in spirit
rather than in name—ever since the mid-1990s. So long as the PRC’s goals include re36
unification with Taiwan by force, the underlying conditions for the patrol remain. It is
mainly the presence of the U.S. Navy that reminds Beijing of Washington’s commitment
37
to defend Taiwan. Considering the large number of times USN vessels have been sent
either to the Taiwan Strait or to adjacent East Asian waters since the mid-1990s, it could
be argued that the Taiwan Patrol Force never ended. In fact, the U.S. Navy remains the
primary tool for American military, economic, and political policies aimed at the goals
of retaining manageable military relations with the PRC government while promoting
China’s economic integration with the rest of the world and its gradual transition to
Western-style democracy. These goals are as important to American national security
today as they were when the Taiwan Patrol Force was created in June 1950.
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Appendix A: U.S. Taiwan Defense Command Commanders
Vice Adm. A. M. Pride, 11 December 1953–December 1955
Vice Adm. Stuart H. Ingersoll, December 1955–July 1957
Vice Adm. Austin K. Doyle, July 1957–July 1958
Vice Adm. Roland N. Smoot, July 1958–May 1962
Vice Adm. Charles L. Melson, May 1962–July 1964
Vice Adm. William E. Gentner, Jr., July 1964–July 1967
Vice Adm. John L. Chew, July 1967–August 1970
Vice Adm. Walter H. Baumberger, August 1970–September 1972
Vice Adm. Philip A. Beshany, September 1972–August 1974
Vice Adm. Edwin K. Snyder, August 1974–August 1977
Rear Adm. James B. Linder, August 1977–April 1979
Source: US Taiwan Defense Command (blog), 8 November 2010, ustdc.blogspot.com/.
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Appendix B: Commanders of the Taiwan Patrol Force, 1950–1979
Rear Adm. Thomas Binford, 4 August 1950–March 1953
Rear Adm. Thomas B. Williamson, March 1953–July 1953
Rear Adm. Truman J. Hedding, July 1953–July 1954
Rear Adm. Frederick N. Kivette, July 1954–August 1955
Rear Adm. George W. Anderson, August 1955–July 1956
Rear Adm. Robert E. Dixon, July 1956–April 1957
Rear Adm. Paul D. Stroop, April 1957–February 1958
Rear Adm. Paul P. Blackburn, Jr., February 1958–July 1959
Rear Adm. John W. Gannon, July 1959–February 1961
Rear Adm. Bernard M. Strean, February 1961–December 1962
Rear Adm. Robert A. Macpherson, December 1962–September 1964
Rear Adm. Roy M. Isaman, September 1964–December 1966
Rear Adm. Damon W. Cooper, December 1966–August 1968
Rear Adm. William T. Rapp, August 1968–July 1970
Rear Adm. Richard E. Fowler, Jr., July 1970–July 1973
Rear Adm. Wycliffe D. Toole, Jr., July 1973–June 1975
Rear Adm. Gordon J. Schuller, June 1975–July 1977
Capt. Gerald W. Mackay, July 1977–1 January 1979
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